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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review by this cross-appeal:
1. Did the trial court err in concluding on remand that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by
Doms* delay in seeking rescission?
2. Did the trial court err by refusing to award attorney's fees and appropriate costs
to Doms?
3. Did the trial court err in its award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs?
Standards of Appellate Review: The first issue presents a question of law which
should be reviewed for legal correctness without deference to the trial court's rulings. City
of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697 (Utah 1990).
Issues 2 and 3, regarding awards of attorney's fees and costs, present initial questions
of law as to which parties are entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The overall standard of
review in regard to any awards of attorney's fees and costs is an abuse of discretion
standard. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules determinative of or
pertinent to the issues presented for review is contained in the body of this brief or in the
addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the second time this case has been before the Utah Court of Appeals. On
November 4, 1994, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision resolving many of the prior
issues on appeal. Anderson v. Poms, No. 920653CA, (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994)
(Memorandum Decision) (a copy of this opinion is attached as Addendum 1). In this short
and succinct opinion, the Court concluded that the trial court had correctly permitted Doms
to proceed with his counterclaim for rescission, but had erred in its application of the
doctrine of laches in determining that rescission was inappropriate. That is, the trial court
had enteredfindingsof fact regarding thefirstprong of laches—delay in bringing an action—
but had failed to make anyfindingsregarding the second prong-prejudice.
Accordingly, this Court remanded this matter to the trial court on very narrow and
specific grounds: to "enter[]findingsof fact relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced
by any delays in Doms pursuing his counterclaim." IcL at 2-3. This Court concluded, "If the
trial court cannot find from the evidence presented that appellants were prejudiced by the
delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the remedy of rescission." Id. at 3
(emphasis added).
On remand, the trial court expressed vehement disapproval of this Court's decision,
and stated at several junctures that it had no intention of permitting rescission in this case.
(A copy of the transcript of the October 27, 1995, hearing is attached as Addendum 4).
Not surprisingly, the court then adopted very conclusoiyfindingsof fact and conclusions of
law determining that there were other legal grounds precluding rescission and that prejudice
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existed. (The trial court's two sets of Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law are attached as Addendum 2 and Addendum 3).
The foregoing is the most pertinent procedural history regarding this case. In order
to provide a context within which to understand both this Court's decision and the trial
court's conduct on remand, a more detailed statement of the case follows.
In March of 1982, Defendant/Appellee and Cross-Appellant Eugene E. Doms
("Dams") and Michael R. McCoy ("McCoy") purchased the subject property of this appeal
("Rossi Hills") from Plaintiffe for $276,750.00 (F. of F. 17; Ex. 69D).1 A copy of the
warranty deed is attached as Addendum 7. Rossi Hills is located in the Park City Survey,
Summit County, State of Utah (F. of F. 1; Ex. IP).
Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills as part of a residential development to be
built in conjunction with two other adjacent parcels (F. of F. 26, 35). Doms and McCoy
eventually became adversaries in 1983, and McCoy had nothing further to do with the
development of Rossi Hills or this lawsuit (R. 7185-91, 7517-20; Ex. 78D). From a
subsequent land survey and diligent legal investigation, Doms learned in December of 1984
that a road (the "loop road") and other physical encroachments were located on the property
and constituted prescriptive easements and encumbrances (R. 7498-7500, 7611, 7625).

1

Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this brief to Findings of Fact (F. of F.)>
Conclusions of Law (C. of L.), and Judgment (Judg.) are to the trial court's final Second
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99; Add. 5) and Second
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07; Add. 6). All references to exhibits are to trial exhibits
admitted into evidence at trial on April 17-19,1990, and August 21-24,1990. All references
to attorney's fees exhibits are to exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing held on
attorney's fees on December 31, 1991.
3

In January of 1985, Doms informed Plaintiffe he was entitled to rescission of the
transaction and the return of all money received by Plaintiffe (R. 7504-07). Doms even
offered to deed Rossi Hills back to Plaintiffe in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed
note, thus allowing Plaintiffe to keep aD money already received under the contract (F. of
F. 44; R. 7507-08).
Plaintiffe responded by filing their Complaint to foreclose on June 6, 1985 (F. of F.
45; R. 1-9). Plaintiffe eventually obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy in
January of 1988 (R. 34-40). The default judgment against Doms was subsequently set aside
(R. 76-78,126-27), but not as against McCoy. Doms filed an Answer and Counterclaim, an
Amended Counterclaim, and eventually a Second Amended Counterclaim (R. 41-44,102-05,
237-42).
Following three days of trial on April 17-19, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying rescission based upon the doctrine of laches (R. 4188-95). Following
four days of trial on August 21-24, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision
ruling that Doms suffered $83,000.00 in damages as a result of the encumbrances on the
property (R. 4348-54). Subsequently, a hearing was held on December 31, 1991, in regard
to awards of attorney's fees and costs (R. 6360-6540).
Following extensive objections, motions and argument by the parties over the
appropriatefindingsof fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the trial court entered its final
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99) and Second
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07) on June 23,1992. After this matter was remanded to the
trial court for additionalfindingson November 4,1996, the trial court entered Supplemental
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 4,1996, and on September 8,1997. (Add.
1 and Add. 2).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March of 1982, Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills for $276,750.00 (F. of F.
17; Ex. 69D). D.C. Anderson (who subsequently died in September of 1983) and his wife,
Ellen Anderson; and Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott; all executed the warranty deed
as grantors and transferred Rossi Hills to Doms and McCoy as tenants in common (F. of
F. 1, 4; Ex. IP; Add. 7). This deed of conveyance was a warranty deed under Utah law and
conveyed with it all of the statutory warranties and covenants pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12
(F. of F. 1-6; C. of L. 1).
Pursuant to an earnest money agreement dated November 12, 1981 (Ex. 63D; Add.
8), D.C. Anderson and Dan Scott received $10,000.00 as earnest money and another
$72,500.00 as the down payment, leaving a balance due of $194,250.00 after closing of the
sale (F. of F. 18; Exs. 4P, 69D). Doms and McCoy executed a trust deed and trust deed
note in the amount of $194,250.00, which called for monthly interest payments of $2,266.25
up to and including January 10,1985 (F. of F. 19, 20; Exs. 2P, 3P; Add. 9,10). All of these
monthly interest payments were received by Plaintiffs, in the total amount of $72,520.25 (F.
of F. 22; Ex. 6P; Add. 11). The entire unpaid balance of $194,250.00, together with interest,
was due on January 25, 1985 (F. of F. 19; Ex. 3P).
Rossi Hills was purchased by Doms and McCoy as part of a residential development
to be built in conjunction with two other adjacent parcels known as the "Slipper Parcel" and
"Block 62" (F. of F. 26, 35). Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the Slipper Parcel
5

in October of 1982 to further the integrated residential development potential of the three
parcels, and strengthen their position with the developers of Block 62 and the other interestholders of the Slipper Parcel (F. of F. 36, 37). Prior to Doms' purchase of Rossi Hills and
the interest in the Slipper Parcel, Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the
development of the three parcels prepared by an architect by the name of Richard Kohler
(F. of F. 39; Ex. 68D). Doms relied upon this architectural plan for the residential
development of the three parcels (R. 7430). Prior to purchasing Rossi Hills in March of
1982, Doms met with D.C. Anderson and Anderson's real estate agent, Michael Sloan, in
the fall of 1981 (F. of F. 33, 34). Both Sloan and Anderson represented to Doms that Rossi
Hills was a "prime piece" of development property and its "highest and best use" would be
as part of the integrated residential development with Block 62 and the Slipper Parcel (F.
of F. 35).
In October of 1982, Doms retained attorney Gerald H. Kinghorn for the purpose of
closing a deal with regard to Doms' purchase of an interest in the Slipper Parcel, and
continuing negotiations with the owners of Block 62 for purposes of creating the threeparcel development based upon representations of Sloan and the architect, Kohler (F. of F.
38).

Kinghorn subsequently met several times with the owners of Block 62 between

October of 1982 and the summer of 1983 in an effort to negotiate a joint venture agreement
which would be acceptable to all of the parties (R. 7421, 7479-80; Exs. 81P, 82P).
In anticipation of the three-parcel development, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi
Hills by warranty deed to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. ("Domcoy") on August 20, 1983 (R.
7182-84; Ex. 16P; Add. 12). Domcoy was a closely held Utah corporation formed in
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October of 1981 for the general purpose of acquiring, developing and selling real property
(R. 7179-81; Ex. 3IP). The two corporate officers of Domcoy were McCoy as president and
Doms as secretary/treasurer; and the directors were Doms and his wife, and McCoy and his
wife (Exs. 31P, 32P). Doms and McCoy had problems over a number of issues and
eventually became adversaries in 1983 (R. 7185-86). McCoy tendered his voting rights for
all of his shares of stock in Domcoy to Doms in 1985. (Add. 13).
Negotiations for the joint venture agreement broke down in the summer of 1983 as
a result of the position taken by the owners of Block 62, who informed Kinghorn that the
percentage of profit to be received by Doms would be much smaller than anticipated due
to the fact that much of Rossi Hills was undevelopable due to apparent easements and
encumbrances on the property (R. 7481-83). Kinghorn was told by the Block 62 group that
they had been through all of this before with the previous owners of the property, and
Kinghorn relayed this information to Doms (R. 7482, 7484, 7603-04).
Pursuant to Doms' instructions tofindout what the Block 62 group was talking about,
in the spring of 1983 Kinghorn walked the loop road on Rossi Hills and observed the
encroachments which the Block 62 owners believed constituted easements and encumbrances
on the property (R. 7484-87). Although the loop road appeared to be located on Rossi
Hills, Kinghorn was uncertain about the location of the loop road and other encroachments
because he did not know the exact boundaries of the property (R. 7486).
Kinghorn contacted Doms and informed him a road and other encroachments
appeared to exist on the property and might constitute easements and encumbrances (R.
7619). Doms instructed Kinghorn to immediately take whatever steps were necessary to
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determine whether or not the loop road and other encroachments did in fact constitute legal
easements and encumbrances (R. 7620).
In August of 1983 Kinghorn retained surveyor Bing Christensen to locate and stake
the boundaries of Rossi Hills (R. 7489). Although Christensen claimed to have placed
stakes on the property to determine the boundaries sometime in the fall of 1983, it was
November when he informed Kinghorn, and there was already two feet of snow on the
ground and no way to locate the stakes (R. 7491). After the snow melted in the spring of
1984, Kinghorn walked the property and was unable to locate any of the stakes (R. 7491-92).
Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1984, Doms and Kinghorn both contacted Alliance
Engineering in Park City, Utah, and eventually retained Alliance in the late summer of 1984
to do a complete land survey of Rossi Hills (R. 7493-94). At about the same time, in March
of 1984, Kinghorn met with attorney Edward S. Sweeney, who represented the Estate of
D.C. Anderson (and Ellen Anderson, who was the personal representative of the estate),
and Dan Scott (R. 7500). At this meeting, Kinghorn expressed concerns to Sweeney that
the loop road and other physical encroachments which appeared to be on Rossi Hills may
constitute easements and encumbrances on the property (R. 7504-05).
In October of 1984, Alliance Engineering completed their land survey of Rossi Hills
(R. 7494; Ex. 77D). This land survey clearly revealed to Kinghorn and Doms for the very
first time that the loop road and other physical encroachments were physically located on
the property (R. 7170-72, 7496). Doms then instructed Kinghorn to do further investigation
and form a legal opinion as to whether or not these encroachments constituted prescriptive
easements or otherwise were encumbrances under Utah law (R. 7175, 7624-25).

8

Kinghorn personally talked to several long-time residents of Park City regarding the
physical encroachments and the use of the loop road by abutting property owners (R. 749899), Several of these people told Kinghorn that Elden and Ella Sorensen, and other people
who resided on property abutting Rossi Hills, had always used the loop road for access to
their property long enough to qualify as prescriptive easements (R. 7498-99). Kinghorn also
was aware that the Park City Planning Department required all developments in Park City
to recognize and respect lawful prescriptive easements and other property interests which
exist upon property (R. 7499). Kinghorn then formed a legal conclusion for the first time
that the loop road and other encroachments constituted prescriptive easements and
encumbrances upon Rossi Hills, and shortly thereafter reported his conclusion to Doms in
December of 1984 or early January of 1985 (R. 7500, 7611, 7625).
Doms and Kinghorn both concluded that neither the three-parcel development nor
Rossi Hills by itself would be economically feasible to develop because there was not enough
useable land due to the encumbrances (R. 7398-7400, 7445-46, 7500). Doms accepted
Kinghorn's legal opinion and instructed him to attempt to negotiate a resolution to the
problem that would avoid litigation (R. 7176-77, 7500-01). Doms instructed Kinghorn to
offer to deed the property back to the Andersons and Scotts in exchange for cancellation
of the trust deed note and not to demand the return of money which had already been paid,
in order to attempt to avoid expensive and protracted litigation (R. 7176-77, 7501-02, 7625).
In a telephone conversation with Sweeney in January of 1985, Kinghorn informed
Sweeney about the survey (Ex. 77D), and that the loop road and other encroachments
constituted a serious problem which needed to be resolved; and that he wanted to meet with
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Sweeney and present a proposal and discuss these issues (R. 7504-05). On January 17,1985,
Kinghorn had a lengthy meeting with Sweeney in Kinghorn's law office (R. 7505). At this
meeting, Kinghorn showed Sweeney the Alliance Engineering land survey of Rossi Hills,
which clearly showed the loop road and other physical encroachments located upon the
property (R. 7506). Kinghorn told Sweeney the names of the people he had talked to in
Park City regarding use of the loop road by the Sorensens and others far in excess of 20
years as access to their property, and that in his legal opinion the loop road, back yards,
sheds and fences constituted prescriptive easements on the property under Utah law (R.
7506-07).

Kinghorn further told Sweeney these prescriptive easements constituted a

violation of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed conveying
Rossi Hills to Doms, pursuant to U.CA. § 57-1-12; and Doms was entitled to rescission of
the transaction and the return of all money received by Plaintiffs (R. 7507).
As a compromise, in lieu of seeking full rescission, Kinghorn presented Doms' offer
to deed the property back in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed note, and allowing
Plaintiffs to keep all money already received under the contract (F. of F. 44; R. 7507-08).
Sweeney told Kinghorn he would have to talk to his clients, but not to worry about making
the principal payment of $194,250.00 due January 25, 1985, until he got back to Kinghorn
(R. 7508).
On March 18, 1985, Kinghorn again met with Sweeney and another lawyer in his law
firm by the name of Peter Mulhern at Kinghorn's law office to further discuss the matter
(R. 7509). In a lengthy meeting, Kinghorn reiterated to Sweeney and Mulhern all of the
information he had given to Sweeney at the January 17,1985, meeting (R. 7510). Kinghorn
10

again made the offer that Doms, in an attempt to avoid litigation, would deed the property
back to the Andersons and Scotts in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed note, and
they could keep all payments already received by them (R. 7511-12). Mulhem and Sweeney
indicated they would get back to Kinghom and assured Kinghom that Doms would not be
expected to make the $194,250.00 payment purportedly due under the trust deed note until
they got back to Kinghom in regard to this matter, and the situation was straightened out
(R. 7514).
However, Plaintiffs did not subsequently respond to Doms' offer or contact Kinghom,
but rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property on June 6, 1985 (F. of F. 45; R.
7514-15). This Complaint is Civil No. 8339, the main case now on appeal (R. 1-9; Add. 14).
After Plaintiffs filed their foreclosure Complaint in June of 1985, Kinghom engaged
in numerous discussions with various counsel representing Plaintiffs at that time, and several
extensions, stipulations and agreements were entered into to allow Doms to locate new
counsel because Kinghom was going to have to be a witness in this case (R. 3182-85).
Contrary to an agreement between Kinghom and counsel for Plaintiffs at that time, and
unbeknownst to Kinghom, Plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of judgment by default and
obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy on or about January 20,1988 (R. 3440, 3185-86).
On January 29,1988, Kinghom filed an Answer and Counterclaim to rescind the Rossi
Hills transaction, unaware that a default judgment had been entered against Doms (R. 4144; Add. 15).
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The default judgment against Doms was subsequently set aside by the trial court
effective June 1,1988, upon Doms' payment of $4,467.60 to Plaintiffs, which represented all
attorney's fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs in the action up to and including that date
(R. 76-78, 126-27). The trial court issued an Order that whether or not it was appropriate
to award that amount as attorney's fees was an issue reserved until final disposition of the
case on the merits (R. 245-47; Add. 16). The default judgment against McCoy was never
set aside.
On June 15, 1988, Doms filed an Amended Counterclaim (R. 102-05; Add. 17). In
this Amended Counterclaim, Jeanne Scott (the wife of Dan Scott) and Ellen Anderson,
personally, were joined as involuntary Plaintiffs pursuant to an Order of the trial court (R.
248-50). On July 6, 1988, Doms filed a Second Amended Counterclaim against all four
Plaintiffs (R. 237-42; Add. 18). Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim alleged breach of
the implied statutory covenants of warranty contained in the warranty deed pursuant to
U.C.A. § 57-1-12, breach of contract, and fraud and misrepresentation; and sought rescission
of the Rossi Hills transaction or, in the alternative, damages (R. 237-42).
The major portion of Rossi Hills was sold in May of 1987 to Summit County for nonpayment of property taxes (R. 3115). Due to the adversarial relationship between Doms
and McCoy, and a lack of communication with Kinghorn, Doms was unaware that this had
occurred until sometime later (R. 3115).
In July of 1988, after researching and investigating the status of the title to Rossi Hills,
Doms' new counsel (and present counsel herein) informed Doms the tax sale had indeed
taken place in May of 1987; and Summit County was in fact deemed to be the owner of the
12

major portion of Rossi Hills (R. 3116). Doms immediately instructed counsel to do
whatever was necessary to redeem or purchase back Rossi Hills from Summit County (R.
3116). In August of 1988, pursuant to instructions of counsel, Doms tendered a cashier's
check paid to the order of the Summit County Treasurer in the amount of $4,175.51, to pay
all delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs, plus the 1988 estimated taxes, due to
Summit County; and for conveyance of the property back to Domcoy, the record owner of
the property prior to the tax sale to Summit County (R. 3116, 3158). Upon receipt of this
payment, Summit County, by quit-claim deed dated August 24,1988, conveyed Rossi Hills
back to Domcoy, the prior record owner (R. 3117, 3160-61; Add. 19). On August 26,1988,
Domcoy conveyed Rossi Hills by warranty deed to Doms (Ex. 17P; Add. 20).
The action proceeded through a lengthy discovery process and the consolidation with
another case, Civil No. 10066 (Supp. R. 244). Civil No. 10066 (the "tax sale case") was filed
by Plaintiffs in December of 1988 to declare unconstitutional and set aside the May 1987
tax sale of Rossi Hills to Summit County and to quiet title to the property in Plaintiffs
(Supp. R. 2-66). The Summit County tax sale was subsequently declared void and set aside
by the trial court upon stipulation of all of the parties in the tax sale case (C. of L. 42; Judg.
11 16).
In February of 1989, Plaintiff Jeanne Scott filed a Petition in the Utah Supreme Court
for Permission to File an Interlocutory Appeal from an Order of the trial court denying her
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction over her in the action (Add. 21).
Pursuant to a Minute Entry dated March 9, 1989, the Supreme Court denied this Petition
for an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 22).
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Shortly thereafter, in June of 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ
in the Utah Supreme Court, seeking to restrain and prohibit the Third Judicial District
Court and the judges thereof from proceeding further in the trial of this case based upon
exactly the same in personam jurisdiction arguments which were rejected by the Utah
Supreme Court in Plaintiff Jeanne Scott's Petition to File an Interlocutory Appeal (Add.
23). In an Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the Supreme Court denied this
Petition for Extraordinary Writ (Add. 24).
In a bifurcated trial, the trial courtfirstdecided to resolve the issue of whether or not
the Rossi Hills transaction should be rescinded (R. 7315). Following three days of trial on
April 17-19, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying rescission based
upon the doctrine of laches (R. 4188-95; Add. 25).
The remainder of the trial was held on August 21-24, 1990, and related primarily to
the issue of damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills (R.
7753-8285, 6541-89). Following this portion of the trial, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision which ruled that Doms suffered $83,000.00 in damages as a result of the loop
road and other encumbrances existing on Rossi Hills as of March of 1982, when the
transaction was closed and the warranty deed delivered (R. 4348-54).
Subsequently, a hearing was held on December 31, 1991, to determine which parties
were entitled to awards of attorney's fees and costs in the action (R. 6360-6540). Plaintiffs
and Doms submitted attorney's fees affidavits, memoranda of costs, other documents
regarding expenses; and Plaintiffs' counsel and Doms' counsel testified at this hearing.
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Following extensive objections, motions and argument by the parties over the
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the trial court entered its final
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99; Add. 5) and Second
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07; Add. 6) on June 23, 1992.
Both parties appealed the trial court's rulings in numerous respects. On November
4,1994, this Court filed a Memorandum Decision that disposed of almost all of these issues.
See Anderson v. Poms, No. 920653CA, (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994) (Memorandum
Decision) (Add. 1). The Court concluded that the lower court had erroneously applied the
doctrine of laches to bar rescission because the trial court had made no findings on the
second prong of laches, i.e., prejudice, from Doms' delay in pursuing rescission. The Court
therefore remanded this matter "for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to
whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in Doms pursuing his counterclaim." Id.
at 3. This Court further ruled that "[I]f the trial court cannot find from the evidence
presented that the appellants were prejudiced by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches
should not bar the remedy of rescission." IdL
The trial court on remand was not pleased with the decision issued by this Court.
At the October 27,1995 hearing, the trial court began the proceeding by stating, "It appears
to me from reading the [Utah Court of Appeals'] memorandum that the issue here is with
regard to rescission. . . . I thought I made that quite clear that I would not allow the
rescission at the time we started this case." (Add. 4 at p. 1). The court later stated,
"[Ljaches wasn't the only basis upon which I made my decision . . . and in order for them
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[the Utah Court of Appeals] to latch onto this one issue, I think is out in left field, if you
want to know the truth of the matter." Id at p.4 (emphasis added). The lower court
concluded, "I don't think [sic] even laches is a necessary issue in this case. . . .1 don't care
what the—I shouldn't say I don't care. But I think they [the Utah Court of Appeals] are off
on the wrong tact [sic] in this case and I am going to go back over the Findings and then
we will submit that; and then if they want to reverse me again, that is fine." Id. at pp. 5-6
(emphasis added).
Despite this Court's very clear instructions in the Memorandum Decision that the
remand was limited to entering findings of fact regarding the prejudice prong of laches, the
trial court entered additional findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting other
theories, besides laches, which would bar rescission in this case. The trial court also entered
vague and conclusory findings regarding prejudice. Both parties have again appealed the
trial court's rulings.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This second appeal is far simpler than the first. The primary issue is whether the trial
court erred in concluding from its supplemental findings of fact on remand that Doms' delay
in seeking rescission prejudiced Plaintiffs such that rescission of the underlying real estate
transaction is precluded.

The secondary issue concerns the only other issue remaining

undecided from the prior appeal after this Court's Memorandum Decision—the trial court's
treatment of certain attorney fee issues.
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In reviewing the trial court's supplementalfindingsof fact concerning prejudice, it is
crucial to understand the difficulty of the task that the trial court had undertaken.

This

Court instructed the trial court to make its supplementalfindingson prejudice based upon
the "evidence in the record." See Anderson v. Doms, No. 920653CA at 3, fn 1 (Utah Ct.
App. Nov. 4,1994) (Add.l). The trial court, as amply demonstrated by its statements at the
hearing on remand, was adamantly opposed to permitting rescission, and fully intended to
enter additionalfindingsof fact to this effect. However, at trial Plaintiffs had evidently not
realized that prejudice was an issue, and had never introduced evidence on this subject.
There simply was no record evidence on the issue of prejudice for the trial court to include
in its supplemental findings of fact.
With this understanding, the trial court's supplemental findings of fact on remand
begin to make sense. The findings are, beyond a doubt, vague and conclusory. In many
instances, they are also oddly irrelevant to the issue of prejudice. The simple explanation
for these findings is that the trial court had no actual additional evidence of prejudice it
could cite from the record, and so it was limited to inferring prejudice where it might seem
plausible.
As a particularly egregious example, Finding of Fact 10c states that Plaintiffs have
been prejudiced by Doms' delay in seeking rescission because "D.C. Anderson, one of the
principals in the transaction, died while Doms was in possession of the property, thus
making it impossible to elicit testimony from the decedent." (Add. 2 at 11 10c). It is
impossible to draw a conclusion of prejudice from this fact. The trial court did not state
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what evidence Mr. Anderson could have provided, nor how this evidence would be related
to afindingof prejudice. Mr. Anderson's death is simply an unrelated fact, from which the
trial court infers prejudice.
Another example of the trial court's attempts to infer prejudice is set forth in Finding
of Fact lOd where the court finds prejudice "because witnesses would be unavailable and
memories are dimmed by the lapse of time." Id. at U lOd. In sofinding,the court does not
refer a single particular witness who is unavailable, or provide any specifics regarding how
memories have dimmed and how this impacts Plaintiffs. The reason for this omission is, of
course, that the court cannot refer to any such witnesses. Plaintiffs did not raise this issue
at trial, and hence there is no evidence on this subject.
In fact, the only real evidence referred to in the Supplemental Findings of Fact is the
evidence concerning the diminution of value of the subject property.

However, this

evidence was included in the original Findings of Fact, and was specifically identified by this
Court as inadequate to support afindingof prejudice. Poms, No. 920653CA, at 2-3 fill.
(Add. 1). Accordingly, the trial court has failed on remand to enter additionalfindingsof
fact supporting a conclusion of prejudice, and there is no longer any reason why Doms
should not be granted the equitable remedy of rescission.
The only other outstanding issue concerns the trial court's rulings on attorney fees.
The trial court erred by refusing to award attorney's fees and appropriate costs to Doms for
sustaining his title to Rossi Hills against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions. In
addition, the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
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are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs because Doms is the prevailing parly in this
lawsuit and was never in default under the trust deed and trust deed note, which provided
the only possible basis upon which Plaintiffs could make a legitimate claim for attorney's
fees or costs.
Plaintiffe are also not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their petitions
to the Utah Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal and extraordinary writ because
Plaintiffe lost both of these petitions. Further, Plaintiffe are not entitled to any attorney's
fees or costs pursuant to their motions for sanctions in regard to Doms' objections to
discovery requests because all of Doms' objections were substantially justified under Rule
37(a)(4), U.R.C.P. Finally, Doms is entitled to a refund of a substantial amount of the
attorney's fees and costs paid to Plaintiffe as a condition of the trial court setting aside the
default judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING
THAT PREJUDICE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED,
A.

The trial court did not comply with this Court's mandate on remand.
This case was remanded to the trial court pursuant to the Court of Appeals' June 4,

1994 Memorandum Decision on very narrow and specific grounds. See Anderson v. Doms,
No. 920653CA, (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994) (Add. 1). In short, the trial court had found
a breach of the statutory covenants contained in the Warranty Deed, but denied Doms the
remedy of rescission based upon application of the doctrine of laches. However, while the
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trial court had entered findings of fact regarding the first prong of laches-delay in bringing
an action-it had failed to make any findings regarding the second prong—prejudice.
Accordingly, this Court remanded this matter to the trial court with instructions to
"enterQ findings of fact relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in
Doms pursuing his counterclaim." Id. at 2-3. This Court concluded, "If the trial court
cannot find from the evidence presented that appellants were prejudiced by the delay, the
equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the remedy of rescission." I d at 3 (emphasis
added).
The trial court was extremely reluctant to comply with this Court's mandate. At the
October 27, 1995 hearing on remand, the trial court began the proceeding by stating, "It
appears to me from reading the [Utah Court of Appeals1] memorandum that the issue here
is with regard to rescission. . . . I thought I made that quite clear that I would not allow the
rescission at the time we started this case." (Add. 4 at p. 1). The court later stated,
"[LJaches wasn't the only basis upon which I made my decision . . . and in order for them
[the Utah Court of Appeals] to latch onto this one issue, I think is out in left field, if you
want to know the truth of the matter." Id at p.4 (emphasis added). The lower court
concluded, "I don't think [sic] even laches is a necessary issue in this case. . . .1 don't care
what the—I shouldn't say I don't care. But I think they [the Utah Court of Appeals] are off
on the wrong tact [sic] in this case and I am going to go back over the Findings and then
we will submit that; and then if they want to reverse me again, that is fine." Id. at pp. 5-6
(emphasis added).
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Despite the very clear instructions from this Court, the trial court on remand entered
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting other theories, besides laches,
which would bar rescission in this case. For example, in Supplemental Conclusion of Law
la, the trial court stated that Doms did not have a sufficient interest in the Rossi Hills
Property to be entitled to rescission. (Add. 2 at p. 9). In Supplemental Conclusion of Law
lb the trial court stated that Doms could not invoke the doctrine of rescission because he
is a "person in default." Id.
It is not necessary to address the merits of these legal conclusions because they are
entirely outside the scope of the remand.

Doms notes, however, that Supplemental

Conclusion of Law la is contradicted by the trial court's additional Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law issued on September 8, 1997. In the latter Conclusions of Law, the
Court stated that "[d]espite intervening conveyances between Doms and McCoy to Domcoy,
[etc.] Doms presently holds clear title to the property and his right to pursue his
counterclaim is not affected." (emphasis added) (Add. 3 at p. 5 11 1).
This Court has already concluded that rescission is appropriate under the facts of this
case unless it is barred by the doctrine of laches. This case was remanded for the specific
purpose of entering findings of fact bearing on the second prong of laches—not to permit
the trial court to entirely revisit the issue of whether rescission is appropriate. As noted in
Bailev-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet. 945 P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997), "v "[Pronouncements of
an appellate court on legal issues . . . become the law of the case and must be followed in
subsequent proceedings!/,] • • • [thus] the lower court must implement both the letter and the
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spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the
circumstances it embraces.'"" Id at 185 (citing Slatteiv v. Covev & Co. Inc., 909 P.2d 925,
928 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
In particular, "vit is only when issues are left open by an appellate decision that the
trial court has discretion to deal with those issues as it sees fit.'" IdL Thus, because the trial
court'sfindingsand conclusions are beyond the scope of remand, and in fact contradict the
directions on remand, they should be summarily disregarded by this Court.
B.

The trial court's findings of fact on remand are legally insufficient to support a
conclusion of prejudice.
The real focus of this appeal is whether the trial court'sfindingson remand support

its conclusion that the existence of the second prong of laches—prejudice—precludes the
application of rescission in this case. The trial court made eight purportedfindingsof fact
supporting its conclusion that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms' delay in bringing his
counterclaim.

These findings are manifestly insufficient to support the court's legal

conclusion that Plaintiffs were prejudiced because they are vague, conclusory, and largely
irrelevant.
As an initial matter, Doms is well aware of his burden to marshal the evidence
supporting challenged findings of fact. However, "there is, in effect, no need for an
appellant to marshal the evidence when thefindingsare so inadequate that they cannot be
meaningfully challenged as factual determinations." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477
(Utah App. 1991). Inadequatefindingsare those that do not "embody sufficient detail and
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include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which they are grounded,"
id., or that are "conclusory, and reflect an intention to merge the trial court's ultimate
factual determinations with [a particular legal test]." IdL at 478. In such cases, "appellant
need not go through a futile marshalling exercise. Rather, appellant can simply argue the
legal insufficiency of the court'sfindingsas framed." Id. at 477-78.
1.

Finding of Fact #10a is Conclusory, Insufficiently Detailed, and Lacks
Evidentiary Support.

Finding of Fact 10a states as follows:
Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the
exclusion of the plaintiffe. He purchased the slipper parcel and
attempted to formulate a plan for a three-parcel integrated
development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffe are now
foreclosed from developing an integrated development because
Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel and the likelihood of
Doms cooperating with the plaintiffe in an integrated
development is remote.
(Add. 2 at pp. 4-5).
There are a number of very serious problems with this finding. To begin with, its
factual premise is completely erroneous. Doms' interest in the slipper parcel was foreclosed,
and he has had no interest at all in this parcel for several years. Moreover, even if Doms
were still in possession of the slipper parcel, there is no absolutely no evidence in the record
supporting a finding that Doms would not cooperate with Plaintiffe in a development
project. Whether Doms would or would not cooperate with Plaintiffe in the event of
rescission was not even explored at trial because the trial court had no intention of ever
granting rescission. Thus, because Finding of Fact 10a is conclusory, recites no evidentiary

23

detail and is, in fact, completely without evidentiary foundation in the record, it cannot
support a conclusion of prejudice as a matter of law.
2.

Finding of Fact #10b is Irrelevant.

Finding of Fact 10b states:
Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982,
1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and
required the plaintiffs to initiate legal action to clear the title.
(Add. 2 at p. 5).
Finding of Fact #10b is absolutely correct and absolutely irrelevant. Doms did fail
to pay the property taxes for the years 1982 through 1986, there was a tax sale, and Plaintiffs
were required to bring an action to clear the title. However, the action was resolved by a
stipulation in which the parties agreed that the tax sale would be declared void and
Plaintiffs' lien declared valid. Accordingly, because the status quo was reestablished by the
stipulation of the parties, there can be no prejudice arising from these events. Therefore,
Finding of Fact #10b also does not support a conclusion that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by
Doms' delay.
3.

Finding of Fact #10c is Irrelevant and Conclusorv.

Finding of Fact 10c states:
D.C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction,
died while Doms was in possession of the property, thus making
it impossible to elicit testimony from the decedent.
(Add. 2 at p. 5)
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The third Finding of Fact is a conclusoiy statement that Plaintiffe are prejudiced by
Doms* delay because D.C. Anderson is dead, and cannot provide testimony. However, the
Finding does not mention to which facts Mr. Anderson would testify, and whether others
could testify regarding these same facts. Moreover, there was no proffer made at trial
regarding Mr. Anderson's testimony, and no attempt to admit statements he made to third
parties prior to his death. Therefore, it is impossible to ascertain from the Finding of Fact
whether Plaintiffe were in fact prejudiced by Mr. Anderson's death. This sort of conclusoiy
and irrelevant Finding cannot support a determination of prejudice.
4.

Finding of Fact #10d is Conclusorv and Unsupported by the Record,

Finding of Fact lOd states:
Doms' delay of more than six (6) years before he sought
to rescind the transaction adversely affected the plaintiffe'
opportunity to resolve the encroachment and easement
problems because witnesses would be unavailable and memories
are dimmed by the lapse of time.
(Add 2. at p. 5).
This fourth Finding of Fact is yet another example of the inaccurate, speculative and
conclusoiy nature of the trial court's findings. First, the court's statement that Doms waited
six years to seek to rescind the transaction is simply and flatly wrong. The undisputed
evidence is that Doms attempted to rescind the transaction within three years. However,
this Court has already determined that Doms delayed in bringing his action for rescission,
so the point is moot.
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The real difficulty with this Finding of Fact is that the trial court is merely speculating
that the alleged six year delay prejudiced the Plaintiffs because "witnesses would be
unavailable," Nowhere does the Court list who these "imavailable" witnesses might be, or
what the subjects of their testimony would be. Again, the real reason for this absence of
evidentiary detail is that there was no testimony on this issue at trial. Hence, the court has
no record evidence to cite in support of its conclusions.
The same arguments apply to the court's speculation that memories would be
"dimmed" by the passage of time. Whose memories? Memories of what? What, precisely,
was the prejudice? There is no record evidence to support this vague assertion, it is simply
the court's opinion, couched as a "finding of fact."
5.

Finding of Fact #10e is Insufficient Alone, to Support a Conclusion of
Prejudice.

Finding of Fact lOe states:
During the time that Doms. Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.
and Summit County were in possession of the property, the
property suffered a 50% reduction in its value.
(Add. 2 at pg. 5).
Doms does not challenge Finding of Fact #10e, but reminds the Court of its footnote
1 in the Memorandum Decision stating that a mere decrease in property value does not
alone convert delay into laches (Add. 1 at pp. 2-3, fa. 1). Further, Doms points out to the
Court that the reason that the property decreased in value was that the encumbrances on
the property made it undesirable for development. Plaintiffs' failure to give good title to
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the property and its consequent devaluation should not permit Plaintiffs to claim that they
have been prejudiced by the reduction of the property's value.
6.

Finding of Fact #10f Simply Restates Finding lOe.

Finding of Fact lOf states:
Doms5 inexperience in developing property or inability
to sell the property impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of
down turn in the real estate market and the increased costs to
develop the property if they chose to do so.
(Add. 2 at p. 5).
Finding of Fact lOf is simply a rewording of Finding of Fact lOe done in attempt to
give the Findings of Fact more substance and bulk. Again, Doms does not challenge that
a downturn in the market may have occurred, or that there would be increased costs
involved in developing the property. However, both factors are part of the "mere decrease
in property value" that this Court has determined do not, alone, constitute prejudice.
Further, the increased costs involved in development are directly due to the encumbrances
that are on the property. These encumbrances were not created by Doms' delay, they have
existed from the outset. Hence, this Finding of Fact also does not support a finding of
prejudice.
7.

Finding of Fact #10g is a Conclusion of Law,

Finding of Fact lOg states:
Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the
expense of the plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be
inequitable.
(Add. 2 at pp. 5-6).
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This "Finding of Fact" is actually a conclusion of law. Moreover, it does not speak
to the issue of prejudice. Accordingly, this Finding of Fact is irrelevant, and should be
disregarded.
8.

Finding of Fact #10h is a Conclusion of Law,

Finding of Fact lOh states:
Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine
of rescission.
(Add. 2 at p. 6).
This "Finding of Fact" is also a conclusion of law, similar to "Finding of Fact" lOg.
It does not discuss prejudice, and is irrelevant.
Finally, some of the "Conclusions of Law" are in actuality additional "Findings of
Fact," and require discussion. In Conclusion of Law 2c, the trial court states that Doms
"had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs, changed the
condition of the property in relation to adjacent properties and foreclosed the Plaintiffs from
taking any prompt corrective action in relation to encumbrances." (Add. 2 at p. 12). There
is no evidence to marshal in support of this finding of fact because there is no testimony
that supports it. None of the witnesses testified that there were any changes to the property
since the date of purchase, and there is no other evidence suggesting that this was the case.
The trial court simply invented this "fact."
Finally, in Conclusion of Law 2f, the trial court throws out a hodge-podge of facts
and ultimate conclusions that appear to have no bearing on the issue of prejudice, but
probably require some attention. Id. at p. 13. For example, in Conclusion of Law 2f(3) the
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court cites the fact that "the entire Rossi Hill Property had been conveyed by Doms and
McCoy to a third party, to wit, Domcoy Enterprises" as support for its determination that
Plaintiffs were prejudiced. Id. Doms is at a complete loss as to how this fact has any
bearing whatsoever on the issue of prejudice. Moreover, the trial court later itself concluded
in paragraphs 1-4 of the September 8, 1997 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that
Doms had 100% ownership interest in Rossi Hills, thus eliminating any such ground for
prejudice, even if it were assumed to be valid. (Add. 3 at p. 5).
Similarly, Doms has no idea why the trial court thought that the fact that "Doms as
an equal fifty percent (50%) shareholder in Domcoy, received the full benefit of the value
of the Rossi Hill Property because his shareholding interests would have been increased by
the value which the Rossi Hill Property contributed to the net worth of Domcoy" has
anything to do with prejudice. See Add. 2 at pg. 13. The final "fact" concerning prejudice
cited by the trial court in paragraph 2f is "at the time the defendants conveyed their interest
to Domcoy, the Property was worth as much as it was when they purchased the Property
from the Plaintiffs." Id Again, if there is any connection between this fact and the issue
of prejudice, it escapes ready understanding.
In brief, the trial court on remand was unable to find any evidence supporting a
conclusion of prejudice beyond the evidence of diminution of value that was already before
this Court. Because the trial court was unable to make any real additional findings of fact
regarding prejudice, the laches defense to rescission fails as a matter of law. Consequently,
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this Court should order rescission of the real property transaction at issue, as stated in the
Memorandum Decision.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND APPROPRIATE COSTS TO POMS.
A.

Poms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs for sustaining
his title to Rossi Hills against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions.
Plaintiffs' foreclosure action in the main case (Civil No. 8339) and quiet title action

in Count 2 of the tax sale case (Civil No. 10066) have assailed and disputed Doms' title to
Rossi Hills, and required Doms to incur substantial attorney's fees and costs. In Forrer v.
Sather, 595 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1979), citing its previous decision in Van Cott v. Jacklin, 226
P. 460, 463 (Utah 1924), the Utah Supreme Court stated that under these circumstances,
an award of attorney's fees and costs is appropriate. In particular, the Court observed:
This court has further approved as an additional element of damages
for breach of the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment, the
recovery of a reasonable sum as attorney fees that plaintiff has paid
or has become legally obligated to pay, together with the costs, in
attempting to sustain the title to the premises conveyed.
595 P.2d at 308 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
Because the trial court has ruled that Plaintiffs violated the "covenants of warranty and
quiet enjoyment," this Court should follow Forrer and Van Cott, and award attorney's fees
and costs in this case to Doms, the prevailing party.
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B.

Doms is entitled to prejudgment interest on any awards of attorney's fees.
Utah case law holds that it is appropriate to award prejudgment interest on an award

of attorney's fees.2 Therefore, Doms should be awarded prejudgment interest on any awards
of attorney's fees in the instant case.
C.

Doms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred on this
appeal.
Utah case law holds that when a party entitled to attorney's fees for the trial of an

action prevails on appeal, that party is also entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred on the appeal.3 Therefore, Doms should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and
costs in regard to prosecution of this appeal.
D.

Doms is entitled to an award of appropriate costs, including costs of depositions.
The trial court awarded Doms a total of only $101.50 in costs, and only for the

prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim (F. of F. 60; C. of L. 56; Judg. 11 25).
Doms filed a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements with the trial court requesting
$5,913.81 (R. 5619-23), and an affidavit regarding travel expenses requesting $2,701.22
(Attorney's Fee Ex. 2D). Thus, the costs and expenses claimed by Doms totalled $8,615.03.
Doms submits that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the paltry amount
of $101.50 to Doms for his costs in the instant case. In particular, the depositions taken by

2

See, e ^ First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feed Yards Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah
1982); Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co.. 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983); P.A.D.D. v. Gravstone
Pines Homeowners Ass'n.. 789 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990); Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d
1375 (Utah App. 1987).
3

See e.g.. Management Servs. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah
1980); Brown V. Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah App. 1992).
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Doms were clearly taken in good faith and were essential for the development and
presentation of the case, and should be taxable as costs. See Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d
771, 774 (Utah 1980^: Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing. Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507,512
(Utah App. 1988).
E.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with directions to
award Doms attorney's fees and costs consistent with this Court's decision.
The trial court erred in its ruling that Doms is not entitled to attorney's fees (F. of F.

58; C. of L. 55; Judg. U 23). Therefore, this Court should remand this matter one last time
to permit the trial court to determine reasonable attorney's fees and costs which should be
awarded to Doms. Doms' counsel, Lany R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, filed affidavits
regarding attorney's fees with the trial court. Keller's affidavit established that Doms
incurred out-of-pocket and reasonable attorney's fees to him of $70,822.75 as of the date
of the affidavit (R. 5663-5716). Boorman's affidavit established that Doms incurred
additional out-of-pocket and reasonable attorney's fees for his services of $79,330.00 as of
the date of the affidavit (R. 5624-62). Thus, the total amount of attorney's fees incurred by
Doms as of the dates of these respective affidavits was $150,152.75. On remand, the trial
court would need to determine additional attorney's fees and costs incurred by Doms
subsequent to those already claimed and submitted to the trial court as set forth above.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS,
On December 31, 1991, the trial court held a hearing on attorney's fees and costs,
which included the submission of affidavits and other documentation, the testimony of the
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parties, and oral argument by the parties regarding awards of attorney's fees and costs (R.
6360-6540). Plaintiffs' counsel, James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele, submitted affidavits
and other documents requesting a total of $300,659.57 in attorney's fees up to the date of
the hearing (Attorney's Fees Exs. IP, 3P, 4P, 5P, 7P; R. 6408-09). Plaintiffe also requested
costs and disbursements in the total amount of $26,272.44 (Ex. 2 and Ex. 7 attached to
Attorney's Fee Ex. 3P). Thus, Plaintiffe requested a total amount of $326,932.01 as
attorney's fees and costs through December 30, 1991. These exorbitant amounts are
representative of the "stubbornly litigious" posture taken by Plaintiffe throughout the history
of this case. As a comparison, Doms' counsel requested less than one-half the amount
requested by Plaintiffe' counsel.
With the exception of amounts awarded pursuajit to previous orders of the trial court
regarding discovery sanctions and setting aside the default judgment, all of the attorney's
fees and costs awarded to Plaintiffe by the trial court are based on the legal conclusion that
Doms was in default under the trust deed and trust deed note. However, as discussed
earlier, this conclusion was rejected by this Court in the June 4, 1994 Memorandum
Decision. Instead, this Court found that Plaintiffe were the party in breach, and that Doms
was entitled to the remedy of rescission, provided that his delay in seeking rescission did not
make damages a more suitable remedy. Finally, the trial court made no findings of fact
which support the amounts of attorney's fees awarded to Plaintiffe, and therefore all of such
awards constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App 1992); Matter of
Estate of Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992).
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A.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No. 8339,
the main case.
Plaintiffe have no statutory claim to attorney's fees, and the trust deed and trust deed

note contain the only possible contractual provisions upon which Plaintiffe can make a claim
for attorney's fees and costs in the main case. See Turtle Management Inc. v. Haggis
Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781
P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1989). An award based upon a contract must be "in accordance with
the terms of the parties' agreement," and "a party is entitled only to those fees attributable
to the successful vindication of contractual rights within the terms of their agreement."
Travner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856. 858 (Utah 1984V4
Plaintiffe have absolutely no legal basis to claim an award of attorney's fees or costs
because they have utterly failed to vindicate any of their contractualrightswithin the terms
of the trust deed and trust deed note. Doms was excused from performance and never in
default under the trust deed and trust deed note, and, because this Court has determined
that rescission is appropriate in the absence of laches, Plaintiffe are the losing party on their
complaint for foreclosure.
B.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No. 10066,
the tax sale case.
Plaintiffe are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs in the tax sale case for the

same reasons set forth above in subpoint A in regard to the main case. The only possible
contractual basis upon which Plaintiffe can make a claim for attorney's fees and costs in the

4

See also Turtle Management. Inc.. supra; Stubbs v. Hemmett 567 P.2d 168 (Utah

1977).
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tax sale case are the provisions of the trust deed and trust deed note. Since Doms was
excused from performance and not in default under the trust deed and trust deed note,
Plaintiffs have absolutely no basis upon which to claim attorney's fees or costs.
Furthermore, it would clearly violate basic principles of equity to award Plaintiffe any
attorney's fees or costs in regard to the tax sale case. At a hearing held before the trial
court on March 20, 1990, Plaintiffe, Doms, Domcoy and Summit County (the parties to the
tax sale case) entered into a stipulation in open court at the suggestion of the trial court that
the tax sale would be declared void and Plaintiffe' Ken declared vaKd as evidenced by their
trust deed and trust deed note (R. 7060-72).
The stipulation of the parties was set forth in an Order issued by the trial court (R.
3968-78), which is reflected in Conclusions of Law 42 and 43 and 11 16 of the Judgment.
Doms would never have stipulated to the suggestion of the trial court that a simple solution
was to declare the tax sale void and Plaintiffe' Ken vaKd, if Doms had had any idea that the
trial court would subsequently award attorney's fees to Plaintiffe as to Count 1 of the tax
sale case. It is simply unconscionable for Plaintiffe to even request attorney's fees and costs
in regard to the tax sale case.
In addition, and perhaps the most important fact is that Count 1 was against Summit
County and not against Doms. Doms had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the
manner in which the tax sale was conducted by Summit County. If any party is liable for
the alleged attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiffe in Count 1 of the tax sale case, it is Summit
County, not Doms. Doms cannot be held responsible for any alleged failures of Summit
County to provide Plaintiffe with adequate notice of the tax sale of the property.
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It should also be pointed out that Plaintiffe failed completely on Counts 2 and 3 of
their Complaint in the tax sale case. Count 2 was Plaintiffe' action to quiet title to Rossi
Hills, and Count 3 was their action against Summit County, which was dismissed on motion
for summary judgment by Summit County early in the tax sale case (Supp. R. 169-70).
The trial court awarded Plaintiffe $5,245.00 for Mcintosh's attorney's fees in the
"lawsuit to set aside tax sale" (F. of F. 70(a)(i)), and $1,050.00 for Biele's attorney's fees for
exactly the same thing (F. of F. 70(b)(ii)). These rulings by the trial court are clearly in
error and must be reversed.
C.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their Petition for
an Interlocutory Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court,
On or about February 6, 1989, Plaintiffe filed a Petition for Permission to File an

Interlocutory Appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, requesting permission to appeal an Order
of the trial court denying Plaintiff Jeanne Scott's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In
Personam Jurisdiction (Add. 21). Plaintiffe' Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal was denied
by the Utah Supreme Court on March 9. 1989 (Add. 22).
The trial court awarded Plaintiffe $2,730.00 for Mcintosh's attorney's fees incurred in
regard to the Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal (F. of F. 70(a)(ii)). This award by the
trial court constitutes clear legal error and must be reversed. First and foremost, Plaintiffe
lost on their petition and cannot possibly make a legitimate claim for attorney's fees.
Secondly, Plaintiffe are not the prevailing party in this lawsuit, and have no statutory or
contractual basis upon which to make a claim for attorney's fees for filing this petition.
Next, this petition was filed in defense of Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim, and
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Plaintiffe cannot recover attorney's fees or costs incurred in defense of Doms' Counterclaim.
Travnor v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 858, fn 6 (Utah 1984); Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v.
Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981).
Finally, it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to award fees on matters it decides,
not the trial court.
D.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their Petition for
an Extraordinary Writ to the Utah Supreme Court
On or about June 23,1989, Plaintiffe filed a Petition for an Extraordinaiy Writ in the

Utah Supreme Court, in which Plaintiffe sought an extraordinary writ to restrain the trial
court from proceeding with the trial against Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson, personally,
on exactly the same in personam jurisdiction grounds argued by Plaintiffe in their earlier
Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 23). On July 31. 1989, the Supreme Court filed
an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffe' Petition for an Extraordinary Writ on the
grounds the trial court had jurisdiction over Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson because they
were grantors on the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills and because both were proper
parties to Poms' Second Amended Counterclaim pursuant to Rules 13 and 19. U.R.C.P.
(Add. 24).
For exactly the same reasons as set forth immediately above in regard to Plaintiffe*
Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal the trial court's awards of attorney's fees to Plaintiffe
for the Petition for an Extraordinary Writ are clearly in error and must be reversed. The
trial court awarded Plaintiffe $2,160.00 for Mcintosh's fees for the Petition (F. of F.
70(a)(iii)). and $2.740.00 for Biele's fees for the same thing (¥. of F. 70(b)(iii)).
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E.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs pursuant to their motions for
sanctions in regard to Poms' objections to discovery requests.
In February and March of 1989, Plaintiffs served Doms with Requests for Production

of Documents and Requests for Admissions (R. 1213-15; 1222-24). In March of 1989, Doms
served his responses to these discovery requests (R. 1341-42). Doms made full or partial
objections to many of Plaintiffs' requests on the grounds they were not relevant to the
subject matter of the pending action; not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence; and they constituted harassment, annoyance, oppression and would
create an undue burden or expense.
A typical example of the inappropriate and oppressive nature of Plaintiffs' requests
is Request No. 12 of Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents, which requested
Doms to attempt to locate thousands of irrelevant documents:
12. All diaries, journals, or other records kept by you from the
period of time commencing January 1, 1978, and continuing to the
date of your deposition, and which refer to, reflect upon, discuss, or
relate to any purchases or sales of property by you, your wife, Michael
R. McCoy, Mr. McCoy's wife, or any partnership, joint venture or
other business relationship between you and Mr. McCoy, or any other
third parties for the years from January 1, 1975, through the date of
your deposition.
On April 21, 1989, Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against Doms with
voluminous supporting memoranda (R. 1401-1539).

Doms filed a memorandum in

opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, which included numerous exhibits (R. 15741674).
On June 22,1989, the trial court issued a Minute Entry granting Plaintiffs' motion for
sanctions "to the extent that the discovery sought relates to real property transactions (as
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opposed to personally)," and granting Plaintiffs "reasonable attorney fees . . . to be
determined at trial" (R. 1739; Add. 26). The trial court subsequently entered an Order
regarding this Minute Entry ruling (R. 2329-33).
Doms was surprised by the ruling of the trial court, because the trial court did not
allow an opportunity for a hearing before awarding attorney's fees and expenses as required
by Rule 37(a)(4), U.R.C.P. (Add. 27). Rule 37 of the Utah Rules is patterned after and
virtually identical to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respected authorities
point out that under Rule 37(a)(4) of the Federal Rules, a court must allow an opportunity
for a hearing before awarding expenses and attorney's fees.5
All of Doms' objections were "substantially justified" under Rule 37(a)(4), and
therefore Plaintiffs were not entitled to any awards of attorney's fees or expenses. If the
dispute over discovery between the parties is genuine, about which reasonable people could
differ, then sanctions under Rule 37(a)(4) are inappropriate.6 Furthermore. Doms was in
fact the prevailing party, at least in part, in regard to many of Plaintiffs' discovery requests
because Doms' objections to Plaintiffs' requests regarding personal property were sustained
in the trial court's Minute Entry ruling. Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4), Doms is entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and expenses in regard to these objections, and/or the reasonable

5

See 8 C WRIGHT AND A. MILLER FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES § 2288
(1970); 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE U 37.02[10] (1988).
6
See Advisory Committee Note to the 1970 Amendment to Rule 37(a), F.R.C.P.; 8 C.
WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2288 (1970);
4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 37.02[10] (1988).
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expenses incurred by both Plaintiffs and Doms should be apportioned because Plaintiffs'
motion was granted in part and denied in part.
Under Rule 37(a)(4), the trial court is required to make findings and rule on each
discovery request and objection thereto, in order to sufficiently identify the expenses or
attorney's fees to which a party is entitled. Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950, 965-66 (Utah App. 1989). Such findings were never made by the trial court, and
the award of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs ultimately made by the trial court must be reversed
and remanded.
Doms pointed out all of the foregoing case law and authority to the trial court in a
motion for a hearing on the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs (R. 1740-42,
1948-67). Contemporaneously with this motion for a hearing, Doms filed a motion for
clarification of the trial court's Minute Entry ruling of June 22, 1989, and a motion for
extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests (R. 1746-66,1767-71). Before
Doms even had the opportunity to file his reply memorandum to Plaintiffs' responsive
memoranda, the trial court issued another Minute Entry ruling on August 10,1989, in which
all of Doms' motions were denied and additional attorney's fees were granted to Plaintiffs'
to be determined at trial (R. 1968; Add. 28). This Minute Entry ruling was later issued as
an Order of the trial court (R. 2362-70). Doms submits it was clearly inappropriate for the
trial court to further sanction Doms in regard to his motion for hearing and motion for
clarification (especially since the requested hearing is required by Rule 37(a)(4)), and
therefore Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or expenses in regard to these
motions.
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The trial court awarded Plaintiffs $4.750.00 pursuant to the June 22 and August 10,
1989, Minute Entry rulings (F. of F. 70(a)(v)). This award constitutes an abuse of discretion
by the trial court and must be reversed.
F,

Doms is entitled to a refund of a substantial amount of the attorney's fees and costs
paid to Plaintiffs as a condition of the trial court setting aside the default judgment
The trial court set aside the default judgment against Doms on the conditions that

Doms pay attorney's fees to Plaintiffs pursuant to affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel,
and obtain new counsel (R. 126-27). Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit and a supplemental
affidavit in support of attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $4,467.60 (R. 29-33,
60-63; Add. 29).
Doms paid the $4,467.60 pursuant to the Order of the trial court to comply with the
conditions of setting aside the default judgment (R. 76-78). The trial court subsequently
ordered that the amount of attorney's fees to which Plaintiffs were entitled would be
decided by the trial court at a final disposition of the case on its merits (R. 245-47; Add.
16).
Plaintiffs are entitled only to those attorney's fees and costs directly incurred in
obtaining the default judgment and the setting aside of the default judgment.7

An

examination of Plaintiffs' affidavit and supplemental affidavit of attorney's fees and costs
clearly reveals that Doms should receive a substantial refund of the $4,467.60 he paid to
have the default judgment set aside. The trial court awarded the full $4,467.60 to Plaintiffs,

7

See, e ^ C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2700 (1983); Annotations, 3 A.L.R. FED. 956 (1970); Nichiro Gyogvo Kaisha v. Norman,
606 P.2d 401, 403 (Alaska 1980); Weitz v. Yankoskv. 409 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Cal. 1966).
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thus allowing them to keep the money they had already been paid by Doms (F. of F.
70(b)(i)). This ruling must be reversed and remanded with directions to award Plaintiffe
only these attorney's fees and costs incurred in regard to the default judgment.
G.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded.
The trial court awarded Plaintiffe a total of $27,185.00 in attorney's fees for the

services of Mcintosh, $13,790.00 in attorney's fees for the services of Biele, and $358.20 in
costs (C. of L. 51-53; Judg. 1111 19-21). Plaintiffe are not entitled to any of these awards of
attorney's fees and costs, and these rulings of the trial court should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's "findings of fact" on remand regarding alleged prejudice suffered by
Plaintiffe through Doms' delay in seeking rescission are a complete fiction. There were no
additional findings to be found in the record regarding prejudice because it simply was not
an issue at trial. Because the trial court was unable to enter real additional findings of fact
concerning prejudice on remand, Doms is entitled to rescission.
In addition to rescission, Doms is entitled to fees at trial, and on appeal as the
prevailing party at each. For the same reason, the trial court's award of fees to Plaintiffe
should be vacated. Finally, Doms' overpayment of fees to Plaintiffe with respect to the
default judgment should be refunded.
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Irving H. Biele
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees and
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Salt Lake City, UT 84105
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Ellen Andersen, as personal representative of the Estate of D-C. Anderson;
Ellen Andersen, personally; Dan Scott
and Jeanne Scott,
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and
Cross-Appellees,
v.
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E. Poms.
Defendant, Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant,

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

MEMORANDUM
DECISION
(Not For
Publication)
Case No- 920653-CA
F I L E D
(November 4, 1994)

Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the Estate of D.C- Anderson;
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott
and Jeanne Scott,
Third-Parry Plaintiffs, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees,
v.
Summit County Title Company, a Utah
corporation,
Third-Party Defendants, and
Appellees,
Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the Estate of D^C. Anderson;
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott
and Jeanne Scott,
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and
Cross-Appellees,
v.
Summit County, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah; and Blake
L. Frazier, in his official capacity as
Summit County Auditor; Gump & Ayers Real
Estate, Inc., a Utah corporation; Victor
R. Ayres; Dcmcoy Enterprises, Inc., a
Utah corporation; Eucene E, Doras:
unknown defendants described as John
Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5,
Defendants, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellant.

Third District, Summit County
The Honorable John A- Rokich
Attorneys:

Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, Salt Lake City,
for Cross-Appellant Eugene Doms

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellants raise several challenges to the trial court's
determination to alicv appellee (Doms) to proceed with his
counterclaim. Appellants7 arguments relating to the counterclaim
include whether the statute of limitations barred the
counterclaim, whether the counterclaim related back to the date
appellants filed their foreclosure action, whether the deed Doms
obtained from Dcmccy was valid, whether Doms was the real party
in interest, vhe*cher Doms was a remote grantee, and whether the
trial court improperly joined involuntary plaintiffs. We agree
with the trial court's decision to allow .Doms to proceed with his
counterclaim and find appellants7 arguments to be without merit.
Thus, we decline to address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d
336, 396 (Utah 1939} (court may decline to address arguments
without merit en appeal).
In his cross-appeal, Doms asserts that the trial court
improperly applied the equitable doctrine of laches and refused
to rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. "To successfully assert
a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the
defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. Chandler,
733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987); accord Paoanikolas Brothers Enter,
v. Sucarhcuse Shoreinc Canter Assocs.. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah
1975) ; Utah Deot. of Transo. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ,
751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (defendant must establish
prejudice before laches defense may be successfully asserted) ;
see In re Petition of Merrill Cook. 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah
1994) (denying petition because petitioners failed to act with
reasonable diligence and because relief requested "could work a
substantial hardship on the State").
The trial ccurt made findings concerning Doms's delay in
bringing the action but made no findings as to whether appellants
were prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, we remand this case to
1. We note that we do not agree that any time property increases
or decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense
is automatically met. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 988
(Utah 1953) ("natural increment" in value of property does not
constitute prejudice in laches claim); see also West Los Angeles
Institute for Career Research v. Maver, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th
Cir. 1965) (mere increase or decrease in property value does not
(continued«...)
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the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact
relevant: to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in
Dons pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find
from the evidence presented that the appellants were prejudiced
by the delay, the ecuitable doctrine of laches should not bar the
remedy of rescission*2 Accordingly, we remand this case to the
trial court.

5^5

Norman H. Jackson^Cucge

WE CONCUR:

CKadiHh M. B i l l i n g s ,

Judge

greenwood, i Judge
1. (. ..continued)
alone convert delay into laches) ; Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386
A.2d 1334, 1388 (R.I. 1978); (fact that property appreciated does
not in and of itself convert delay into laches) ; Lincoln v.
Fisher, 339 P.2d 1084, 1093 (Or- 1959).
A chance in property value is one factor courts should
consider in determining prejudice. Lawson v. Hanves, 170 F.2d
741, 744 (10th Cir. 1943); Filler v. Richland County, 806 P.2d
537f 540 (Mont. 1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 159
(Utah 1976) . Further, other courts have determined that a change
in property value did not prejudice landowners because the change
could be taJcen into account by a court of equity in fashioning a
just remedy. Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647, 658 (Haw. 1985).
2. Because it is possible that the trial court will order the
contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in the record
concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims
raised. However, in the event the trial court does not rescind
the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings
and conclusions do net adequately treat the effect of the
intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms,s right to
pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment
entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of McCoy's interest
in Rossi Hills on Dcms's ownership interest in the property and
any damages for breach of title warranties.
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IRVING H. BEELE, USB #A0317
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

FILED DtSTaCT COURT
Third Judicial District

#2194
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

JUN 0 4 1996

J A M E S A MCINTOSH, U S B

SALT LAKE COUNTY
By
OoutyCJam

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D. C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs,

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AS PER THE MEMORANDUM DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

vs.

EUGENE E. POMS and
MICHAEL R. McCOY,
Defendants.

Case No. 8339
Judge John A. Rokich

From the evidence and law adduced at trial of this case, the Court makes the following
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The real estate transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendants relating to the

Rossi Hills Property in Summit County, State of Utah, was an arms-length transaction conducted
in good faith and wherein the Defendant Doms had full knowledge of the encumbrances (Second
Amended Findings of Fact #41 and #43) and as heretofore found there was no fraud or
misrepresentation involved in the sale.
2.

Doms determined that the property value could be enhanced if it was developed

with two other adjoining parcels and purchased an interest in one of the adjoining parcels,
slipper parcel, so that an integrated development could take place and he proceeded to try to
develop the properties even though he had no experience in that area.
3.

Doms did not raise the issue of rescission at the time of the conveyance from him

and McCoy to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on August 30, 1983. (See Ex. 16), nor did he raise
the issue of rescission when he requested and obtained a warranty deed to the property from
Domcoy on August 20, 1988. Doms' actions and conduct indicated he wanted to own the subject
property despite the encroachments and prescriptive easements and did not act to rescind the
transaction.
4.

The findings of fact heretofore made by this Court found that Doms had

familiarized himself with the property, knew of the encroachments, the loop road and that
Anderson's property development could be enhanced if developed with two other adjoining
parcels. Doms proceeded to try and develop the property even though he had no experience in
developing real estate and was unfamiliar with land development in the Park City area.
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5.

It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a quick profit

and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound economic evaluation for the
development of die property.
6.

Doms' motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the slipper parcel so that

an integrated development could take place. However, he was unsuccessful in obtaining the
I

third parcel which would have made the project more feasible and profitable.
7.

The Defendant Doms' claim for rescission was based on two theories, the first

being stated in the first cause of action of the Counterclaim which claimed a violation of the
covenants against encumbrances as the same were contained in the warranty deed; and the
second claim was contained in the third cause of action which claimed rescission based on fraud.
I

(See Second Amended Counterclaim).
a.

In relation to the first cause of action, the court found that all the

preliminary documents were merged into the warranty deed (Second Amended Findings
of Fact #54 and Second Amended Conclusions of Law #7) and the doctrine of Bersstrom
v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) did not apply as this was an executed contract
rather than an executory contract as existed in Bersstrom v. Moore.

Mavnard v.

Wharton. 284 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, (Utah Ct. App. February 23, 1996) citing other Utah
Appellate Court Decisions, some of which were discussed by this Court in its Second
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
b.

The Defendant Doms abandoned his claim for fraud and misrepresentation

as set forth in the third cause of action of the counterclaim and the court concluded that

there was no fraud or negligent misrepresentation in this matter. Plaintiffs had* not made
representations which were false or that would have induced Doms to enter into the
transaction to his injury and damage.

Furthermore, there was no showing that the

plaintiffs were in a superior position and negligently made false reprsentations about the
property which they could expect Doms to rely and act thereon.

(Second Amended

Conclusion of Law #41)
8.

During March 1982 the Deed, Note and Trust Deed were all signed, delivered

and recorded (Exhibits #1 and #3). The purchase price was paid by cash and the execution of
the Promissory Note.
9.

The defendants entered into possession of the real estate and commenced

negotiations for a three-parcel integrated development with adjoining property owners (Second
Amended Findings of Fact #46 and Exhibits #81 and #82).
10.

The first offer for rescission by either of the defendant parties was made by Doms

through the filing of his second amended counterclaim on or about June, 1988, which was more
than six (6) years after the completion of the purchase agreement and after he obtained
knowledge of the claimed defects (R. 6882-3 and Second Amended Finding of Fact #43). The
Court found and now finds that this is a grossly unreasonable delay in requesting rescission
(Second Amended Conclusions of Law No's. 33, 35, 39, 40) for the following reasons:
a.

Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.

He purchased the slipper parcel and attempted to formulate a plan for a three-parcel
integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs are now foreclosed from
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developing an integrated development because Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel
and the likelihood of Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated development
is remote.
b.

Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984,

1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and required the plaintiffs to initiate legal
action to clear the title.
c.

D. C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction, died while Doms

was in possession of the property, thus making it impossible to elicit testimony from the
decedent.
d.

Doms' delay of more than six (6) years before he sought to rescind the

transaction adversely affected the plaintiffs' opportunity to resolve the encroachment and
easement problems because witnesses would be unavailable and memories are dimmed
by the lapse of time.
e.

During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. and Summit County

were in possession of the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value.
f.

Doms' inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the property

impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in the real estate market and the
increased costs to develop the property if they chose to do so.
g.

Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the

plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable.
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h.

Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine of

rescission.
11.

On August 30, 1983, the defendants and each of them, by warranty deed,

conveyed the Rossi Hills Property to a corporation named Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibits
81 and 82) If Doms is claiming that this deed conveyed all of Mr. McCoy's interest so that it
was not subject to foreclosure, then it also conveyed all of Doms' interest and he would have
no basis for rescission or enforcement of plaintiffs' March 10, 1982 warranty deed to him and
Mr. McCoy.
12.

Neither of the defendants had title or color of title to the subject premises between

August 30, 1983, when they deeded the premises to the corporation, until August 20, 1988,
when the dissolved corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., delivered a conveyance of the subject
Property to Mr. Doms. (Exhibit 12).
13.

The trust deed required the defendants and each of them to pay the accruing taxes

on the Property (Exhibit 2) and the defendants failed to pay the taxes for the years 1982, 1983,
1984, 1985 and 1986.
14.

The defendants and each of them were in substantial default under the provisions

of the Trust Deed as they failed to pay the required real estate taxes which resulted in the sale
of the Property to Summit County on May 27, 1987 (Notice of Final Tax Sale - Exhibit 5 to
Complaint in consolidated case #10066).
15.

Subsequent to the said tax sale on May 27, 1987, Summit County, as a body

corporate and politic of the State of Utah, held the fee simple title to the Rossi Hill Property
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until on or about August 24. 1988. See §59-2-1357, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
which was in effect at the time of the said tax sale and the Utah Supreme Coun case of Hanson
v. Burris. 46 P.2d 400, 403, 406 (Utah 1935).
16.

The result of a valid Auditor's Deed conveying the fee simple title to the Rossi

Hill Property to Summit County, would cause the security represented by the Trust Deed to be
extinguished. See Hanson v. Burris. 46 P.2d 400, 403, 406 (Utah 1935). Therefore, plaintiffs,
in order to protect their security interests, were required to institute an action against Summit
County to set aside the Auditor's Tax Deed. This coun found the sale to be unconstitutional and
therefore plaintiffs' Trust Deed was reinstated. (Consolidated Case #10066 and Exhibit 5 to the
Complaint in such consolidated case.)
17.

Defendant Michael R. McCoy defaulted in this case, a judgment was entered

against him (R. 34-40; R. 572,3) and in accordance with said judgment, his undivided one-half
interest was sold at sheriffs sale as per the Certificate of Sale which is attached hereto. There
is no evidence that Doms made any attempt to redeem the property at any time subsequent to
said sheriffs sale, nor did the said defendant, Michael R. McCoy, join in the actions for
rescission or tender his interest in the subject real estate. Under these circumstances McCoy's
former interest in the property could not be conveyed to the plaintiffs in any attempted rescission
by Doms.
18.

The defendants and each of them were in default as the payments required by the

Promissory Note to be made after September, 1984, were not paid (Exhibit 6), nor were the
taxes paid.
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19.

One of the grantors, Mr. D. C. Anderson, died in Salt Lake City, Utah on

September 20, 1983, making it impossible to elicit testimony from him. Mr. Anderson's estate
was duly probated and his wife, Ellen R. Anderson, was duly appointed personal representative
of his estate and has been acting as such since November 30, 1983. Neither of the defendants
filed a claim for either damages or rescission against the estate. (R. 7988)
20.

From August 30, 1983 (when Doms and McCoy conveyed their title in the

property to Domcoy) through the date of the tax sale on May 27, 1987 (when Summit County
acquired fee simple title to the property) the corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., was the sole
owner of the Rossi Hills Property having acquired title thereto subject to the trust deed, by
reason of a warranty deed from both defendants to it dated August 30, 1983. (Exhibits 81 and
82). The Defendant Doms did not reacquire any interest in Rossi Hills Property until August
20, 1988, when the dissolved corporation, Domcoy, delivered a conveyance to Mr. Doms.
(Exhibit 17)
21.

During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, and Summit County had title

to the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value.
22.

At no time, by pleading or otherwise, did the Defendant Doms or any other party

owning an interest in the Rossi Hills Property make a legally sufficient tender the same to the
plaintiffs.
23.

The March 10, 1982 deed from plaintiffs to the defendants and involving the Rossi

Hills Property created a fully integrated contract involving two grantees or purchasers, each of
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whom acquired an undivided one-half interest. (Exhibit 1, Second Amended Findings of Fact
#54, and Second Amended Conclusions of Law #7.)
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Doctrine of Rescission was not available to the defendant and counterclaimant

Doms for the following reasons:
a.

The Defendant Doms obtained only an undivided one-half interest in the

Rossi Hills Property by reason of die March 10, 1982 deed (Exhibit 1) and a joint action
by all co-owners is required in order to repudiate or rescind the contract.
b.

The default of the defendants in failing to pay accruing taxes and to

continue the payments required by the contract constituted substantial defaults and a
person in default cannot invoke the doctrine of rescission or repudiation.
c.

In order to rescind, it must be possible to return all parties to the status

quo and this is not now possible because:
i.

no claim for either damages, rescission, or other relief was made

against the estate of D. C. Anderson and it cannot be required to regurgitate
payments made to it;
ii.

the defendant/co-owner Michael McCoy's undivided one-half

interest has been sold at sheriffs sale and is not available to return the parties to
the status quo; and,
iii.

Doms, being motivated by the lure of a quick profit, did not take

time to make a sound evaluation for the development of the property.
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It would be inequitable to allow Doms to rescind under these circumstances.
d.

The Defendants had no right, title or interest in and to the real estate

subsequent to August 30, 1983, when they conveyed the Rossi Hills Property to Domcoy
Enterprises, Inc. or prior to August 20, 1988, when the dissolved corporation attempted
to convey the Property to Mr. Doms. This constitutes the entire pleading stage of the
action and since the defendants during that period had no interest in the Rossi Hills
Property, they could not tender the same to the plaintiffs.
e.

Since all prior Uniform Real Estate Contracts and representations were

merged into the final document, the March 10, 1982 deed, (Second Amended Finding
of Fact #54) this is a fully executed contract and the doctrine of rescission espoused in
Bersstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) is not applicable since that case
pertains only to executory contracts where the sale documents are still in escrow and
have not been delivered or recorded and the purchase price has not been paid (Second
Amended Conclusions of Law #7 and #11).
f.

Doms did not have the grounds for rescission based upon fraud or

negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs had not made representations which were false
or that would have induced Doms to enter into the transaction to his injury and damage.
Furthermore, there was no showing that the plaintiffs were in a superior position and
negligently made false representations about the property which they could expect Doms
to rely and act thereon.
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g.

It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a quick

profit and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound economic evaluation
for the development of the property.
h.

Doms' motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the slipper parcel

so that an integrated development could take place. However, he was unsuccessful in
obtaining the third parcel which would have made the project more feasible and
profitable.
i.

This Court now concludes that when Doms realized he did not have the

experience to develop the property, that he was in over his head in the transaction, and
when the bottom fell out of the real estate market in Park City, he sought to rescind,
which was an unavailable remedy in this Court's opinion. In other words, Doms was
suffering from buyer's remorse and trying to find a way out by trying to rescind.
2.

The plaintiffs were substantially prejudiced as a result of:
a.

The failure to pay the real estate taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984,

1985 and 1986, caused Summit County, a body corporate and politic, of the State of
Utah, to hold a tax sale on May 27, 1987 and since no one made a bid on the Property
at such sale, an Auditor's Tax Deed conveying the fee simple title to the Rossi Hills
Property in Summit County was executed which if valid would have eliminated all right,
title and interest of the plaintiffs in and to the Property, Hanson v. Bums, 46 P.2d 400,
403, 406 (Utah 1935).
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b.

The failure to pay real estate taxes which resulted in a tax sale of the

subject Property to Summit County required plaintiffs to institute an action against
Summit County to declare that the Auditor's Tax Deed conveying fee simple title to the
Rossi Hill Property to Summit County was void thereby reinstating the plaintiffs' Trust
Deed which required the expenditure of substantial sums by the plaintiffs.

(Second

Amended Findings of Fact, #42 and #43)
c.

Doms, Domcoy, and Summit County for over six (6) years (March 10,

1982 - August 26, 1988) had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs, changed the condition of the property in relation to adjacent properties and
foreclosed the plaintiffs from taking any prompt corrective action in relation to
encumbrances.
d.

The death of D. C. Anderson and the failure to file any claim against his

estate made it impossible to elicit his testimony in relation to the terms and conditions
of the sale or to require his estate to participate in any judgment or decree.
e.

The delay of approximately five years after knowledge of the encumbrance

and before requesting rescission was unreasonable and allowed market forces to adversely
affect the value of the subject Property to the prejudice of the plaintiffs.
(iJ

This Court recognizes the doctrine of prejudice established in the Utah

Supreme Court case of Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976), cited by the
Utah Court of Appeals in its Memorandum Decision.

This Court believes all the

elements found to exist in Jacobson are also present in the instant case as more fully
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described in the Findings of Fact above including the fact that (1) an original seller D.
C. Anderson, had died and his testimony as to the transaction was no longer available;
(2) the Rossi Hill Property had a 50% reduction in value during the five years when
Doms and Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. had the exclusive possession of the property; (3) the
entire Rossi Hill Property had been conveyed by Doms and McCoy to a third party, to
wit, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.; (4) Doms as an equal fifty percent (50%) shareholder in
Domcoy, received the full benefit of the value of the Rossi Hill Property because his
shareholding interests would have been increased by the value which the Rossi Hill
Property contributed to the net worth of Domcoy; and (5) at the time the defendants
conveyed their interest to Domcoy, the Property was worth as much as it was when they
purchased the Property from the plaintiffs.
g.

The undivided one-half interest of Michael R. McCoy, a defendant in the

case, was sold at sheriffs sale so that only a 50% interest in the Property could be
tendered for rescission.
h.

Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the

plaintiffs. He purchased the slipper parcel and attempted to formulate a plan for a threeparcel integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs are now foreclosed
from developing an integrated development because Doms has an interest in the slipper
parcel and the likelihood of Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated
development is remote.
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i.

Doms' inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the property

impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in the real estate market and the
increased costs to develop the property if they chose to do so.
j.

Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the

plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable.
k.

Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine of

rescission.
3.

The other matters referred to in the court of appeals' note 2 are reserved for

additional hearing and consideration.
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CERTD7ICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss.
)

CAROL A. DeMILL, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and that she caused the attached SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS PER THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS to be served upon counsel of record by causing the same to be hand
delivered as follows:
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
KELLER & LUNDGREN
(Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms)
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on this 15th day of May, 1996.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of May, 1996.

NOTARY PUBLIC
fj
Residing at Salt Lake County, UT *
My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SALE
I N THE"THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT
I N AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

N ANDERSON as P e r s o n a l
t e n t a t i v e -for t h e E s t a t e o-f
I ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, ELLEN
[SON p e r s o n a l l y , and JEANNE

Civil No. 8339
Judgment Rendered
January 20, 1988

!T,

P l a i n t i -f-f s ,

Order o-f Sale Issued;
October 21, 198S
Property Sold:
December 12th, 1988

vs

aEL R. MCCOY AND EUGENE E. DOMS.
De-f endants
The Sheriff o-f Summit County, State o-f Utah, hereby certifies as -follows:
1- On December 12th, 1988, pursuant to Rule 69 (e) o-f the Utah Rules
livil Procedure, the undersigned Sheri-f-f conducted an order o-f sale on
*ain Real property located in Summit County, Utah, legally described as
bws:
PARCEL NO. 1:
All o-f Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to
the amended plat thereo-f, as filed and o-f record in the
o-f-fice o-f the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2:
A l l o-f L o t s 17 and 1 9 , B l o c k 5 9 , Park C i t y S u r v e y , a c c o r d i n g
t o t h e amended p l a t t h e r e o - f , as - f i l e d and o-f r e c o r d i n t h e
o-f -f i c e o-f t h e Summit County R e c o r d e r , e x c e p t i n g t h e r e f r o m
any p o r t i o n l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e r e a i l r o a d r i g h t s o-f way as
d e s c r i b e d i n t h o s e c e r t a i n documents r e c o r d e d as E n t r y No.
8 1 7 6 i n Book C a t Page 4 0 1 , E n t r y No. 13316 i n Book H a t
Page 3 2 6 , and E n t r y No. 13610 i n Book H a t Page 3 7 3 , r e c o r d s
o-f Summit C o u n t y , U t a h .
PARCEL NO.

3i

•». 5U«t3G8_2Cfi

of the Summit Co* "»ty Recorder, excepting r-retrom any portion
located within t, . railroad rights of way . , described in
those certain documents recotded a^.Entry No, .8176 in Book C
at Page. 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book. H at Page 326, and Entry
No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah.

TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT FOR UTILITIES, INCLUDING SEWER AND
WATER LINES OVER AND SOUTHERLY FIVE FEET AND NORTHERLY FIVE FEET OF
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOTS.
• All o-f Lot 14, the South 1/2 o-f Lot 15, Block 58, Park City
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as -filed and o-f
record in the o-f-Fice o-f the Summit County Records,
The above described real property is located in Park City,
Summit County, Utah.
2— All right, title, interest and claim o-f said De-fendant, Michael R.
:y in and to the above described property, including the seller's interest
any real property contract relating to that above described real property
:onveyed to Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative -for the Estate o-f
Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott.
3— The above described property was sold -for a total purchase price paid
[lien Anderson as Personal Representative -for the Estate o-f D.C. Anderson,
Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, in the amount o-f
500.00, leaving a balance due on judgment in the amount o-f $339,942.94.
This real property listed above is subject to six month redemption
DATED this 15th day o-f December, 1988.

Sheriff Fred Eley
Summit County Sheriff

Dept,
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ADDENDUM 3

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
KELLER & LUNDGREN, L.C.
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal,
Representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,

ORDER ON COURTS
MINUTE ENTRY OF
MAY 6, 1997

Plaintiffs,
vs.

MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND
EUGENE E. DOMS,
Defendants.
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal,
Representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,

Civil No. 8339

Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.
1

BEST YBfic 539

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
representative of the Estate of
D.G ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5,

Civil No. 10066

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came before me, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Senior
District Court Judge, pursuant to remand from the Utah Court of Appeals requiring
additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to the above-entitled matter.
The Court having reviewed its notes and the memoranda filed by respective
counsel, concludes that the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by
Defendant Doms on March 10, 1997 are adopted by the Court. By the adoption of these
Facts and Conclusions, which will follow, the Court in its opinion has adequately treated
the effect of the intervening conveyance to and from Domcoy on Doms' right to pursue
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his counterclaims and the effect of the Default Judgment entered against McCoy and the
sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest, if any, in Rossi Hills on Doms' ownership interest in
the property and any damages for breach of title warranties.
The Court allowed an additional hearing at which both parties were heard through
their respective counsel on January 28, 1997. Respective counsel also submitted
memoranda and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court.
Being fully advised of the parties' positions herein, the Court herein makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendants Doms and McCoy, as tenants in common, conveyed Rossi Hills

to Domcoy, Inc., a Utah corporation, by warranty deed dated August 20, 1983.
2.

The two corporate officers of Domcoy at that time were McCoy as

president, and Doms as secretary/treasurer, and the directors were Doms and his wife,
and McCoy and his wife.
3.

In March of 1985, McCoy and his wife irrevocably tendered all their voting

rights in their shares of Domcoy, Inc. stock to Defendant Doms and resigned from the
corporation.
4.

Prior to this time, Doms' wife, who was never involved in the business of

Domcoy, had also resigned from Domcoy.
5.

Doms became the only officer and director of Domcoy, and still is the only

officer and director to this date.
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6.

On December 31, 1986, Doms allowed Domcoy to be involuntarily

dissolved by the Utah Division of Corporations for failure to file annual reports because
Doms was the only remaining officer and director of Domcoy; and Domcoy, therefore,
no longer had the minimum number of officers and directors required by Utah law and
the Certificate of Incorporation of Domcoy.
7.

By August of 1988, when Domcoy deeded Rossi Hills to Doms, Domcoy

was no longer conducting any business except "winding up" its affairs as a dissolved
corporation.
8.

As a result of these transactions, Domcoy had no board of directors which

could adopt a resolution regarding the transfer of Rossi Hills, and Doms was the only
shareholder entitled to vote because McCoy and his wife had irrevocably tendered their
voting rights and their shares of Domcoy stock to Doms in March of 1985.
9.

A sheriffs sale occurred on December 12, 1988, by the Sheriff of Summit

County and a corrected sheriffs deed bears the date of June 26, 1989, transferring the
interests of defendant McCoy in the Rossi Hills property to plaintiffs.
10.

At the time of the issuance of the sheriffs deed, defendant McCoy had no

ownership interest whatsoever in the Rossi Hills property.
11.

Doms and McCoy did not purchase the property as a partnership, and at

no time did either party hold the property as a partnership.
12.

Plaintiffs have not sued Doms and McCoy in this lawsuit as a partnership,

and have never obtained or attempted to obtain a Judgment against Doms and McCoy as
4

a partnership.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Despite intervening conveyances between Doms and McCoy to Domcoy,

the foreclosure upon title to the Rossi Hills property by Summit County, and the
subsequent reconveyance to Doms by Summit County, Doms presently holds clear title to
the property and his right to pursue his counterclaim is not affected.
2.

Plaintiffs lack standing to attack the validity of the Warranty Deed

conveying Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms which is a valid deed vesting title to the
property in Doms.
3.

Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as the real party

in interest, because Rossi Hills was never partnership property.
4.

The Default Judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of

McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills has no effect on Doms' ownership interest in the
property and his ability to collect damages for breach of title warranties, because McCoy
had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the sheriffs sale pursuant to the Default
Judgment against McCoy was conducted; and plaintiffs, therefore, acquired no ownership
interest in the property from the sheriffs sale.
5.

Since rescission has been denied by this Court based upon the doctrine of

laches, Doms still has available to him the remedy of damages based upon plaintiffs'
breach of the warranty against encumbrances.
6.

This Court now concludes that it has now met the requirements of the
5

orwar \T raw r t. -*

decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in remanding this case back to this Court for
further Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and this Order shall be deemed final
for purposes of appeal on the date in which it is signed.
DATED this

ff

day oiS^fT&~

o^li'Ljj"///
>

, 1997.
~\

A. ROKICH
IOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be
mailed, by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this £>j<\ day of
Irving H. Biele
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

\ lliflf

, 1997, to:

James A. Mcintosh
James A. Mcintosh & Associates
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
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ADDENDUM 4

IN T

DISTRICT COURT OF THE TK

D JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, et al.

Transcript of:

Plaintiff,

HEARING

vs.
MICHAEL R. MC COY, et al.
Defendant.

Case No. 8339

The above-entitled cause of action came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable John A. Rokich,
Senior Judge pro tern of the Third Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah, at Summit County, on Friday,
October 27, 1995.
Appearances
For the Plaintiff:

IRVING H. BIELE
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah
JAMES A. McINTOSH
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant:

LARRY R. KELLER
KELLER & LUNDGREN
257 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

: 2". 1995, Judge Rokich, in the conference
.::r. senior pro tern Judge.
::-:i COURT:

3
4

vs. Michael ?. llz Zzy,

Lee m e —

Ellen Anderson et al.

et al., Case No. 8339, and the

• needing today is to either set a
ierer.ee or maybe get it resolved here this
rpears to me from reading the memorandum
here is with regard to rescission.
9

EL. KELLER:

That is correct, Your Honor.

10

~'£Z ZOURT:

11

:--li net allow the rescission at the time we

I thought I made that quite

12
13

I!?.. 3ISLE:

14

HR. EZLLER:

You did.
Your Honorr if I may.

:ty initially.
Zzizz

We are

We filed the first motion to

of Appeals1 decision.

I would like tc

:unity to explain that to you if ycu will let

:av= a:
13
19
20

THE COURT:
is

Yes.

I just wanted to know that

:e issue.

21

. *vZLLER:

It is the issue, Judge, but

:g cf rescission is the issue.

22

a

23

Essentially v'-zz

24

found zhaz

25

tc the issue cf unreasonable delay were appropriate.

*•*«.«•).

. •r

f***

2i

^ "•• ** '

the Court of Appeals has said is they

your Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
You

found -ha- -here was unreasonable delay.

But what they

•hen said was -hat is not enough to implement the
affirmative defense of laches.

That, in fact, in order to

prevail- rescission through laches as you have done, you
have -o make Findings of Fact regarding prejudice to the
?ar~7 that is alleging the laches-

So even though you

found there was nc rescission because of the unreasonable
delay, ycu made nc findings whatsoever with regard to the
issue cf prejudice.

And the Court of Appeals is very

specific. Judge, and essentially they upheld you-

Do you

have that Court cf Appeals1 decision?
7HZ COURT:
M?.. 3CELLER:

Yes, I have it now.
On the second page, Your Honor.

I ask ycu :: read along so there is no question.

The very

first paragraph Judge Jackson talks about the challenges
raised :: Ccms* counterclaim for rescission.

They list

si:c cf these challenges and they state, "We agree with the
trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his
counterclaim and find appellant's arguments to be without
merit.

Thus we decline to address them."

So they first

upheld you en your decision to allowing Doms to proceed
with counterclaim.
Then with regard to the issue of laches, the
court states that, "To successfully assert a laches
defense," I am reading the second paragraph now, "a

defendant must: establish both that the plaintiff
unreasonably delayed in bringing an action, and that the
defendant was prejudiced."
In the last paragraph on that page, before
the footnote it begins, "The trial court made findings
concerning Dents' delay in brining the action but made no
findings as to whether appellants were prejudiced by the
delay."

In the footnote they note that, "We do not agree

that any time property increases or decreases in value the
prejudice prong of the laches defense is automatically
met."
That footnote goes on to the next page,
Your Honor, and they cite several cases for that
proposition and they say a change in property value is one
factor the court should consider in determining prejudice.
So then the last sentence on the second page before the
footnote is, "Therefore, we remand this case to," over to
page. 3, "the trial court for the purpose of entering
findings of fact relevant to whether appellants were
prejudiced by any delays in Doms pursuing the
counterclaim.

If the trial court cannot find from the

evidence presented," and I am reading just above, up here
Judge. "If the trial court cannot find from the evidence
presented that the appellants were prejudiced by the
delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the

remedy cf rescission.

Accordingly, we remand this case to

the -rial court."
So it is cur position in this motion, Judge,
that the plaintiffs now have the burden of coining forward
and establishing zc you the prejudice from the record.

I

mean, this is not a situation where we are opening
anything up.
THE COURT:

I think probably what has

happened here. I go through my notes, is the fact that
laches wasn't the only basis upon which I made my
decision.

That is the thing.

In fact, I recall from

going back from my recollection, a number of factors that
I considered in outlining my decision.

I think one cf

them was your client couldn't wait to get into that
property.

I didn't find fraud.

misrepresentation.

I didn't find

It was just an out-and-out sale of the

property which he bought.

And in order for them to latch

onto this one issue, I think is out in left field, if you
want to know the truth of the matter.
MR. KELLER:

May I respond briefly to that,

Judge?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. KELLER:

I respect your opinion, but I

would like for you to understand that essentially the
Court of Appeals is saying that whether you found that

f

ether issuss should control this case or not, they believe
-ha- rescission should control unless you find the second
prong cf laches.
THE COURT:

I don't think even laches is a

necessary issue in this case.
ever -his.
find—

That is m y — And I went

Luckily I have kept: my notes, and I don't

I was surprised a~ this decision that laches was a

con-roiling issue.

I don't find that to be the case.

MR. KELLER:

But the Court of Appeals

decided otherwise. Judge, and now they have asked you to
do something specific.

The question is what are you going

wO cc rrcm nere."
THE COURT:

I will have to go back through

my notes and I will just write—

I don't know the

necessity of another hearing.
MR.. KELLER:

I propose, Judge, that what we

maybe ought to dc is have them present to you their
position with regard to what prejudice is, and then let us
respond to that.
THE COURT:
necessary.

I don't think that is absolutely

I don't think that is absolutely necessary.

I

am going to go back through my notes and I will review and
I have to go back through your proposed Findings.

I may

have created the problem for not including Findings in my
memorandum decision.

Whoever prepared the final Findings

didn't address "his issue and so, therefore, what I would
suggest and what Z have beer, thinking about, is why don't
you each prepare seme proposed Findings with regards to
this issue of rescission-

It might be repetitive of what

you did before, and file those and then we can have
another hearing and I will review them with you.

But I

will give you each ten days to file some proposed findings
concerning the issue of rescission, and I will go back
over my notes that I kept and review them and review what
Z do have and if Z don't have all of them I will call you,
but that is what Z am going to do.

I don't see the

necessity cf another hearing in this case.
MR. KELLER:

Well, there is something mere

here too ycu need to understand, Judge.

The court has

also instructed ycu that if you find there was adequate
prejudice tt establish that the doctrine of laches should
prevent the rescission in this case, then it says in
footnote two, it is very important.
THE COURT:

I don't care what the—

shouldn't say Z don't care.

I

But I think they are off on

the wrong tact in this case and I am going to go back over
the Findings and then we will submit that; and then if
they want to reverse me again, that is fine.
MS.. KELLER:
specific instructions too.

But, Judge, there are some

THE COURT:

They may give me those

instructions.

They may give me chose specific

instructions.

The appellate court is not always right.

And when Z nade that decision, I recall specifically that
was the first thing we decided in this case, remember:
vr

—~hsr :: rescind and take the counterclaim.

And I, at

that time. Z made my ruling that laches and prejudice was
~-~.

Sc whoever read the transcript, whether they did or

didn't. Z ±z-'z
zz then.

know, but they only read what you submit

And I think the appellate court doesn't have all

of the farts for them to make such a ruling.

MR. KELLER:
regard for ycu, sir.

That is my

Judge, I have the highest

I want you to know that.

I am

asking ycu new if. on the record, ycu are stating that you
den't intend to fellow the direction of the Court of
Appeals?

Is that what ycu are saying?
THE COURT:

No, I am not saying that.

I am

saying that Z am going back and review my notes and find
cut eicacnly what I based my decision on, and then I am
gcing to have the three of you review it.

But at this

juncture Z don't think that this issue they raised is the
basis u?cn which I made my decision.

This happened a

couple cf years ago and this case has gone on forever.
I will get that resolved in the next— We

will se: a hearing date so I can gee you back together
here.

Z will ss: it right new so that we can get that

case resolved.

And I will review the case in line with

this case and in line with my notes,
Mr.. 3ISLE:

You would like us to submit

proposed Findincs?
THE COURT:
MR. KELLER:

Right.
3ut not legal argument or

cases, just prepesed Findings?
THE COURT:

Proposed Findings.

I will go

ever the- ~ith my notes and I will get back to you, get
back together and then we will have argument.
MR. 31ELE:

If we need to go further, then

we will lock at footnote two.
THE COURT:
MR. KELLER:

Right.
Judge, will you just allow me

to address the subject of other things that the Court of
Appeals has asked you to do?
THE COURT:

Sure.

I don't preclude

anytning.
MR. KELLER:

I understand you think the

Court of Appeals was wrong on laches.

I appreciate that.

In footnete two they suggest that if you decide there was
adequate prejudice in this case to allow the second prong
of laches to prevent rescission for Doms, there are other

findings ycu need to make.

It seems to me what you are

saying, ycu think "here was adequate prejudice.
grir.g "

You are

r: bark zz ycur notes and lock at this, and then

ycu will h = -.-s us argue that.

But it is clear that isn't

the only -hing ycu have been instructed to do*

THE COURT:

Ycu

But my concern is, in the first

instance, is -ha- this was net a contract wherein there
vas

— T —isrerresentaticn, any fraud.
MR. SELLER:
THE 30URT:

Doesn't need to be, Judge.
It was an arm's-length and your

client wanted zz rescind.
11?.. SELLER:

Right, because of the statutory

warranty against encumbrances which was violated.
found it --as violated.

You

Ycu said rescission was no good.

Yru found that they were in violation of the statutory
V£r

^anty against encumbrances and you awarded damages to

THE COURT:
2!?.. SELLER:

THE COURT:
MR. SELLER:

Right.
In addition to other remedies

Right.
The issue here is the Court of

Appeals is saying to you, sir, you were wrong in making
the decision based upon the Findings of Fact.

You held

that laches should prevent rescission and if ycu don't
find prejudice frcr. this, then rescission should apply.
That is what -hey are saying7HI COURT:

You understand?

I understand what they have

said, but my concern is whether that is the basis upon
which the decision was made or why that was raised.
MR. KELLER:
in this case.

That is the fundamental issue

It truly is.
THE COURT:

I don't know why the appellate

court even raised the issue.
MR. KELLER:

We raised it.

That was our

appeal.
THE COURT:

I don't know why they latched on

to that defense, that is the point I am making.

Why did

they pick out that specific point to have it come back for
further f indings ?
MR.. 3IELE:

What I see then is we make our

proposed Findings.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. 3IELE:

We then have a meeting.

THE COURT:

Right.

We will discuss that

and, if necessary, we go onto the other things that have
to be established.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. McINTOSH:

That is what we will do.

When did you want to have

that nex: meeting?
THE COURT:
Today is the

Let me look at the calendar.

27.
MR. McINTOSH:

You will give us ten days to

file seme simultaneous findings?
THE COURT:
November.

Yes.

You can file on the 10 of

Why don't we plan en meeting on the 17 here at

10 o'clock, or in the afternoon.

I can meet almost any

time Friday.
MR. KELLER:

The 17th at 10 o'clock is fine

wi th me.
MR. McINTGSH:

I will probably be down in

St. George that day, but Kank can carry it.
THE COURT:

Any Friday you are free, at 10

o'clock on Friday to get it taken care of.
over it.

I will go back

If you will make your appearances for the record

please.
MR. 3IELE:

Irving H. Biele and James A.

Mcintosh appearing for the plaintiffs.
MR. McINTOSH:

On that regard, Your Honor, I

have not been in this case since June 23 of 1992.
Mr. Bielefs office and other attorneys have handled all of
the appeal proceedings.

I have just this week filed a

Notice of Appearance, as co-counsel for the plaintiffs, in
the Summit County offices in Coalville.

Mr. Biele will be

the lead attorney in this case and I am co-counsel with

MR. KELLER:

And Larry R. Keller for

defendant Doms in this case.
THE COURT:
Lee me write this down.

All right, we will get it done,
November 17 at 10 a.si.

juggle ray Tooele calendar.

I will

If anything comes up, I will

call ycu.
MR. KELLER:

Judge, may I request of you,

because there are a couple of interesting twists to this.
THE COURT:
MR. KELLER:

Mere than one.
Well, procedurally, this is a

Sumr.it County case and apparently the file for this case
is still in Summit County.
THE COURT:

I got the file.

They brought it

down.
MR. KELLER:
THE COURT:

You do have the file?
I have it at home.

If either

one of you need the file, I will leave it here with Susie
downstairs here and then you can get it from her.
MR. KELLER:

In our memorandum on proposed

Findings of Fact we will be submitting to you, or our
proposed Findings of Fact, wouldn't it be appropriate to
ask the plaintiffs to cite to the record the evidence that
they believe establishes prejudice beyond just the

increase cr decrease in value?
THE COURT:
MR. KELLER:

Uh-huh.

Yes.

If we had an appraisal again

today, I think we would find the value is significantly
sere than it was originally purchased for.
THE COURT:
MR.. KELLER:

I'll Say.
Nevertheless, we are stuck with

the record and Z recognize that.

If they would be

required to cite to the record—
THE COURT:

You have a copy of the

MR. 3ISLE:

The transcript i s —

THE COURT:

Voluminous?

MR. 3IELE:

Yes.

transcript?

MR. SELLER:

If they come in and say

something is a fact, they need to cite that to you and
tell you where it is a fact.

So do I take on that

responsibility?
THE COURT:
here.

I don't have the transcript

Who has the transcript, the Summit County

Courthouse?
MR. 3IELE:

I guess it will be up at the

THE COURT:

I will ask Ms. Sundberg to see

courthouse.

if they can deliver it down here.

MR. KELLER:

I feel that if we could get

these down here in Salt Lake, it would make it easier for
bcth cf us.
T£Z COURT:
them.

I think I could get Melba to get

Z thin:-: it would be easier to get Susie or Mike

Halverscn, one c'f ~he two.
file dewr., all cf them.

I will ask then to order the

Everything that is up there to

bring then down.
MR. McINTOSH:
^»/*«-»0

What do you have at your

.""* * * *^ C" e* ^

THE COURT:

Just two files.

MR.. McINTOSH:

There is a lot more than

that.
THE COURT:

I have the most recent files.

MR. McINTOSH:

Is this going to interfere

with the filing cf the briefs on November 10th?
Suppose it is net down here?
MR. 3IELE:

If it does, we will contact you.

THE COURT:

As soon as I finish here I will

have then crder it and bring everything down.

All the

files in this case and the transcript.
MR. KELLER:

Judge, one concern that I have

is that the Court cf Appeals has squarely put it, put the
burden en the plaintiffs to show you that there is
prejudice sc ycu can establish it.

JLD

THE COURT:

Right.

ME.. KELLER:

In filing simultaneous briefs-

THE COURT:

Okay, you dcn't have to do it

MR. KELLER:

Could I have ten days after?

:nen.

THE COURT:

Ten days after.

What we ought

to do is kick the scheduling to sometime in December.
Let's get the transcripts down here and I will get a
telephone conference and set a date after the documents
are here.
MR. KELLER:

That will be good.

The date of

both first submissions, you agree I can have ten days
after they present theirs?
THE COURT:

Right.

that, sure you can have the time.
time in December.

If we are going to do
We will set it for some

3ut as soon as I get word that the

documents are here, then from that date forward I will set
a date in which you have to have the findings in to me,
okay.
MR. 3IELE:

Now, there are more than one

basis for rescission.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. BIELE:

And if the court determines

that there is a different basis than they had in mind,
then ycu will have to make the findings as to that basis.

THE COURT:
tc make earlier.

That is the point I was trying

That is what I was saying about this

opinion, if there are ether bases upon which the
rescission was refused, then laches is not applicable.
MR. McINTOSH:
for your decision.

You gave that as the basis

You said we will not get to that

because you went into the rescission issue on laches.
That is what you based it on.

They have cited Bergstrom

vs. Moore, and I think that needs to be addressed.
MR. KELLER:

We are not submitting arguments

or law, just proposed Findings and the evidence upon which
you are relying.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. 3ISLE:

Because the timing of various

things is important in this case, I have prepared a
time-line draft.
MR. KELLER:

Your Honor, I object to this.

The one they presented in the Court of Appeals was not
accurate.

I have never seen this before.

introduce new evidence.
from the record.

We are not to

The court is very clear, it is

This is new stuff.

I object to it.

I

don't think the court should consider it.
MR. McINTOSH:

Judge, that is illustrative.

It would help you tie all of these things together.
THE COURT:

You can offer it.

If you

1

object, I will withhold accepting it until you have an

2

opportunity to review.
MR. KELLER:

I object to any party

presenting any new evidence for illustrative purposes or
otherwise.
5

THE COURT:

All right, no problem.

7

MR. BIELE:

Mr. Keller, let's net get: into

3

hassling about things that are not important.

9

new evidence.

10
11

This is not

This is illustrative of the evidence.
MR. KELLER:

trial of this case.

That was not presented in the

It is new evidence, whether

illustrative or otherwise.
THE COURT:

13
14

won't look at it.

15

MR. KELLER:

15

THE COURT:

IT

If there is an objection, I

I object.
Fine, nc problem.

That will

take care of it.

IS

MR. BIELE:

I would like you to keep this

19

and the record will note that I have submitted it as being

20

illustrative of the timing in this case and to assist the
court.
MR. KELLER:
MR- McINTOSH:

23

I will be happy to keep it.
I guess you wouldn't have

24

any objection to us attaching it to any documents we file

25

in court?

THE COURT:

No, he is objecting to it.

Don't attach anything to the documents.
problem.

I don't want any

I will get it resolved one way or the other.

I am wrong, I am wrong.
MR. KELLER:

If I am right, I am right.
You thought you had retired.

MR. McINTOSH:

Thank you, Judge.

(Hearing adjourned.)
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
:
representative of the Estate of :
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON :
personally, DAN SCOTT and
:
JEANNE SCOTT,
:
Plaintiffs

SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

VS.

MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants

NO

;

FILED'"

:
:

*:?»; 2 z B2
.Cere at 2a^,~r. Ciuniy

:

D«curv iZUrx

ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the Estate of :
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON ::
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
:
Third-party Plaintiffs

:
::

vs.

Civil No. 8339

(Judge John A. Rokich)

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party Defendant
W^^^^^^SS^B^^BM^^^^^^^^^^^.
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^^

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,

:
:
:
:

Plaintiffs

:

vs.

:

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5,

:
:
:
;:
:
:
::
:
:
:
i
:

Civil No. 10066
(Judge John A. Rokich)

Defendants

Trial in the above-entitled matter came before the Court April
17, 18, and 19, 1990, and August 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1990.

An

evidentiary hearing dealing with the issues of attorney fees and
costs was held on December 31, 1991. At all times, Plaintiffs were
represented by James A. Mcintosh, Esq., and Irving H. Biele, Esq..
Defendant Eugene E. Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq.,
and Craig L. Boorman, Esq..

Third-Party Defendant, Summit County

Title Company, was represented by Brant H. Wall, Esq..

After

hearing the oral testimony of witnesses, reviewing such documentary
evidence as was admitted, memoranda filed by counsel herein,
considering the oral argument of counsel, and good cause appearing,
the Court having heretofore on September 9, 1991, signed certain

006875

"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Judgment;" the
parties having filed certain motions to amend the said Findings,
Conclusions, and Judgment; the Court thereafter on May 6, 1992,
having signed certain documents entitled "Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law," "Amended Judgment," and heaving further
signed those certain documents entitled "Supplement to Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law," and "Supplement to Judgment;" which
supplemental documents pertain primarily to the issue of attorney
fees and Court costs; the Court desiring to consolidate the said
amended and supplemental pleadings; hereby enters its "Second
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as follows:
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs

in this case, as grantors, conveyed

to

Defendant Eugene E. Doms and one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a
form Warranty deed upon which the word "Special" was typed, Lots
in Block 58 and 59, Park City Survey, State of Utah, and more
particularly described in Plaintiffs1 Exhibit IP as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1:

All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58,
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat
thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.

PARCEL NO. 2:

All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof,
as filed and of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad rights
of way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 32 6,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.

PARCEL NO. 3:

All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed
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and of record in the office of the Summit
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page
4 01, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 32 6,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 37 3,
records of Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five
feet of the following described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Records.
The property so described shall be referred to hereafter as
the "Rossie Hills Property."
2.

The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated

November 12, 1981

(see Defendant's Exhibit

contract

sale

for

the

of

the

Rossie

63D) , is a valid

Hills

Property,

and

specifically states that the conveyance of said property is to be
by "Warranty Deed."
3.

All subsequent documents of sale involving the parties

in this action leading up to the transfer of the Rossie Hills
Property by the aforementioned Warranty Deed referred to the
documents of transfer as a "Warranty Deed."
4.

The aforementioned Warranty Deed, executed by all four

of the Plaintiffs in this matter as grantors did not have the word
"Special" typed at the top of the document at the time the grantors
executed said Deed nor was it on the Deed when said Deed was
delivered to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982.
5.

Said Warranty Deed did not contain any of the language

which could lead the Court to the conclusion that it may have been
a "Special Warranty Deed," even if such were officially recognized
-4u *.J O
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under Utah law.
6.

Said Warranty deed contained no exceptions or limiting

language with regard to certain encumbrances and easements which
shall be hereafter discussed in these Findings.
7.
McCoy

Access to the Rossie Hills Property at thektime Doms and

purchased

the

property

was via

a

graded

right-of-way

extending in a northeasterly direction from the old rail right-ofway south of Block 59 as shown in Defendant's Exhibit 77D.
8.

After accessing the Rossie Hills property, the roadway

continued to Lot 21 of Block 58, made a loop through what was
designated as McHenry Avenue and Lots 24 and 25. This roadway will
hereafter be designated as the loop road.

(See Defendant's Exhibit

77D.)
9.

The loop road which is approximately 10-15 feet wide has

been in use for in excess of 40 years.
10.

Said

loop

road

has been used

openly,

notoriously,

continuously, and adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario
Avenue and whose rear property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie
Hills property, for a period in excess of 40 years as of the date
of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery of the Warranty Deed by
grantors to Defendant doms.

Such use was for ingress and egress

to the rear of their property, and for parking.
11.

Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are

encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by
adjoining property owners to the west.
77D.)
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(See Defendant's Exhibit

12.

The encroachments protrude from 12-16 feet onto the

Rossie Hills Property.
13•
bordered

These
by

encroachments,

said

including

fences, had been used

the

backyard

areas

openly, notoriously,

continuously and adversely for a period in excess of twenty years
as of March 23, 1982, by the aforementioned property owners, and
such use continues through present time.
14.

At the time of the delivery of the Deed to the Rossie

Hills Property, Plaintiffs had knowledge of the aforementioned
encroachments, either directly or through the knowledge of their
agent, Mike Sloan.
15.

Plaintiffs made no effort to remove or extinguish the

aforesaid encumbrances prior to the delivery of the Deed to
Defendant Doms, or at any time thereafter.
16.

Plaintiffs made no effort to quiet title to the Rossie

Hills Property and cause McHenry Avenue to be vacated; therefore,
Plaintiffs made no effort to mitigate Defendant's damages as such
damages related to these aforementioned encumbrances.
17.

The purchase price for the rossie Hills Property was the

amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($276,750.00).
18.

(See Defendant's Exhibit 69D.)

The Plaintiffs received the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars

($10,000.00) as earnest money in the aforementioned transaction,
and a down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($72,500.00), leaving a balance due on the purchase price of One
Hundred

Ninety-Four

Thousand

Two

($194,250.00).
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Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

19.

In consideration for the transfer of the Rossie Hills

property by Warranty Deed, Defendant Doms and one Michael R. McCoy
executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982*
(See Plaintiffs1 Exhibits 2P and 3P.) Said Trust Deed Note was in
the amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars (!$194,250.00) and called for interest payments monthly up
to and including January 10,1 985* The Note also provided that the
entire unpaid principal, together with interest, was due on January
25, 1985.
20.

The amount of each monthly payment was to be Two Thousand

Two Hundred Sixty-Six and 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25).
21.

Said Trust Deed Note provided that "each payment shall

be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the
reduction of principal."
22.

Plaintiffs received the sum of Seventy-Two Thousand Five

Hundred Twenty and 25/100 Dollars ($72,520.25) as monthly payments
pursuant to the aforementioned Trust Deed Note.

(See Plaintiffs1

Exhibit 6P.)
23.

The property conveyed to Eugene E. Doms and Michael R.

McCoy was located in a platted subdivision.
24.

The Rossie Hills Property as platted showed that the lots

in Block 58 and 59 were accessible by McHenry Avenue.

(See

Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 99P.)
25.

The recorded plat of the Rossie Hills Property was not

a true reflection of the actual physical layout of the land because
of the contour and fact that McHenry Avenue was never constructed
as a roadway.
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26.

The Rossie Hills Property was purchased for residential

development.
27.

At the time the Rossie Hills property was purchased, it

was zoned HR-1, which allowed historical uses and allowed single,
duplex and tri-plex dwellings to be constructed upon-the property.
28.

The utilization of all of the Rossie Hills Property is

affected by the contour of the land, the loop road, encroachments
and McHenry Avenue being undeveloped.
29.

Plaintiffs1 appraiser, Mr. Pia, concluded that as of

March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills Property subject to
the loop road and encroachments was around Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00).
30.

Defendant Doms1 appraiser, Mr. Webber, concluded that as

of March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills property was One
Hundred

Sixty-Six

Thousand

Dollars

($166,000.00)

if

the

encumbrances and loop road can be relocated and One Hundred Ten
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($110,700.00) if the loop road and
encumbrances cannot be relocated.
31.

McHenry Avenue had not been vacated by Park City or by

a judicial determination.
32.

Plaintiffs did not or could not have conveyed good and

marketable title to any part of McHenry Avenue at the time of the
execution of the warranty Deed to Doms and McCoy.
33.

Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate agent,

in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of the Rossie
Hills Property.
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34.

Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, one of the

sellers of the Rossie Hills Property, once before Doms and McCoy
purchased the property.
35.

Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property was

a prime piece of development property and its highest and best use
would be as an integrated development with the two adjoining
parcels referred to as Block 62 and the Slipper parcel.
36.

Defendant Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the

Slipper parcel in October of 1982.
37.

The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to

further the integrated development of the three parcels and to
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper parcel
and Block 62.
38.

In October of 1982, Doms engaged Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn,

an attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the owners
of Block 62 for the purpose of developing the three parcels as an
integrated development.
39.

Prior to Doms' purchase of the rossie Hills Property,

Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the development of the
three parcels of property prepared by the architect, Mr. Richard
Kohler.
40.
the

Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased

Rossie

Hills

Property

and

the

Slipper

parcel

that

the

integrated development of the three parcels had failed because of
the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel.
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41.

Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr. Sloan in

the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on the
property.
42.

Mr. Sloan informed Defendant doms that the encroachments

would not affect development and an access road to the property
would be in the same place as the loop road.
43.

Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for

the first time sometime between October 22, 1981, and November 7,
1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up and through 1984.
44.

Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind until

January of 1985, and said notice was by way of a settlement offer
in lieu of making the One Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty Dollar ($194,250.00) payment due on January 25, 1985.

Said

settlement offer in January of 1985 was an offer made to Plaintiffs
through Defendant Doms1 attorney, Gerald H. Kinghorn, in which
Defendant Doms offered to deed back the property to Plaintiffs in
return for Plaintiffs' cancellation of the aforementioned Trust
Deed Note.
45.

Plaintiffs did not respond to said settlement offer, but

rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property in June of
1985.
46.

Doms' purchase of Slipper parcel, the negotiations to

develop the three parcels as an

integrated development, the

subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems
with the Rossie Hills property, affirm the fact that Doms had
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than
October of 1982.
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47.

It was not until Plaintiffs1 action to foreclose was

filed that Defendant Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June
of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed.
48.

Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages

against the Estate of D.C. Anderson within three months after the
date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as provided
in Section 75-3-8 03 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
49.

The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment signed

on September 9, 1991, were filed in the office of the Summit County
Clerk on October 22, 1991, which the court finds is the date of
Entry.
50.

The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not

"final" because there were several issues to be decided which the
Court had not included in the said documents, which consisted of
several items including determination of attorney fees and costs.
51.

The Court does not believe it should interfere with the

agreements entered into by the client and the attorney for services
to be rendered when the attorneys, as in this case, have fully
apprised the clients of the fees and costs at the outset of the
case.
52.

The attorneys for plaintiffs and defendant have kept

detailed records of the time spent in the prosecution of this case
and have billed regularly so that the client was always aware of
what was transpiring in the case.
53.

The Court's decision as to fees and costs is not to be

construed as negating the client's obligation to pay the attorneys
in accordance with the terms of the attorney-client agreement.
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54.

The Court finds that the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer

to Purchase" which was signed by some of the parties in November
1981 was merged into the later Warranty Deed dated March 10, 1982.
Esoinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979).
(a)

The said Warranty Deed did not provide for payment

of attorney fees in an action based upon breach of warranties
contained in the said Deed.
55*

The Court finds that purchasers of real estate are not

entitled to attorney fees absent an express agreement providing
therefore, unless the purchaser commences a separate action against
third parties to remove encumbrances.

George A. Lowe Co. v.

Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 117 Pac. 874 (1911).
(a)

Doms has not commenced a separate action against

third parties to remove encumbrances.
56.

The Court finds the plaintiffs1 complaint in foreclosure

as well as all other actions by the plaintiffs were not instituted
or prosecuted in bad faith.
57.

The Counsel for plaintiffs and Doms aggressively

and

zealously presented their cases and neither party acted in bad
faith.
58.

The Court finds that Doms is not entitled to attorney

59.

The defendant Doms is not entitled to any prejudgment

fees.

interest on the $83,000.00 damages.
60.

Doms

is

entitled

to

the

following

costs

for

the

prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim:
(a)

Service of process on Jeanne Scott

$ 12.00

(b)

Service of process on Ellen Anderson

$ 12.75

-12-

00S885

61.

(c)

Service of trial subpoena: Mike Sloan

(d)

Witness fees: Elden and Ella Sorensen

(e)

Recording fee for corrected Sherifffs
Deed

(f)

The said costs awarded to Doms total

The issue of plaintiffs being entitled to attorney fees

and costs can be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs because the
provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed provided
that all costs and expenses of collection including reasonable
attorney fees can be charged against the maker.
62.

The Court finds that counsel for the plaintiffs and

defendant have expended many hours in the prosecution of this case
and their time sheets so reflect.
63.

The Court finds that hourly rates charged by counsel for

plaintiffs and defendant were reasonable.
64.

The

Court

finds

that

Plaintiffs'

counsel, James

A.

Mcintosh, at page 12 of his affidavit dated December 6, 1991,
states, "Most of the services rendered were in connection with the
Second Amended Counterclaim."
(a)

The

time

spent

on collection

of the Note

and

foreclosure action by plaintiffs1 counsel was nominal in comparison
to all the hours expended in this case.
(b)

The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to

recover attorney fees for the time spent on the collection of the
Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but not for
any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in
the Second Amended Counterclaim.
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65.
fees

for

The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney
legal services

incurred

in the prosecution

of the

collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set aside
default,

to

compel

sanctions,

setting

aside

the

tax

sale,

intermediate appeal and petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah
Supreme Court.
66.

In addressing the issue of these fees, the Court will

take into consideration the effect of the attorney fees awarded the
plaintiffs by Judge Pat B. Brian in the amount of $4,467.60 as a
condition of setting aside the Default Judgment against Doms.
67.

The Court will also make an award to plaintiffs based

upon Judge J. Dennis Frederick's ruling that plaintiffs were
entitled to a reasonable fee for bringing a motion to compel and
for sanctions before the court.
68.

The criteria for the Court's decision awarding attorney

fees is set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985
(Utah 1988).
69.

The Court understands the amount in controversy can be

a factor in determining a reasonable fee, but the Court is not
putting much reliance on this factor.
70.

The Court finds the plaintiffs should be awarded attorney

fees as follows:
(a)

FOR PLAINTIFFS1 COUNSEL, JAMES A. MCINTOSH. ESQ.:
(i)

Lawsuit to set aside tax sale

$ 5,245.00

(ii)

Petition for intermediate appeal

$ 2,730.00

(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ

$ 2,160.00

(iv)

For the foreclosure complaint

$12,300.00

(v)

For the motion to compel and for
-14-
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sanctions as per Judge Frederick's
minute entries
$ 4,750,00
(vi)
(b)

The total amount to be awarded for
Mr. Mcintosh's fees is
$27,185,00

FOR PLAINTIFFS1 COUNSEL IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ,:
(i)

Motion to set aside default
(This amount has already been
paid by Doms)

$ 4,467.00

(ii)

Lawsuit to set aside tax sale

$ 1,050.00

(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ

(iv)

and mandamus

$ 2,740.00

For the foreclosure complaint

$10,000.00

(v)

71.

The

The total amount to be awarded
for Mr. Biele's fees is
$13,790.00
Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to the

following costs:
(a)

Summit County Clerk —

(b)

Richie Zabriskie —

filing Complaint $ 50.00

fee for service

of Third-Party Summons and Complaint
(c)

Summit County Clerk —

filing fee for

Complaint in Civil No. 10066
(d)

Richie Zabriskie —

$ 16.50

$ 75.00

fee for service

of process in Civil No. 10066 on Domcoy
Enterprises Inc.
(e)

Utah Supreme Court —

$ 24.70
docketing fee

for filing Petition for Intermediate
Appeal
(f)

$125.00

Utah Supreme Court —

filing fee for

Petition for Extraordinary Writ of
Prohibition

$ 50.00

-15-

006888

(g)

Summit County Clerk —

fee for

certification of order
(h)

Steve Deckert —

$

witness fee for

attending trial
(i)

LeRoy J. Pia —

$ 30.00
witness fee

to attend trial
(j)

$ 50.00

The total amount of the said costs
to be awarded to the plaintiffs is

72.

3.50

$358.20

The Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, provides for

payment of interest in the amount of fourteen percent (14%) per
annum prior to default, eighteen percent (18%) per annum after
default.
SECOND AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Deed which transferred the Rossie Hills property was

a Warranty Deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of the
statutory warranties and covenants contained in U.C.A. Section 571-12.
2.
said

The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by

fences,

and

decks

are

encroachments

and

constitute

encumbrances upon the property.
3.

Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property

on the date of the delivery of the Deed, which was March 23, 1982.
4.

Said encumbrances constitute a breach of the statutory

covenants contained in the Warranty Deed pursuant to U.C.A. Section
57-1-12.
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The

aforesaid

statutory

covenants

contained

in the

Warranty Deed were breached upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed
to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982.
6.

The Warranty

Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed

prepared at the same time do not constitute a single contract.
7.
is:

The Court believes that the law applicable to this case

The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of the

contract, and the Deed become final and conclusive evidence of the
contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 1009).
8.

The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese Howell

Company v. Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), sets forth
the controlling law which must be applied in the instant case
regarding the issue as to whether or not the Warranty Deed, Note
and Trust Deed constitutes a single contract.
9.

The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed at the

same time does not make them part of the contract to purchase the
property. The Trust Deed and Note are documents executed to secure
the payment of the property, and have no bearing upon whether the
property is free and clear of encumbrances.
10.

Defendant Doms1 remedy in this case is for a breach of

the statutory covenants of warranty.
11.

The utilization of the Rossie Hills Property is adversely

affected by the encroachments and loop road to the extent that the
value of the property is diminished.
12.

Defendant Doms has been damaged by virtue of Plaintiffs1

breach.
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Defendant Doms1 damages should be measured as of the date

13.

of the breach, which is March 23, 1982, the date of the delivery
of the Deed.
14.

Said

damages

should

be

measured

with

all

of

the

encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982.
15.

The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the

difference in the value of the property without any encumbrances
minus the value of the property with the encumbrances.
16.

The loop road does have a beneficial value for the

development of the Rossie Hills Property.
17.

Under Utah

law, it was the Plaintiffs1

burden and

obligation to mitigate the damages suffered by Defendant doms
because Plaintiffs were in breach of the statutory covenants
contained in the Deed at the time the Deed was delivered.
18.

Plaintiffs had the obligation of quieting title to the

Rossie Hills property and causing McHenry Avenue to be vacated; and
if Plaintiffs had done so, Defendant Doms1 damages would have been
mitigated.
19.

As a result of the encumbrances existing on the Rossie

Hills Property on March 23, 1982, Defendant Doms has suffered
damages in the sum of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00).
20.
Hundred

Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two
Seventy=Six

Thousand

Seven

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

($276,750.00) purchase price of the property, in the amount of
Eighty-Two

Thousand

Five Hundred

Dollars

($82,500.00), which

represents the earnest money payment of Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000.00) and the down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five
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Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00).
21.

The remaining balance due after said offset of Eighty-

Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars

($82,500.00) is One Hundred

Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) , which
represents the principal balance of the Trust Deed Note as of the
date of the execution of said Note and the Trust Deed.
22.
offset

Defendant Doms is further entitled to an additional
of

Eighty-Three

Thousand

Dollars

($83,000.00),

which

represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as a result of
the encumbrances on the property as set forth above.
23.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid balance under the Trust

Deed Note and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date
of the delivery of the Warranty Deed.
24.

From April 0, 1982 through January 10, 1985, monthly

interest payments under the Trust Deed Note were received by
Plaintiffs on an unpaid principal balance of One Hundred NinetyFour Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), rather than
One

Hundred

Eleven

Thousand

Two

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

($111,250.00), which the court has concluded was the unpaid balance
due under the Trust Deed Note at that time.
25.

under the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the amount

actually due in monthly interest payments on the un paid principal
balance of one Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars
(111,250.00) was Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three and
44/100 Dollars ($41,533.44).
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26.

Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in

the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100
Dollars ($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and
81/100

Dollars

($30,986.81), which

represents

the

difference

between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period.
27.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred SixtyThree and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note.
28.

Inasmuch as Defendant Doms1 damages were not determined

and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs1
action for a judgment of foreclosure is premature.
29.

Without

the

necessity

of

refiling

this

action

to

foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require Plaintiffs to give
Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall have
the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney fees,
as determined ny the Court, within 90 days from receipt of the
Notice of Default.

The giving of the Notice of Default shall not

take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can be
served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney.

Service on the

Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the
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Defendants last known address.
30.

The Court recognizes that there are two options by which

to foreclose a note and trust deed, administratively or judicially.
Due to the circumstances in this case, the failure of Plaintiffs
to ascertain damages prior to proceeding with the foreclosure
action, Defendant Doms should be given 90 days1 notice to satisfy
the Note before Plaintiffs can proceed with the foreclosure action.
31.

Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid balance

of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 Dollars
($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid principal
balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note.

The

interest rate to be used in determining the amount due Plaintiffs
as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be fourteen
percent (14%) per annum.
32.

If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing

after notice, Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure upon
filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay.

The

Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a
Judgment

of

foreclosure

based

either

on

the

administrative

foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg.,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg..
33.

In regard to the issue of whether or not Defendant Doms

was entitled to rescind the contract, the Court concludes that
Defendant Doms was bound to take remedial action after the Fall of
1981 which the Court determined to be the date he was made aware
of the encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the
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purchase of the Slipper parcel.
34.

It was not necessary for Defendant Doms to obtain a legal

opinion that the loop road was a prescriptive easement or that the
shed and fences had a legal basis for being on the Rossie Hills
Property before he could make his tender to rescind35.

Once

Defendant

Doms

knew

of

the

road

and

the

encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable time
to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the transaction.
36.

The Court concludes that the case of Eaeter v. West and

North Properties. 758 P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is not applicable
to this case in that Eaeter stands for the proposition, among
others, that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little use and
brush and trees had to be removed to drive on it was not so open
or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with knowledge of
its existence.
37.

Eaeter is readily distinguishable from the facts of the

instant case because there is not question that the road in this
case has been used and was being used.
38.

The Eaeter case is applicable to the instant case in the

sense that it stands for the proposition that the person seeking
to rescind the contract must do so promptly after obtaining
knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescind so long
as he acts within a reasonable time.
39.

Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after

he obtained knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were
upon the Rossie Hills Property.

-22-

00G335

40 • The

Court

unreasonable

amount

concludes
of

time

that
to

Defendant

seek

Doms waited

rescission;

an

therefore,

rescission is not the appropriate remedy in this case and is barred
by the doctrine of laches.
41.
the

Defendant Doms presented insufficient evidence to carry

burden

of

proof

that

Plaintiffs

committed

fraud

and

misrepresentation in this matter.
42.

With

regard

to

Civil

No.

10066,

and

Count

I

of

Plaintiffs1 Complaint contained therein, pursuant to Stipulation
of the parties and a previous Order of the court, the May 27, 1987,
Tax Sale of the Rossie Hills Property by Summit County should be
declared to be null and void.
43.

The foregoing Conclusion of Law shall be deemed not to

affect the Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982, in any adverse manner
by the said tax sale. The rights, title, liens and interest of the
Plaintiffs and Defendant Eugene E. Doms and Domcoy Enterprises,
Inc., a Utah corporation, shall not be deemed to be affected by the
said tax sale.

The Court's previous Order invalidating the tax

sale does not in and of itself either validate or invalidate any
subsequent deeds issued regarding the Rossie Hill Property.
44.

The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy

Enterprises, Inc., as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property
to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed which transferred
legal title to Defendant Doms.
45.

In regard to Count II of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

No. 10066, title to the Rossie Hills Property should be quieted in
Defendant Doms, subject to Plaintiffs1
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right to foreclose as

previously set forth in these Conclusions of Law.
46.

In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

NO, 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the
Court on Motion of Summit County.
47.

In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third-Party Complaint against

Third-Party Defendant Summit County Title Company in Civil No.
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by
the Court on Motion of said parties.
48.

Defendant

doms1

Second

Amended

Counterclaim

seeking

damages against Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the three-month filing
period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section
75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates
to the issues of damages.
49.

This Court has ±n personam

jurisdiction over Plaintiff

Jeanne Scott pursuant to a ruling by the Utah Supreme Court
contained in an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs' Petition
for an Extraordinary Writ under Rule 65B(B)4, Supreme Court Case
No. 890269. In said Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the
Utah Supreme Court denied said Petition for an Extraordinary Writ,
and ruled that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff Jeanne
Scott because she was a grantor on the Warranty Deed, and is a
proper party to Defendant Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim under
Rules 13 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
50.

Plaintiffs1 remaining objections to the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment dated September 9, 1991, are
denied.

00G3S7

51.

The plaintiffs

should

be awarded

attorney

fees of

$27,185.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A.
Mcintosh, Esq.
52.

The plaintiffs

should

be

awarded

attorney

fees of

$13,790.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H.
Biele, Esq.
53.

The plaintiffs should be awarded $358.20 for costs which

they have incurred in these proceedings.
54.

The plaintiffs should be awarded interest of fourteen

percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts the court has
determined were due and owing on the Trust Deed Note dated March
10, 1982, both before and after default.
55.

The defendant Doms should not be awarded any attorney

fees for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 8339
or Civil No. 10066.
56.

The defendant Doms should not be awarded any prejudgment

interest on the $83,000.00 damages described

in the original

Judgment dated September 9, 1991.
57.

The defendant Doms should be awarded $101.50 for costs

for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim.
DATED this ,/fc day of June 1992.
BY THE COURT:
\\ C*/h*
'' «
HONORABLE JOHN A
-District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following:
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
/
/

JAMES A .
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ADDENDUM 6

IRVING H. BIELE, . .). — No. 0317
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, E S Q . —

NO. 2194

JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

JUN 1 6 1992

A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

.A

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs

:
:

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
:
:
;

FILED

J

VS.

MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants

:;
s!

JI;:;

Car* - :-.-XIT s^ai.ty .

:

ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the Estate of :
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
::
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
J

2:; ;~2 /

ST.•••••••^-• • • _

Civil No. 8339

Third-party Plaintiffs
:

vs.

(Judge John A. Rokich)

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party Defendant
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED OF NEXT PAGE
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,

:
:
:
:

Plaintiffs

:

vs.

:

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate :
and politic of the State of
:
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
:
official capacity as Summit
:
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
:
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
j
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
:
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
:
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
:
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
:
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1,
:
2, 3, 4, and 5,
;
Defendants

Civil No. 10066
(Judge John A. Rokich)

J

Based upon the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, entered contemporaneously herein, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

In regard to Civil No. 8339 and Count II of Plaintiffs1

Complaint in Civil No. 10066, title to the property which is the
subject of the above-entitled matters is quieted in Defendant
Eugene E. Doms, subject to the right of Plaintiffs, Ellen Anderson,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan
Scott, to foreclose their Trust Deed against said property as
hereinafter set forth in this Judgment.

Said property is more

particularly described as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1:

All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58,
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat

BOOK N N PAGE O i l
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thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof,
as filed and of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad rights
of way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 817 6 in Book C at Page
401,
Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3:

All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed
and of record in the office of the Summit
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page
401,
Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,records of Summit County, Utah.

Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five
feet of the following described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Records.
2.

Plaintiffs1 Complaint for foreclosure in Civil No. 8339

is premature, in as much as Defendant Doms1

damages were not

determined and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages.
3.
his

Defendant Doms is awarded Judgment in Civil No. 8339 on

Second

Amended

Counterclaim

for

damages

for

breach

of

warranties and covenants against encumbrances contained in the
Warranty Deed conveying the Rossie Hills property, pursuant to
U.C.A. Section 57-1-12.
4.

Defendant Doms is awarded damages for said breach of the

warranties and covenants against encumbrances in the amount of
Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00).
-3-
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5.

The original principal balance due from Defendant Doms

to Plaintiffs Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott, on the Trust Deed Note and
Trust Deed held by said Plaintiffs was One Hundred Ninety-Four
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250,00), as of the date
of the execution of said Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed.
6.

Said amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two

Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) due under said Trust Deed Note
and Trust Deed shall be offset by the Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars
($83,000.00) which the Court has awarded Defendant Doms as damages
for breach of the warranties and covenants against encumbrances.
7.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

from Defendant Doms to said Plaintiffs under the Trust Deed Note
and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery
of the Warranty Deed.
8.

Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in

the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100
Dollars ($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and
81/100

Dollars

($30,986.81), which

represents

the

difference

between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period.
9.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
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Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263-19), as of January 25, 1985, the
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note.
10.

Without

the

necessity

of

refiling

this

action

to

foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require said Plaintiffs
to give Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall
have the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the
Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney
fees, as determined by the Court, within 90 days form receipt of
the Notice of Default.

The giving of the Notice of Default shall

not take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can
be served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney.

Service on the

Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the
Defendant's last known address.
11.

Said Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid

balance of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100
Dollars ($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid
principal balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note.
The interest rate to be used

in determining the amount due

Plaintiffs as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be
fourteen percent (14%) per annum.
12.

If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing

after notice, said Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure
upon filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay.
The Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a
Judgment

of

foreclosure

based

either

on

the

administrative

foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg.,
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg..
13.

Defendant

Doms

is

not

entitled

to

the

remedy

of

rescission of the transaction conveying the aforementioned property
because the remedy of rescission is barred by the doctrine of
laches.
14.

Defendant

Doms1

Second

Amended

Counterclaim,

as it

relates to the remedy of damages, is dismissed as against Plaintiff
Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C.
Anderson, as said claim is barred by the three-month filing period
limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 75-3803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
15.

Defendant Doms1 causes of action relating to fraud and

misrepresentation

in Civil No. 8339 are dismissed, the Court

finding no cause therefore.
16.

In regard to Count I of Plaintiffs' Complaint in Civil

No. 10066, and pursuant to Stipulation of the parties and a
previous Order of the Court, the May 27, 1987, tax sale of the
Rossie Hills property by Summit County is declared to be null and
void.
17.

In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

No. 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the
Court on Motion of Defendant Summit County.
18.

In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third Party-Complaint against

Third-Party Defendant Summit County title Company in Civil No.
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by
the Court on Motion of said parties.
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19.
fees

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $27,185.00 in attorney

for services rendered

by plaintiffs1

counsel, James A.

Mcintosh, Esq.
20.

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $13,790.00 in attorney

fees for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H. Biele,
Esq.
21.

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $358.20 for costs which

they have incurred in these proceedings.
22.

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded interest at the rate

of fourteen percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts which
this court has determined were due and owing by the defendant Doms
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982

r

both before and after default in payment by the said defendant.
23.

The defendant Doms is not entitled to any attorney fees

for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 8339 or
Civil No. 10066.
24.

The defendant Eugene E. Doms is not entitled to any

prejudgment interest on the $83,000.00 damages.
25.

The defendant Doms is hereby awarded $101.50 for costs

for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim.
DATED this /j^. day of June 1992.
BY THE COURT:

s{fjb~^

//*

r\ rJ<^t

HONORABLE JOHN A
-District Court Judge

\ * \ COUNTY/$/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
was hand delivered to the following:
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM 7

FIIZ NO. 4914

Enfry No

lfe^.V& '

Roe* ^

^ul^

RErn—n3.-23.-i2** 3 " * M page * £ ? Recorded at Request of

RFO?
P»£E _

at

5INDEXED
/Z'.<?<2-

M. Fee Paid |L

,;c

1UMMJI CO. TITLE
v

—:

l^-i-^

••»• ,»[* - r

~"
•fCOKPE*

Dep. Book

by-

Mail tax notice f n

Grantee/

M

Pa^e
Ref.:
— _ . „^
2850 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suiu^ 300
^^c^
Santa Etanica, California 90405
AHrir»«c
(SPECIAL)

WARRANTY DEED
DeWAYNE C. ANDERSON ate D.C. ANDERSON aka DEWEY D.C. ANDERSON and EIIEN R.
ANDERSON, h i s wife, and DAN SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT , h i s wife,
grantors
Park City, Utah
Suninit
of
t county of
f s t a t e o f U t a h, h e r e b y
CONVEY and WARRANT to
EUGENE E. DC*€ and MICHAEL R. McCOY, as tenants i n caiman

grantee
for the sum of
— DOLLARS,

0f

Santa Monica, California
TEN AND NO/100
(and other good and valuable considerations)
the following described tract of land in
Summit
State of Utah:

County,

INDEXED:
CTV'-NTIO?*: ..-a£t—
SEE ADDENDUM ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART HEREOF:

UV

71 TO THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR IHE YEAR 1982 AND THEREAFTER, AND
ANY SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS NOW DUE OR TO BECOME DUE.
EXCEPTING ALL OIL, GAS AND/OR OTHER MINERALS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY RESERVED.

WITNESS, the hand

of said grantor

March
Signed in the Presence of

10th

, this
, A. D. 19 82

$*4 SCOTT

day of

f

^

£OOTT (Jeanne)
Pe^BVYNE C. ANDERSON aka D.C. ANDERSCN aka
ANUfci«xa:
/•j'h,. /
\ t . IU rvv:„
DEWEY D.C. Al
ELLEN P. ANDERSON

STATE OF UTAH,
County of Sunmr
March
t ^ D # 19 82
On the
•me? •),^e»www& C. ANDERSON , aka D.C. ANDERSCN
ANDERSON / aka*
personally apfearefffe^me?'"V,be%NE
DEWEY D.85 ANIpEgCfy,ancL;
3na ElfEN
KfJEN ft. ANDERSCN, h i s w i f e ,
executed the

the*^fne%^4k>Whe within instrument,:who duly acknowledged to me that

^hey
Notary Public.

Park City, Utah
BLANK #101—WAMUNTT D K O — C OCM rre. co. — •»•> »o l«oo «»»r — «»LT L»KI CITT

My commission expires

9-28-62

Residing in

B00KM2l5PAGE/,4
7
Park City, Utah

ADDENDUM

PARCEL NO. 1: All of lots 17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to the
amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Sunmit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according
to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Sunmit County,
Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the
Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of
the Sunmit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion
located within the County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Sunmit County,
Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines
over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five feet of the following
described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey according
to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the office of the Sunmit
County Records.
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STATE OF VKCtlMG
)
COUNTY CF MPMAJU-.
)
On the
«?£>K-«1
day of
Tfej&k^
A.D., 1982 personally
appeared before me DAN SCOTT andi\3SHN'#2£CTT the signers of the within instalment,
who duly acknowledged t o me tfet_£6e£.executed the same.

/••';-""

V\

My Camiission expires:
£ ;- , • • ' • / \ ~~
r
My Corcnsssion expires JanuoyjUS^ - ^
. ^
s "| ^ Q u ^ £ ^
&. Q?JTUA
!
\ /-. ' -' -> -* " / / Notary Public - *
"
'\\ %c.
.c'r' /
Residing a t : 2nJLtuL4*»
LLJJUI n*^
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ADDENDUM 9

FHZ ' C . 4914
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

Space Above Thia Line For Recorder's Uae

TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made thia ..A0***.
between

day of

!****

, 19...??.

J^*?:'....^....^^
, as TRUSTOR,

whose addreat is

2850

Ocean Park Blvd., Suite 300, Santa Monica, Calif., 90405
iSirmt • • « Humbert

(City)

^!5?..0g!W

(SUW)

, as TRUSTEE/ and

D?C«. AW^^

«B t o m

«:4^M..^...i!*«»t

§

^ BENEFICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in
County, State of Utah:
A/*

tJ
{

.

A

S9W**

SMC2LH0. IS All of Iota 17,13,19,20,21,22,23,24,23,26,27,23,25,30,31
ani 32, 'JLocfc 52, l*r5c City Sunwy, accariing t D t h a a m
p U t tharaof, as fiLad and of xwxcd in t b i at firm of the
S w r l t Ooaitry lijoor^er.
PMCa 110. 2:

til c f i£c« 17 JUU. 13, .'lcvk 3!\ ?*ri» City - \ m ' ', v - m U f l g
fc:. ch* .1* ••.•>: ••3«*t. ••••*r,-«i\ in ^ l . . % Vi» c*1 - jjnrt !•• ^he
orf portion located within t t e railroad rights of %*y as
cancribol in tlicac onrralTi docrants nioopisrt as Story » •
317f. in Deck C « t Pugs 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H a t
Pags 326, and ttttry No* 13610 in Book R a t Fags 373, raoards
of Sumtt a u x t y , otsh.

PARCEL » •

3t All of l o t IB, Block 59, Park City t u n n y , anonrrling t o ths
taanlad Plat trmaof, as fllad and of saoocd i n ths offioa of
tho Surodt County Aaoocdaar, swnspting thnaftom mtf portion
located within ths railroad rights of way as il—iriliH i n
thcss osrtain aajuaiits raoocdad as Entry Mb, 8176 i n Book C
a t tag. 401, fctry Mo. 13316 i n Book H at Paga 326, and Entry
No. 13610 i n Book H a t Fags 373, rsoocds of Suaatt Cdtttty, Utah.

Together with all buildings, futures and improvements thereon and all waterrights,rightsof
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro. * . ._
t * 194,250.00
„ , , . K„
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $
. maae py
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at (he times, in the manner and with interest as therein
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
•NOTE Trustee must hr a member of the Utah Slate Bar a bank, huildinf an J loan association or savinf*
and loan association authoriied to do inch business in Ulah. a corporation authorized lo do a trust business in
Iliak- nr • title insurance or abstract company authority u> do such business in Utah

TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED TRUSTOR AGREES
1. To keep said proper* \ in good condition and repair not i«, remove or demolish an\ hutldint: thereon to
complete or restore prompiK and in good ami workmanlike mann.r anv IMI.1,1,,^ XN|,„I, ma\ Iv constructed
damaged or dcstroyi-d t U n n l . . comply with all law. «ov.naiits anil re>tru -lion, .,u,M „ „ . %;ill | ..ro,M.ri% not
to commit or permit wa»tr iln rcuf. not to commit, suffer or jM-rmit anv a n uj«m said propt-m in violation ..I law tr
do all other arts which from the character or u v ot said p r o p c m mav In- reasonuhlv necess.uv the specific
enumeration* herein not ext-1 tiding the general, .ttvl if tin- loan secured herehv «.r an\ pan i h m o f is heing ohLamed for the purf>ose uf financing construction of tmprov .m.-nu on s.» I prt»|N*rt\ Trustor lurtlor agrees
(a) To commence < onstruciion promptly. AIUI to pursue same with reasonable •iili^« n,,- to t oniph tion
in accordance with plans and |*«. if nations satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
<b)

To allow Heneficiary to inspect said property at all turn-* during construction

Trustee. u|M>n presentation t.« it of an affidavit signal l.v Iteticficiarv setting forth fails showing a default
by Trustor under this tuimJ* r, <| paragraph, IN authorize! lo acicjn as trio- ami conclusive all ia»i» ami state
ments therein, and to ail thereon hereunder.
2. T o prnvtle and maintain insurance, .if sucii lvp« ..r t\p«s and amounts as Itenelii iar\ mav require on
the improvements now existing or Itercafter erected or pl.t. e.l on «,.»MI pro|N-rt\ .Nu« h uisor on •• *h.ill U- «arrusl
in companies approved h\ liem-ln i.irv with loss pavahh- i l . i » . > to i.ivor ..( .m,l 01 |.<rto .«... pi.ihl. to It* lo-lu iar\
In event of loss. Trustor shall give iiuuw-diale nnin •• •<• lieueli< i.trv nit.. m.tx m.ik. po«.l ot J.~.* . U H | e.i, h insurance
company cunivrmtl is herehv authorized and directed to <n.iki- p.tvuteni tor -.«#• h Jt.s-. dir.i ilv to li.ueficiary
instead of lo Trustor and lieiteh< tarv i«»nill\ and th«- tUMtrai»«e pr«*»eds. ,.r anv part thereof, mav in- applu*d
by livncfictary. at its option, to reduction o| the indebtedness hereby secured or to the respiration or repair ol
the property damaged
3 To deliver lo. pav for and maintain with lienefn iarv until the indebtedness scrur.-d herehv is |tai<) in full,
such evidence of title as lieneficiary mav require, including a)»siract.s ol title or policies ot nth- insurance and
any eitensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto
4 To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purt«>rting to aflect IIM* seeuntv hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or flowers of Ueneficiarv or Trustee, and should llenefuiarv or Trustee elect to
also appear in or defend anv such action or proceeding, to pay all cost* and exfiense*. including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee
JA*> T O pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessment* affectinc said property, including
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and chances for water, appurtenant to or
used in connection with said property; to pay. when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest,
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all cosU.
fees, and expenses of this Trust.
6. Should Trustor fail to make Mny payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may
deem necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized lo enter upon said
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees.
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured hereby.
I T IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option
to commence, appear in and prosecute in it* own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. AH such compensation, awards, damages, rights
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property,
•re hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney s fees,
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indehtednes* secured hereby.
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property: lb) join in granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed
or the lien or charge thereof, id) reconvey. without warranty, all or any part of said property The grantee in
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or |»ersons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustees
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rente, issues, royalties,
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid.
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession of the property effected hereby, to collect alt rente, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to tune to collect any such moneys shall not in any
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same.
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed to
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment ol
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, leas
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorneys fees, upon any indebtedness
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine.
12.
profits,
damage
default

The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents. i**ue*. • « *
or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking dr
of »mid property, and the application or release thereof as sforesaid. shall not cure or waive any
or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.

IJf The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other
or subsequent default
M. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due
and payable at the option of Beneficiary In the event of such default. Beneficiary mav execute or cause Trustee
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligatjona
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and ail documents evidencing
expenditures secured hereby.

15. After the lapee of such ti.
at may then be required by law following
recordation of said notice of
default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required . , law. Trustee, without demand
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place designated in Mid notice of sale, either aa
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), st public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States st the time of
sale. The person conducting the sale may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to
time until it shall be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale: provided, if the sale is postponed
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying sard property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the
Deed of any matters or facte shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale end revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed;
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persona
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be
fixed by the court.
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
IS. This Trust Deed shall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees.
devisees, adminstratora. executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trustee.
20. This Trust Dead shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
Signature of Trustor -

TvUGfrlP

. ITTMB

MZOIMSL R« MnOGBf
(If Trustor an Individual)
STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY OFSuradLt •*•
On the

Mtfc

day of

**&*>.

, A.D. 19...$?., personally

appeared before me
i*SE»..... A . U ^
,
the aigner(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that „.he..Y. executed the

Notary Public residing at:
My C

n

s^!^

Expires:

Sale Irf-a Oity, Utah
(If Trustor a Corporation)

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the ...

day of

appeared before me

, A.O. 19

, personally

, who being by me duly sworn,

says that he is the
of
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-iaws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

acknowledged

Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Expires:

REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full)
TO:

TRUSTEE.

The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment
to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey. without warranty, to the parties
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder.

Dated.

19

Mail reconveyance to
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ADDENDUM 10

FILE NO. 4914

TRUST DEED NOTE
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: Wton paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

$.

194^250.00^

.?.^.„?i&.?...y^
March 1 0 ,

19

82

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of

D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an
undivided 1/2 interest

together with interest from date at the rate of
?5^££™?.
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

per cent (.^.:.9..%) per annum on

TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January
10, 1985.
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985.
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any
suchi installment not paid when due shall
s
bear interest thereafter at the rate ol.~~~£}.
per
cent (JiL.Q.%) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

1/1.
EUGENEE. DGMS

BLANK NO.

8 1 3 © OCM *TC. CO. — 3219 so. 2«oo CAST — SALT urn* cmr

ADDENDUM 11

VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY
ESCROW DEPARTMENT
P.O. BOX 450 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110
(801) 481-5396

April 6, 1990

Nygard, Coke & Vincent
Irving H. Biele
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84103-1215
Re:

Contract # 001-00624

Dear Mr. Biele:
Enclosed is a History of the payments received on the
above contract in 1982, 1983, and 1984, and a History showing
no payments were received in 1985.
I have verified at the bottom of each of the Histories
that they are a true and correct statement of the payments we
received.
If you need anything further, please contact me.
^Jery truly yours,

ng
Assistant Vice President
jc
Enclosures

MEMBER FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

NAME; G(- BUYER

X/1

OR MAKER
ADDRESS-

EU.GEHE...Z..-I3.0KS AMn...MICHAEl...R.....MC....CQY.
^ ^ l O g g ^ L ! ^ . . ^ 1 7 5 ?0°
-"-ITA VOMICA CAL"

SELLER OR PAYEE

£aeu 7 AMDERSGM--«HW>AM-SCaXS

—

„..*^*r„.SI...MAEYS...J}IL.SL.„C....U.IAH

ADDRESS
DESCRIPTION:
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K... REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
!ll0.
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Paid t o . . - ! : ! ? . : .

„... 19 =

In monthly pvmts commencing 4-10-82 in« the amount of $2,266.25 as interst or.
Principal. Interest.- etc.. p a y a b l e i £ S ^ . J f f i j L i i J [ c i ! ^

.

35.
Dote

Collection Fee..

Received

by

CREDIT PROCEEDS TO#l£L

Sheridan Wyom.

82801 Dan Scott

- nDwix-^Sew—
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PRINCIPAL
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I (We) hereby acknowledge receipt of oil documents described above ond of oil turn* collected tfcereon by the VALLEY SANK AND TRUST COMPANY, ond
hereby release said bonk from oil further liability for said collection.

Dated..

nix
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THE VALLEY 3A."JKS
ESCROW INTEREST INCOME STATEMENT
ESCROW # 0524 / ORDER * 10-10524
THE VALLEY 3ANKS
P.C ECX 450
TRUST DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH

84:

ELLEN ANDERSON
DAN SCOTT
2134 ST MARYS DRIVE
SLC UTAH 341 OB

FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF EACH INSTALLMENT RECEIVED ON I'OUR ESCROW
FOR THE YEAR ie&S; THIS REPORT WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH DETAILS OF
INTEREST INCOME FOR THE YEAR. PLEASE KEEP THIS FOR YOUR RECORDS.
NOTE:

IF YOU HAVE SOLD/PURCHASED THIS ESCROW DURING THE PAST YEAR, PLEASE
INCLUDE ONLY THOSE PAYMENTS WHICH YOU ACTUALLY RECEIVED OR PAID.

CURRENT YEAR PAYMENTSi
-*1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
3.
9.
10.
11.

-DUE12/10
01/10
02/10
03/10
04/10
05/10
06/10
07/10
0S/10
09/10
10/10

- F O - - -AR0UNT
•-INTEREST— -RESERVES— •* r ««rifi^i« A uu " ~ •PRUCIPtt.- -HEH PRIfC.- -HEW dNPAID0*00
0.00
194250.00
0.00
03/08
2266.25
2266.25
0.00
Oa/27
04/27
07/0B
07/08
08/16
06716
10/24
10/24
12/15
11/15

2266.25

TOTALS:

24926.75

2266.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25

2246.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25
2266.25

0.00

coo

2266.25

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.0C

24928.75

0.00

TOTAL INTEREST INCOME FOR THE YEAR:

coo

y* vv

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.30

0.00

o.oc

0.00

COO

0»00
0.00
0*00

M Aft

j.00
0.00
0.00

194250.00
194250,00
194250.00
194250.00
194250.00
194250.00
194250.00
194250.00
1*4250.00
194250.00

0.00
0.00
Q.OO

COO
0.00

coo
0.00
0.00
0.00

coo

2452S.,
I c e r t i f y t h a t the above l i s t i ;
of payments is a true and c o r n
statement.
C7

THE VALLEY Bfiftks
E S CR0 U

HISTORY

PRINT

eSCSCW * 06Z4 / ORDER » 10-00624 AS OF 2 / 3 U W *
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

2. SELLER INFORMATION:
1. LAST HARE....ANDERSON
2. FIRST NARE...ELLEN
3. ADDRESS-1....DAN SCOTT

4 . ADDRES3-2....2134 ST KARYS DRIVE
5 . CITY ST II?.,SLC UTAH 84103

BUYER IhiFOPIViTION:
LAST NAHE....BCHS
FLSST NAFtE...EUGENE E
ADDRE33-1....MCHAEL R HCCOY
a » R E S S - 2 - . . P 0 BGX 3614
CITY ST ZIP..HISSIOH VIEJO CA 92690

4. PAYEE INFORMATION:
- -FIRST MADE
ELLEN

-»- -LAST NAflE

1. ANDERSON

2 . SILVER KING BANK
CHECK » ' S i 1:26736 2:32424 3:32423
3 . i^B&T CHEEKING ACCT
CHECK « ' S : 1:26787 2:32425 3:32429
4 . BANK OF COMMERCE
CHECK «'S: 1:26738 2:22426
5. ESCROW FEES
CHECK «'S: 1:2673? 2:32427

3:32420
3:22431

ADDRESS
flEDUHT
NUMBER-PUT AMOUNT- -PENALTY-— •t EXCESS—
DAN SCOTT
{ADVISORY)
0.00
0.00
2134 ST MARYS DRIVE
SLC UTAH MIOS
PROS?ECTGRS«73022233
144.31
0.00
4;32432 5:27174 6:37178 7:3910? 8:40999 9:*3649 10:49426 11:49430
27 117545 ANDERSON
1055.22
0.00
4:22433 5:37175 6:37179 7:39110 8:41000 9:43650 10:4942' 11:49421
50.30
J SOUTH RAIN
«0-0608-7
1055.22
0.00
SHERIDAN UY B28G1
4:22434 5:37176 6:37180 7:39111 6:41001 9:43651 10:49428 11:49432
0.00
30001S181
11.00
0.00
4:22435 5:37177 6:27131 7:39112 3:41002 9:43652 10:49429 11:49433
TOTALS:

2266.25

COO

100.00

. CONTRACT INFORMATION:
1. CONTRACT DATE.,.03/10/32
2. INT BEGIN DATE..03/10/82
3. POT BEGIN DATE..04/10/82

4.
5.
6.
7.

INITIAL ART... 194250.20
18.0000
INTEREST RATE.
UNPD INT SEP..Y
2266.25
P+I AMOUNT..,.

3. PENALTY CDDE..C
9. BEGIN YR BAL.. 194250.00
10. BEGIN YR UNPD,
0.00
11. ESCROW CODE...C

12. NEXT DUE DATE..11/10/.33
13. NEXT LATE DATS.00/00/00
14. If" PAID THRU..10/10/85

6. CURRENT YEAR PAYMENTS:
-INTEREST
RESERVES
PENALTIES- -PRINCIPLE-- -NB» PRINC.- -NEW UNPAID-«- -DUE? -PAID- -AHGUNT194250.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2266.25
1. 11/10 01/26
2266.25
0.00
194250.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2266.25
2. 12/10 04/16
2266.25
194250.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2266.25
3. 01/10 04/16
2266.25
194250.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2266.25
04/16
4. 02/10
2266.25
o.oo
0.00
194250.C0
0.00
0.00
2266.25
5. 03/10 06/21
2266.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
194250.00
0.00
2266.25
6. 04/10 06/21
2266.25
0.00
0.00
2266.25
0.00
0.00
194250.00
7. 05/10 07/18
2266.25
0.00
0.00
194250.00
2266.25
0.00
0.00
3. 06/10 08/15
2266.25
0,00
0.00
2266.25
0.00
194250.00
0.00
9. 07/10 10/01
2266.25
0.00
0.00
2266.25
0.00
0.00
1?4250.00
2266.25
10. 08/10 12/31
0.00
0.00
2266.25
0.00
194250.00
0.00
2266.25
11. 09/10 12/31
0.00

T0T&L3:

24928.75

ti. CONTROL INFORMATION:
1. LOCKED
N
2. EXPLANATION..
SETUP DATE...12/03/82
LAST CHANGE..05/30/e5
LAST COUPON..02/10/85
PRINTED ON...02/10/84

24923.75

0.00

0.00

3. EXPIRE BATE..01/10/85
4. EXPIRE CODE..00
5. FLAGS........
6. NOTZS-1......
7. NOTES-2.....•

0.00

I certify that the above listing of
payments is a true and correct statemer
Vice President

THE vALLEY WsttS
S S C R O J J K I S T G S Y P S I N T

ScwfflH « 0624 / i&DEt « 10-0U*2« A!S Or 12/31/85**
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
4. PAYEE INF2RRA7IDH:
- « - -LAS" NATE
1 . ANDERSON

SELLER IHFORHATIOit
LASTNAKE....ANDERSOM
FIRST HAKE...ELLEN
A0DRESS-1....5Afc SCDTT
ADDRES8-2....2134 37 BASKS DRIVE
CITY ST 2 P . . 2 L C UTAH 34108

FIRST NAHE
ELLEK

2 . SILVER KING BANK
3 . UBiT CHECKING ACCT
4 . BANK DF CDHTERCE

2- BUYER IS^FORTKTIGw:
1. LAST H H l S . . . . 2 0 5
2 . FIRST K£fS...SJG£KE £
3 . ADDRESS-i...MICHAEL R .'CCOY
4 . AMRE33-2....?G BOX 3614
5 . CITY 3T ZIf.,. T iI£SIOfl vIEJO -A v2i<?C

ABCRSS
DAN SCOTT
2.34 ST BARTS DRIVE
SLC 17AH 34105

aCUUHT NUffflS

l*G=?EC70RS873C'222S2
27 117545 ANDERSON
*O-Oc0c-7

4 SOUTH I1AIH
SHERIDAN UY S2SC1

5 . ESCROW FEES

I44.il
1055.22
1035.22

300212131

11,00
TOTALS:

5 , CONTRACT IMFDFtfJATIOHt
1. CSKTRACT DATE...03/10/82
2 . INT SSGIN DATE. .03/10/82
3 . P W BESIH DATS..04/10/82

f W APSUNT- -PENALTY
% IXCESS-(ADVISORY)
0,00
:.:*.

4 , INITIAL A m . . . 1*4250.30
5 . INTEREST RATS,
16.0000
6 . UNPB INT aEr..Y
7 . P+I AflQUff....
2913.7S

ft.

PE*L7Y CQDE..0
9 . BSSJN YR BAL.. 1V4Z50.00
10. 3E3IN YR UHFD.
13921.25
2 1 . ESCROW C0DE...0

a. CURRENT YEAR WffRSNTS:
•:MD PRWSNTS LISTED)
. 3 . CGNTKL IMFCRKATICN:

1. LOCKED.......,N
2 . EXPLANATION..
SETUP DATE... 12/02/32
LAST CHANGE..04/21/84
LAST CDUPDN. .03/10/86
PftlKTSD 0N...C£'22/a5

22i*.25

Z, Sir'IRE Jfi?£..Si/l(j/S5
4 . EXPIRE CODE..00
5 , FLAGS
6 . NWES-1 . . . . . .
7 . HCT2S-S

I certify that there were no payments received
in 19f"
g, Assistant//ice President

0.00
O.CC
3.00

CK
50.CC
5O.0C

0.00

0,:;:

0,0D .

.100.5'.

1 2 . >£<T SUE DATE..12/1Q/34
1 3 . NEXT LATE DATE.00/00/00
14. 2 f f PAH THRU..12/1S/6*

ADDENDUM 12

Enir. No

""J^

WJJEN RECORDED, J1AIL TO:

I ^CUEIST OF

RECORDED

^SL/1 ^ OTT^M

"2SU
WgTIgN37ATP^T^r

W A R R A N T Y

of

, grantors

Salt Lake

hereby CONVEY

,State of Utah,

and WARRANT

Salt Lake

for the sum of

' 7

DEED

MICHAEL R MC COY and EUGENE E. DOMS
of

i\/lD

SEP

Space Above for Recorder's Use

*FHW\

to

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC,
. grantee

, County of Salt Lake

,State of Utah,

TEN

DOLLARS,

the following described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah,
to-wit:
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in
the office of the-Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of way
as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No,
817C in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit
County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in
the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described in
those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at
Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No.
13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sever and water
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the
following described lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in* the
office of the Summit County Recorder.
WITNESS the hand

of said grantor

, this^Pday of 0*^\

#1951

Signed id the^rf?ps-&aca of

npn

MM 273*A5E£3d

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
County of «3. C • ^
)
^
,
On the 7 o dayv of
&*~T-~*T
personally appeared before* me %***M~^t-^
the signer* ..of the . above, instrument,
that v^^kAjexecuted the same.

My commission expires- L-~T~4 ^5t$~"

: DEPOSITION
§
EXHIBIT^

o duly acknowledged tg
A* *

Notary--PTro\3)c.
"• ;- \ .
Residing in
*2^<~.C' ,>CL>«-

me»" "'-V

STATE OF UTAH

)

County cf Summit

)

t. AJ2* 5prigg3. County Recorder in and lor Summit County. State of Utah,
do htfieby certify thai the attached aforegoing * a fufl, truo and correct copy
of dial certain ^ ^ ^ ^ T
Aj>U^t

which anpoars of record in my office In Ecofc ^
being Cntry Kz.^^/se
£ ^i-

7<3*~ •

Pa

9*

J^-^^"

and affixed my
\H WITNESS WHEREOF, t have hereunto est my hand
*officii siai. mis /^x^MJay of U.^^-^,'-/?
f ?

2-, / . ^ J.

/^A-JQUMSZ-

Sum.nJ County Recorder

(J

ADDENDUM 13

March 15, 1985
Mr. Eugene E. Doms
Domcoy Enterprises Inc.
23276 South Pointe Dr.
Suite 204
Laguna Hills, CA 92653
Dear Gene,

Pursuant to our discussion and verbal agreement, I hereby irrevocably tender to
you all voting rights for all my shares of stock in Domcoy Enterprises Inc, a Utah
corporatioa I willingly take this measure to ratify the indemnification
agreement I exercised in your favor in the lawsuit commonly known as Park City
Investors I v. Cen Corp., et al (or Park Avenue Central).
This revocation of my voting rights is to allow you to freely make those business
decisions necessary to insure the continuity and viability of Domcoy as a
business entity in light of my current legal and business situation.
This agreement will continue until you and I mutually agree to the return of my
stock voting rights.
Very Truly Yours,

cc: Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq.

March 15, 1985

Mr. Eugene E. Doms
23276 South Pointe Dr.
Suite 204
Laguna Hills, CA 92653

Dear Gene,
In order to show my support of the business decisions of my husband, Michael
R. McCoy, and per his request, I irrevocably tender my stock voting rights to
you under the same terms as outlined in Michael's letter of March 15, 1985 in
regards to this matter.

Very Truly Yours,

Marguerite McCoy
cc: Gerald H. Klnghorn
attch.

M I C H A E L H. MoCOY
TAX ANO f O l ESTATE ATTOHNEV
8 8 0 8 9 DOROTHY DOVE • SUITE 108 • AGOURA HUB. CA 81301

Eugene E. Doms
PO Box 3614
Mission Viejo, CA 92690

t w w it re *»*-»»

ADDENDUM 14

Edward S. Sweeney (3168) and
J. Peter Mulhern (3667), of
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the estate of
D. C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT,
Plaintiffs,

COMPLAINT

Civil No.

?33 9

v.
EUGENE E . OOMS and MICHAEL R.
McCOY,
Defendants.
,

^K>

|M||||

0«ou«r Ctets

*

P l a i n t i f f s complain of Defendants and for cause of action allege:
1.
State of Utah.

P l a i n t i f f , Ellen Anderson, is a resident of Salt Lake County,
Ellen Anderson became Personal Representative of the estate

of D.C. Anderson by court order dated November 30, 1982.
2.

P l a i n t i f f , Dan Scott, is a resident of Sheridan County,

State of Wyoming.
3.

Defendants are both residents of Orange County, State of

California.
4.

On or about March 10, 1982, defendants executed a Note

pursuant t o which they promised to pay "D.C. Anderson as t o an undivided
one-half interest, and Dan Scott as to an undivided one-half interest"
$194,250.00.

A true and correct copy of that Note is attached hereto as

OOOOOi

Exhibit "A".

The outstanding principal balance on that Note is

$194,250.00 which principal balance is currently due and owing.

Defendants

have f a i l e d and refused to pay p l a i n t i f f s that amount.
5.

In addition to the principal due and owing under the Note

attached hereto as Exhibit "A", interest payments of $2,266.25 per month
for the months of November, 1984, December, 1984 and January, 1985 are now
past due.

Defendants have f a i l e d and refused to make those interest

payments to p l a i n t i f f s .

Defendants are therefore indebted to p l a i n t i f f s in

the amount of $6,798.75 for past due interest payments.

Defendants t o t a l

indebtedness to p l a i n t i f f s for the principal amount: due under the Note
together with past due interest payments is therefore $201,048.75.
6.

The Note attached hereto as Exhibit "A" provides that a l l

past due payments under that Note shall bear interest at the rate of
eighteen percent (18%) per annum.
7.

The Note attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is secured by a Trust

Deed dated March 10, 1982.

A true and correct copy of that Trust Deed is

attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

The Trust Deed attached hereto as Exhibit

"B" covers the property in Summit County, State of Utah, which is f u l l y
described as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1 ;

All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 2 1 , 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 3 1 , and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to
the amended plat thereof, as f i l e d and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2:
All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according
to the amended plat thereof, as f i l e d and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad rights of way as
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No.

"2- 000002

8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records
of Summit County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3:
All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the
Amended Plat thereof, as f i l e d and of record in the'office
of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No.
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records
of Summit County, Utah.
TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT FOR UTILITIES, INCLUDING SEWER AND
WATER LINES OVER THE SOUTHERLY FIVE FEET AND NORTHERLY FIVE
FEET OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOTS.
All of Lot 14, and the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park
City Survey according to the amended plat thereof as f i l e d
and of record in the office of the Summit County Records.
8.

P l a i n t i f f s have elected to foreclose the Trust Deed Note and

Trust Deed attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" as a note and mortgage
pursuant to paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed and the Utah Code.
9.

Other than the above captioned matter, p l a i n t i f f s have

commenced no action to collect the sums owing from defendants•
10.

The Trust Deed and Note attached hereto provide that i f the

Note is collected by an attorney defendants w i l l pay a l l costs of
collection, including a reasonable attorney's f e e .
11.

P l a i n t i f f s have had to retain an attorney and incur

attorneys fees to collect the sums due from defendants.
WHEREFORE, p l a i n t i f f s pray for r e l i e f as follows:
1.

For a judgment against defendants, j o i n t l y and severally, in

the sum of $201,048.75, together with interest thereon at 18% per annum
from January 25, 1985 until paid.

-3-

nfinf*c -

2.

For costs including reasonable attorney's fees.

3.

For a determination that p l a i n t i f f s 1 interest in the subject

property is superior to the claims of a l l defendants.
4.

For declaration that the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed

attached hereto as Exhibits "A11 and "B" are to be treated as a note and
mortgage and for an order authorizing and directing that they be
immediately foreclosed and that the subject property, or so much thereof as
may be necessary, be sold as provided by law to satisfy the amounts prayed
f o r , including costs and attorney's fees.
5.

For a judgment for any deficiency which may remain owing by

defendants to p l a i n t i f f s after the property is sold and the proceeds duly
applied to the costs of sale, attorney's fees, costs of this action, and
the principal and interest remaining unpaid on the Note attached hereto as
Exhibit "A".
6.

For an order that a l l persons claiming an interest in the

subject property have the r i g h t , upon producing satisfactory proof of
i n t e r e s t , to redeem the property within the time provided by law for such
redemption, and that after the expiration of the period of redemption as
provided by law, defendants and a l l persons claiming by, through, or under
them are forever barred and foreclosed of a l l r i g h t , t i t l e , and interest in
and to the subject property.
7.

For such further r e l i e f as the Court deems j u s t .

DATED this Sjjk day of QZ*€s*^

1985.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH

3 7 PETER MULriEfcrt

-4-
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P l a i n t i f f s ' Address:
Ellen Anderson
2134 St. Mary's Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Dan Scott

Box 297
Dayton, Wyonring

82836

S0G000
-5-

FILL: NO. 4914

E x h i b i t "A"

TRUST DEED NOTE
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing some, must be wrrendei^d
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

$..

i9jit25o%oo

wJPi^?.J&?y.!...5Sft

March 1 0 ,

1tt

82

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an
undivided 1/2 interest
....j^^Ham^^lONCT FOUR THOUSAND TOO HUNDRED FIFTST & N O / I Q Q Q T T AR<.
together with interest from date at the rate of . 5 5 5 ^ S £ 3
me unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

tf

194,250.00 ^

per cent (±Z.zP...%) per annum on

TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTC SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January
10, 1985,
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due oh January 25, 1985.
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any
sucha installment not paid when due shall
si bear interest thereafter at the rate o f . f r r ~ ~ r
, per
cent (.18 .0.%) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, ax i a
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in me payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointiy and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney s fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or nrviffiffH'»"« that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

• L A N K NO.

8 1 3 O ««« T O . CO. — »*i» •©. a*oo BA«T — SALT L*«C CITY
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

IR
ECO* 0-0 T'^'^TZ
5ECOP.D-03
- 2iiTT^>

Valley Bank & T m s t
*c/o Dave Bennett - Ttust"i>epw.
SIC, Utah
*"""*"

34111
* "

?*,* Trf'-''-^-^ ^ ^ - ^

| *&-*.-. >T c f . gUM^ICO, JlTLE .
!"- 5 . ^ W^-«.Y «. c *s* -^M-Trn ~^~~

1

Space Above This Line tor Kedordui^ UJL-

TRUST DEED

Exhibit "B"

With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ...10th
between

d a y 0f

March.

19.. 82

&X£ttJZ.^
, as TRUSTOR,

whose address is

2

. .?5?..?>cean Park B^
(Strwrt an4 number)

-

(City)

.SU£^.CQUOT^

(3t»U)

as TRUSTEE/ and

£*C.,..ANJ£S$^..a^
Uncllv34ed^l/2..ijatex3est.

, as BENEFICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in
County, State of Utah:

Sunmit.

PARCEL NO. 1: A l l of Lots 17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according t o the amended
p l a t thereof, a s f i l e d and of record i n the o f f i c e o f t h e
Sunmit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2 : A l l of Lots 17 and 1 9 , Block 59, Park City Survey, according
t o the amended p l a t thereof, a s f i l e d and of record i n t h e
o f f i c e of the Sunmit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any p a r t i a l located within the railroad r i g h t s of way a s
described i n those c e r t a i n documents recorded as Entry No.
8176 i n Book C a t Page 401, Entry No. 13316 i n Bock H a t
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 i n Book H a t Page 373, records
of Sunmit County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3 : A l l of Lot 18, Block 5 9 , Park City Survey, according t o t h e
Amended Plat thereof, a s f i l e d and o f record i n the o f f i c e o f
the Sunmit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion
located within t h e railroad r i g h t s of way a s ripyTihflri i n
those c e r t a i n documents recorded a s Entry No. 8176 i n Book C
a t Page 401, Entry No. 13316 i n Book H a t Page 326, and Entry
No. 13610 i n Book H a t Page 373+ records of Sunmit County, Utah.
T0GEIHE2* KITH AN EASa©JT FOR UTILITIES, INCLUDING SEWS* AND VMER LINES OVER
THE SOUTHERLY FIVE FEET AND NCE3HERL? FIVE FEET OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOIS.
A l l of Lot 1 4 , t h e South 1/2 of l o t 1 5 , Block 58, Park City Survey according
t o t h e amended p l a t thereof a s fP*** and of record i n the o f f i c e of the Sunmit
County Records.
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and ail water rights, rights of
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to theright,power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of S 19.4,250.00
, made by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein
set forth, and anv extensions and /or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of* Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah SUte Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings
and loan association authorised to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.

BOOKM .15 PA lA^O
2r'Z>
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TO PROTECT T . - SECURH . J F THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGRt.~S.
1. To keep laid property in rood c
'ion and repair; not to remove or demolish any buildinf
eon. to
complete or restore promptly and in .
and workmanlike manner any building which may he
.ructed.
da roared or destroyed thereon: to coo.
with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting aaid pi . <rly; not
to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or |>ermit any act upon said property in..vio3atJuajjCu' law:*to
do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably in 11 SJSSSI.I w e specific
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing; construction of improvements on said properly. Trustor further agrees:
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursui* same with reasonable diligence to completion
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b)

To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all tunes during construction.

Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon hereunder.
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amount* a* Beneficiary may require, on
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said pmfierty. Such in»urancc »hali lie carried
in companies approvvd by Beneficiary with loss payable riau>«*» in fa\»»r of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary.
In event of loss. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of lun*. and each insurance
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such Uisa directly to Honeficiary
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or U* the restoration or repair ot
the property damaged.
3. To deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full,
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts ol title or policies of title insurance and
any extensions or renewal thereof or supplements thereto.
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee: and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee.
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and •charges for water, appurtenant to or
used in connection with said property: to pay. when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest,
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay aU costs.
fees, and expenses of this Trust
6. Should Trustor fail to make any :>ayment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may
deem necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said
property for such purposes: commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees.
7. To pay immediately and without demand ail sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10Tc) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured hereby.
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary snail be
er.titl-d to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option
to commence, appear in and prosecute m its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rifhta
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property,
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's (ten,
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby.
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease*
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto**, and the recitals therein of any
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, ail
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties.
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid.
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect ail rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same.
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed to
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor mn assumption of liability under, nor a
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
11.

Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary

may

at any time without notice, either in

prson. by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of
Ssecured,
eneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security fcr the indebtedness hereby
enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or

otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profit*, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine.
12.
profits,
damage
default

The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and
or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or
of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any
or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.

13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other
or subsequent default.
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the now and all documents evidencing
expenditures secured hereby.

B00KM215PAGEA51
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15 After the lapse of «***» time »s rk
-hen be required by law following the recordation of said
ice of
default and notice of default and notice of s*.w having been given as then required by law. Trustee; without demand
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the lime and place designated in said notice of sale, either as
a whole or in separate parce**< **<* in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to
direct the order in which such
property. i( consisting of several known Jots or parcels, shall be sold), at public
auction to the highest bidd*r* *"* purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the Ume of
jajt The person conducting the **** may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the tsle from time to
time untd it shall be competed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the tune and place last appointed for the sale: provided, if the sale u postponed
for longer than one day b«yai0**i the day designated xn the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the
same manner as the orig"* notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con»
vevinc said orooerty so sdW. but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the
Deed of any matters or fa*t» *hall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary may bid at the sal«- Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (I) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power °* »1« *n<4 °* the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's
fees* (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed;
(3) ail sums expended und*r the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date
ol «io*tvd\VUT*\ <A\ *U. <*h*< um& thet*. leoiced. heteb>fv *<«i C5\ the remainder, if any, to the person or persons
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county m'which the sale took place.
16 Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mor(f*fes on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding ail costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be
fixed by the court
17. Beneficiary may Appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From
the tune the substitution i*m fl*ed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee n# ed herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice (hereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
18. This Trust Deed 'hall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, adminstrators executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and
severni. The term "Beneficiary** shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed* whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or
neuter, and the singular m*™ber includes the plural.
19. Trustee accepts (his Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as provided by law, Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trustee.
20. This Trust Deed *h«U be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah
21. The undersigned Trustor request* that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to hi™ at the address hereinbefore set forth.

(If Trustor an Individual)
SrTrVTCOFUTKft.
M
COUNTY OFSunorat "•
On the

„, AJD. 1 9 . J 2 , personally

Jtott-Mcax

appeared before me ....,
the signer(s) of the above*

whoril^ly acknowledged to me that .tr.Jie.y. executed the

Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Expire*9-28-82

S a l t Lake City, Utah

(If Trustor a Corporation)
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the
appeared before me ...-

<**y °*

~» AJ)-

i

-

—•

who

19

• P*»°a*lly

M"f by me duly sworn,

says that he is the
~~
—• °'
•
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) *nd said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

-

acknowledged

Notary Public residing at:
My Cornxnission Expires:

BQQKM 2 1 5 . M B t f t 3 i
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ADDENDUM 15

GERALD H. KINGHORM A 1825
Attorney for Defendants
9 Exchange Place, Suite 100 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8644
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of D. C. ANDERSON and DAN
SCOTT,

ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 8339

vs.

F 1 L £i LP

MICHAEL R. McCOY, and
EUGENE E. DOMS,
Defendants.

-»arv -t iu.'-rr.: ^ ^ u n r u

-v

,-:.^- —

Eugene E. Doms hereby answers the Complaint of the""!?Iaintiffs on file herein and for Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs
alleges as follows:
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
Defendant

Eugene E. Doms

admits, denies and

alleges as

follows:
1.

The

Answering

Defendant

denies

the

allegations

of

paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 on the grounds and for the reasons that
with respect to the allegations of paragraphs 1 and 2 The Answering Defendant is without knowledge as to the truth or falsity and
therefore denies the same; with respect to the allegations of
paragraph 3 the Answering Defendant believes that the Defendant
Michael R. McCoy is not a resident of Orange County/ State of
California.
_1
011901/3

"
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&

2.

The

Answering

Defendant

admits

the

allegations

of

paragraph 4 and alleges that the note was in consideration for a
certain purchase of real property described more specifically in
paragraph

7 of Plaintiff's Complaint as an integral part and

consideration for the purchase and sale transaction wherein the
Plaintiffs

sold to the Defendant the real property described

therein.
3.

The

Answering

Defendant

denies

the

allegation

in

paragraph 5 on the grounds and for the reasons that the Answering
Defendant is entitled to rescission of the transaction for the
reasons stated in the Defendants Counterclaim.
4.
paragraph

The

Answering

Defendant

admits

the

allegations

of

6 and 7 and denies the balance of the allegations

contained therein.
COUNTERCLAIM
For the Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs the Counterclaim
of Eugene E. Doms alleges as follows:
1.

That the parties are the holders of a certain trust

deed note executed in connection with the purchase by the Defendants of certain real property in Park City, Utah, described more
specifically in paragraph 7 of the Plaintiff's Complaint.
2.

That the parties entered into the transaction on or

about November 12, 1981 and that in consideration of the trust
deed note which is attached to the Plaintiff's Complaint the
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest executed a certain
general warranty deed in favor of the Defendants warranting title

-2011901/3
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in

the

grantors

thereof

with

the

implied

warranty

and

covenant against encumbrances on the property.
3•

That the grantors violated the warranty against encum-

brances in the execution and delivery of the warranty deed in
exchange for the trust deed note by virtue of certain prescriptive easements which prevented the warranty deed from passing
clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms.
4.
against

Because

of

encumbrances

the
the

violation

of

the

Counterclaimant

implied
is

warranty

entitled

to

rescission of the sales transaction and the return of all sums
paid upon a tender by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs of title
to the property described

in paragraph

7 of the Plaintiffs1

Complaint.
5.

Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that the Court

should rescind the transaction entered by the parties, vest title
in the Plaintiffs as the grantors or successors in interest to
the grantors under that certain warranty deed executed by them
and grant judgement in favor of the Counterclaimant and against
the Plaintiffs in the amount of all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs in a specific amount to the proven
upon trial of the matter.
Wherefore the Answering Defendant and Counterclaimant Eugene
E. Doms prays that the Plaintiff's tak^nothing by the Complaint
and that the Court award Judgment as set/forth/ ab^e,
GEPALO^H. KING^ORN
Attorney JofUelfendant Doms

"3"
011901/3
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was mailed, postage prepaid, on
the

;£?<£

day of January, 1988, to the following:

E. Russell Vetter
BIEHLE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-4-
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ADDENDUM 16

NO

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

Clar* :r iunir;; ^juniy
DY.
Depu^v Clark

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate
Of C D . ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT,

ORDER REGARDING
PROVISIONAL ATTORNEY'S
FEES

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and
EUGENE E. DOMS,
Case No- 8339
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
-ooOoo-

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on
Defendant Doms' objection to the Order proposed by Plaintiff
setting aside Default Judgment and the award of attorney's
fees in the matter.

Plaintiff was represented by Irving H.

Biehle, Esq. and Defendant Doms was represented by Larry R.
Keller, Esq.

000245

After heading argument of counsel and receiving pleadings
and memoranda Of counsel on the issue as to whether or not it
was appropriate for the Court to have awarded all of the
attorney's fees incurred by counsel from the on set of the
case to the date of setting aside the Default Judgment, the
Court orders tnat the matter shall be taken under advisement
and considered anew once the case itself is finally disposed
of on the merits.
Furthermore, the Court denies Defendant Doms' Motion to
impound the sum of $4,467.00 paid by Defendant DomsT to
Plaintiffs1 counsel as a condition of setting aside the
Default Judgment on June 1, 1988.

The court finds that

because this sum has already been paid, that it would be
inappropriate for the Court to now impound it as requested by
Defendant Doms* counsel, but once again orders that whether or
not it was appropriate for the Court to award that sum as
attorney's fees for setting aside the Default Judgment is an
issue which will be reserved until the final disposition of
the case on its merits.
DATED this

5" day of

H< ^ ,/.*/

if

, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

HON. PAT B . ~BRI3

Third D i s t r i c t Court

- 2 -

000246

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order, first class postage prepaid, this &jn day
of June, 1988 to Irving H. Biehle, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 50
West Broadway, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake City, UT

jUUn

-

3

-

000247

84101.
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ADDENDUM 17

NO

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

^ierx OT ^urr.rrn s^ounTy

:Y
Depufv Clark

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON, Personal Representative of the Estate
Of D.C. ANDERSON & DAN SCOTT,
and JEAN SCOTT, his wife, and
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,

MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E.
DOMS,

Civil No.

8339

Defendants.
-ooOooCOMES NOW Defendant, Eugene E. Doms, by and through his
attorney, Larry R. Keller, and amends the Counterclaim
previously filed in the above-entitled matter as follows:
COUNTERCLAIM
For cause of action alleged, Defendant Eugene E. Doms
counterclaims against Plaintiffs as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiffs jointly and severally are the

holders of a certain trust deed note executed in connection

000102

with the purchase by the Defendant Doms of certain real
property in Park City, Utah described more specifically in
Paragraph No. 7 of the Plaintiffs1 Complaint.
2.

That the parties entered into the transaction on or

about November 12, 1981 and that in consideration of the trust
deed note which is attached to the Plaintiffs1 Complaint the
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest executed a
certain general warranty deed in favor of the Defendants
warranting title in the grantors thereof with the implied
warranty and covenant against encumbrances on the property.
3.

That the grantors violated the warranty against

encumbrances in the execution and delivery of the warranty
deed in exchange for the trust deed note by virtue of certain
prescriptive easements which prevented the warranty deed from
passing clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms.
4.

Due to the violation of the implied warranty against

encumbrances and a violation of the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated Section 57-1-12

as amplified by Utah Supreme Court

decisions such as Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124
(Utah 1984), the Counterclaimant is entitled to rescission of
the sales transaction and contract and the return of all sums
paid together with interest upon a tender by the Defendants to
the Plaintiffs of title to the property more particularly
described in Paragraph No. 7 of the Plaintiffs1 Complaint.
5.

Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that no

default ever occurred and the Court should rescind the
transaction and contract entered into by the parties, vest
- 2 -
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title in the Plaintiffs as the grantors or successors in
interest to the grantors under that certain warranty deed
executed by them, and grant judgment in favor of the
Counterclaimant and against the Plaintiffs in the amount of
all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs
pursuant to said contract in a specific amount to be proven
upon trial of the matter which should include interest, costs
and attorney's fees of pursuing this rescission action.
6.

Defendant Doms purchased the property which is the

subject of this lawsuit with the intent of developing said
property and earning a profit from such development.
7.

The failure of the Plaintiff to deliver clear title

prevented Defendant Doms from developing the subject property
as planned and he is damaged thereby in an amount to be
determined at trial, together with interest, costs and
attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms prays that
Plaintiffs take nothing by the Complaint filed against him in
the above-entitled matter and that the Court award Judgment
against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, rescinding the
contract and conveyance in the above-entitled matter and
ordering Plaintiffs to repay all sums paid to them under the
contract and conveyance including interest at the contract or
legal rate, costs, and attorney's fees required to pursue this
rescission action.

- 3 -
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FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him
damages for lost profits, interest thereon, costs and
attorney's fees for this inability to develop the property
which was caused by Plaintiffs1 failure to deliver clear
title*
DATED this

day of June, 1988.

aLER,
for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Amended Counterclaim, first class postage
prepaid, this

fj

day of June, 1988 to: E. Russell Vetter,

Biehle, Haslam and Hatch, 50 West Broadway, Fifth Floor, Salt
Lake City, UT

84101.

- 4 -
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NO.

FILED
LARRY R. KELLER #1785
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

wierx _>T summit County

&

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of"D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT,

SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL R. McCOY, and
EUGENE E. DOMS,

Civil No. 8339
Judcre Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
ooOoo
COMES NOW Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel, Larry R. Keller, Esq., and files this Second Amended
Counterclaim amending the previously filed Amended Counterclaim
in the above-entitled matter as follows:
COUNTERCLAIM
For cause of action alleged, Defendant Eugene E. Doms
Counterclaims against Plaintiffs as follows:

1
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

That the Plaintiffs jointly and severally are the

holders of a certain Trust Deed Note executed in connection with
the purchase by Defendant Doms of certain real property in Park
City, Summit County, Utah.
2.

That the parties entered into a transaction for the

transfer of the parcel of real property more specifically
described in Plaintiffs' Complaint on or about November 12, 1981
and that in consideration of the Trust Deed Notef a copy of which
is attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Plaintiffs or their
predecessors in interest, executed a certain Warranty Deed in
favor of the Defendants warranting title in the Grantors thereof
with the implied warranty and covenant against encumbrances on
the property provided by law.
3.

That the Grantors violated the warranty against

encumbrances in the execution and delivery of the Warranty Deed
in exchange for the Trust Deed Note by virtue of certain
prescriptive easements which prevented the Warranty Deed from
passing clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms.
4.

Due to the violation of the implied warranty against

encumbrances and a violation of the provisions of U.C.A. § 57-1-12
as amplified by Utah Supreme Court decisions such as Bergstrom v.
Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984), the Counterclaimant is

2
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entitled to rescission of the sales transaction and contract and
the return of all sums paid, together with interest, upon a
tender by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs of title to the property more particularly described in Paragraph No. 7 of the
Plaintiffs• Complaint.
5.

As a result of the failure to grant clear title to the

property which is the subject of this lawsuit through the Warranty
Deed, Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that no default ever
occurred with regard to payments due under the Trust Deed Note,
and the Court should rescind the transaction and contract entered
into by the parties, vest title in the Plaintiffs as the Grantors
or successors in interest to the Grantors under that certain
Warranty Deed executed by them, and grant iudgment in favor of
the Counterclaimant and against the Plaintiffs in the amount of
all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs pursuant
to said contract in a specific amount to be proven upon trial of
the matter which should include interest, costs and attorney's
fees pursuing this rescission action.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
6.

Defendant Doms realleges and incorporates by reference

all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 5 above as
though set out in full herein,
7.

Defendant Eugene E. Doms purchased the property which is

3
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the subject of this lawsuit with the intent of developing said
property and earning a profit from such development.
8.

The failure to the Plaintiffs to deliver clear title

prevented Defendant Doms from developing the subject property as
planned, and he is damaged thereby in an amount to be determined
at trial, together with interest, costs and attorney's fees.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
9.

Defendant Doms realleges and incorporates by reference

all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 above as
though set out in full herein.
10.

Defendnat Eugene E. Doms discovered on June 23, 1988,

through his attorney, that a fraud was perpetrated upon him by
the Plaintiffs in this matter, in that Plaintiffs transferred
title to Defendant Doms through a "Special Warranty Deed" in
violation of the express contract and agreement that title should
be transferred by virtue of a warranty deed without the denomination "Special" in the deed.
11.

Plaintiffs therefore breached their contract with

Defendant Doms at the time they typed in the word "Special" in
the form Warranty Deed in violation of the Earnest Money Agreement
which represented the contract between the parties in the aboveentitled matter.
12.

As a result of said breach of contract, Defendant Doms

4

00G240

is entitled to a complete rescission of the contract, or in the
alternative, payment of all sums which are damages as a result of
Plaintiffs1 breach of contract, which include all sums paid by
Defendant Doms on said contract to Plaintiffs, plus interest,
costs and attorney's fees relating thereto.
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimant prays that Plaintiffs take
nothing by the Complaint filed against him the above-entitled
matter, and that the Court award him judgment against Plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, rescinding the contract and conveyance in
the above-entitled matter, and ordering Plaintiffs to repay all
sums paid to them under the contract and conveyance, including
interest at the contract or legal rate, costs and attorney's fees
required to pursue this recission action,
FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him damages
for lost profits, interest thereon, costs and attorney's fees for
his inability to develop the property which was caused by
Plaintiffs' failure to deliver clear title.
FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him all damages caused as a result of Plaintiffs' fraud and breach of
contract in not supplying Defendant Doms with a general warranty
deed as required by the original contract between the parties.
DATED this

c?<l day of June, 1988^.

KELLER,
Atnorr^t for Defendant Doms

000241

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true, correct copy of the
foregoing Second Amended Counterclaim, first class postage prepaid, this 2^fh

day of June, 1988, to:

Irving H. Biele, Esq.
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, OT 84101
Attorney for Ellen Anderson as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of D.C. Anderson and
Dan S c o t t

6

000242

ADDENDUM 19

W1IEN RECORDED, MAIL TU:
C r . n t - ; DOMCOY PTTERP1MSPS

Rj„ M(,lt

Atl

THC.

c/e Larry R.

2%2^9

toller

Vp^>o^--"*N*^*-*^-

2S7E. 200 S . , Suite 340. toe 10
Salt Uk« C^ty, V rt h 64111

QgfcUG3 0 AH 10*- OU
ALAM S,,RIGSS
SUMMIT C0UH1Y RECOROER^

QMT.CUIXMH0

^ . . ^

SttftIT COUNT!, A Body Corporate and Politic* organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at Coalville, County
of Sumit.State of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to
P0HC0Y
ENTERPRISES, INC.
t Grantee
^axt i^ane City, Utah
for good and
of
valuable consideration, the interest of Summit County as acquired under that
certain tax sale in Book 1982 paee 216
j and subsequent Auditors etamp
recorded as entry I 273536
in Book 436 peso 779
in and to the
following described trsct of' land in Summit County, State of Utah:
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28. 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to
the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of
the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lot* J7 and 19, M * c k 59, Park Cily Survry,
according to the aaended plat thereof, aa filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion
located within the railroad rights of way as described in those certain
documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No.
13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373.
records of Summit County, Utah*
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according
to the Amended Plat thereof, aa filed and of record in the office of
the Suamit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion located
within the railroad rights of way aa described in thoae certain
documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry
No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book K at
Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines
over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the following
described lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Psrk City Survey
according to the amended plat thereof aa filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder.

The officer who algns this deed hereby certifies that this Instrument and
the tranafer represented hereby was duly authorised under a resolution duly
adopted by the Board of County Commleeionere of the grantor at a lawful meeting
duly held mnd attended by a quorum.
Therefore, in accordance with title 59-2-1363 of the Utah Code and in
witness hereof, the grantor has cauaed its corporate name and aeal to be here
unto affixed by ita duly authorised County Clerk thia ^ V ^ c a r of Hi/y./n I .
A.O.. \<fd .
3
SlffiTT C0UNTT
By Douglas R. Geary

#
;..^J
**?"

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SWtilT

) ***

Summit County Clerk
J
BOO*

OWOIIKLL*,
Oliilt
rVOflUUfl -V> U t * ,

C

4 9 1 ^ 4 0 5

On t h e J*/. day of £T<*0i*tj*'
l ° i l . A . D . , p e r s o n a l l y appeared before me
Peuglaa R. Coery, who being bf me duly sworn, did s a y , that h e , the s s l d Douglas jl<*.««
R. Gea^y. i s the Clerk of Suamit County, snd that the w i t h i n and foregoing Instrument - t * /
was signed i n behalf of s a i d county by a u t h o r i t y of a r e s o l u t i o n of i t s Board of
Commissioners, and Douglas R. Geary duly acknowledged t o me that s a i d county executed _
the same and that t h e s e s l a f f i x e d i s the s e a l of the s a i d county.
v».

My Commission Expires *-tf

«

J

-* .

j

Notary-Public .
\
'***
Residing at: <*/«*.'., ^<rA T / ^ /

*/
FvU^UV*. A
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RED NC7E

AS.

2%300
R e c o r d e d a t R e q u e s t of
at

M.

88 AUG 3 0 AH 10^ 0U

Fee Paid $

by

Dep.Book

^ ^ ALAN Sr'HlGGS
RfJKMlT COyKlY RECORDER

Page

Mail tax notice to: Grantee c/o Larry R. Keller, 257 EFr.jJ9# S.J!
Suite 340, Box 10, Salt Lake City, UT 84T1T
W A R R A N T Y

^ _

D E E D

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, I N C , —
grantor
of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby
CONVEYS and WARRANTS to
EUGENE E. DOMS
grantee
of Mission Viejo, California
for the sum of
TEN and 00/100
DOLLARS,
the following described tract of land in Summit County,
State of Utah:
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record
in the office of the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry
No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records
of Summit County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record
in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of way as
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No.
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of
Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the
following described lots:
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in
the office of the Summit County recorder.
day of J^uf^f

WITNESS the hand of said grantor, thisl*

, 1988.

Signed in the presence of:
Jean M. Henry

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, I N C . , a

Mission Viejo National Bank

C o r p o r a t i o n by/s r\

Mission Viejo, CA 92691
EUSENEVET

DOMST"Secretary/

T r e a s u r e r and A u t h o r i z e d

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )

Officer

) SS,

COUNTY OF

ORANGE

)

The f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t was a c k n o w l e d g e d b e f o r e me t h i s 26th
day o f
August
, 19_88, by
Eugene E. Poms
~"
S e c r e t a r y / T r e a s u r e r and A u t h o r i z e d O f f i c e r of Domcoy E n t e r p r i s e s ,
Inc
o» r i r u i . VLKX.
\
JEAN M. HENRY

J

NOTARY fUBUC-CMIfOBWU \
OAAftGi COUNTY
J
M, Comm Cap A^iJ 27. 199? \

My Commission Expires A-27-92

NOtAHY P U B L I C " j e a T M .

Residing in

too.

hpfcy
ry

Orange County, CA,

49iw«4G6

c£>

ADDENDUM 21

J A M E S A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — NO. 2194
J A M E S A. M C I N T O S H & A S S O C I A T E S P.C.

A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Attorneys for Petitioner Jeanne Scott
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

*£TDFE3

S 7989

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
*JEANNE SCOTT
Plaintiffs and
Petitioner

NONRESIDENT JEANNE SCOTT'S
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
DENYING HER MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF IN
PERSONAM JURISDICTION

*JEANNE SCOTT IS THE ONLY
PLAINTIFF TO THIS APPEAL
vs.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants

Trial Court No. 8339
(Summit County)

litigate the original lawsuit in the Utah courts, as well as also
litigating the third-party action against Summit County Title
Company.
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION
Jeanne

Scott

submits

the

granting

of

her

appeal

will

materially advance the termination of the litigation, because the
case would be finally dismissed on the merits as to her, without
causing an innocent nonresident to expend substantial time and
funds in litigating a case, when the court has no jurisdiction over
her.
DATED this 6th day of February, 1989.
Respectfully Submitted:
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

I JAMES A. MCINTOSH
( /Attorneys for Petitioner Jeanne Scott

-23-
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
March 9, 1989

C T MA* | 5 1959

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South-10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Jeanne Scott, Ellen Anderson,
as personal representative of
the Estate of D.C. Anderson,
Ellen Anderson, personally, and
Dan Scott,
Plaintiffs and Appellant,
v.
Michael R. McCoy and Eugene
E. Doms,
Defendants and Appellees.
Ellen Anderson as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. Anderson, Ellen Anderson
personally, Dan Scott and
Jeanne Scott,
Third-party Plaintiffs
and Appellant,
v.
Summit County Title Company, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party Defendant
and Appellee.

No. 890042

THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having been
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in the
premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be, and the same
is, denied.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

ADDENDUM 23

IRVING H. EIELE, A0317, of
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Petitioners
Ellen Anderson as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of D. C. Anderson and Dan Scott
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
JAMES A. MCINTOSH,

Ji8rnjo,\i2?^

2194

JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
Jeanne Scott, Personally
Ellen Anderson, Personally
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE
OF D. C. ANDERSON
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
DAN SCOTT, Personally
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
ELLEN ANDERSON, Personally,
Involuntary Plaintiff and
Petitioner,

PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY
WRIT UNDER RULE 65B(b)2 AND
65B(b)4 (TANTAMOUNT TO
PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS)
Case No.

JEANNE SCOTT, Personally,
Involuntary Plaintiff and
Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGES OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,
Respondent,

could be dismissed on routine motions relating to the statute of
limitations, waiver and estoppel.

Judicial economy requires that

the courts enforce the laws and rules that create economy of an
action rather than ignoring the same causing citizens and the court
extensive time and expense before these matters can be brought to
the attention of the Utah Supreme Court.

Continuation of the

discovery in this matter under the present pleadings will require
depositions and discovery in several states which is only a small
example

of the costs

involved.

(See Petitioner

Points and

Authorities, Point 2.)
WHEREFORE, your Petitioners and each of them pray that this
Court issue its Writ directed to the Respondent Court and the
Judges thereof, restraining and prohibiting the Court and the
Judges from proceeding further in the trial of the aforesaid action
against these Petitioners without dismissal from this action of
those persons who are now named as Involuntary Plaintiffs or
mandating that they be so dismissed.
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
NYGAAR

COKE & VINCENT

V « * ^ L

*

AttftSrney for Petitioners Ellen
Anderson as Personal Representative
and Dan Scott
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

-UtsW

^

(J • ,.

Sst -F

JAMES A. MCINTOSH
Attorney for Petitioners Jeanne
Scott and Ellen Anderson, Personally
-16-

ADDENDUM 24

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of Utah

}
Vis.
County of Salt Lake }

I, GEOFFREY J. BUTLER, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, do

hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the j53g£i*«& rendered

Anderson v. Judges of fliird D i s t r i c t

No. 890269

in the foregoing entitled action, now of record and on file in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand

and affixed the seal of said Supreme Court this

the

day of

11th

Ap.ri.l

A. D. 19..0©..

Gg.Q^X.cfty...i7.»...au.tler.
Clerk, Supreme Court

Deputy Clerk

"SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

July 31, 1989
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Brant H. Wall
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
FILE

Ellen Anderson, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of D.C. Anderson, Dan Scott,
Ellen Anderson, and Jeanne
Scott,
Petitioners,
v.
Judges of the Third Judicial
District Court of the State
of Utah,
Respondents.

Petition for Extraordinary
Writ Under Rule 65B(b)4
(Tantamount to Prohibition
of Mandamus)

No. 890269

Amended Minute Entry
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied because the
district court has jurisdiction over both petitioners inasmuch as they
were grantors on the deed, and both are proper parties to the
counterclaim for recission under U.R.C.P. # 13 and 19. Further, under
district court ruling, petitioner Scott still has opportunity to move
for dismissal atleast as to one issue, and district court has not yet
ruled on statute of limitations defense of petitioners to counterclaim.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

ADDENDUM 25

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

8339

Plaintiffs,

NC.

FILED

vs.

MAY

MICHAEL R. MCCOY and
EUGENE E. DOMS,

S1990

Core OT Summit County

Defendants.

8Y.
Deputy Cart

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.

This

case

was

tried

Summit County Courthouse in

on

April

Coalville,

004183

17,

18, 19, 1990, at the

Utah.

The

-A

• 44*'

plaintiffs

ANDERSON V. McCOY

were

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

represented by James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele.

defendant Doms

was

party

defendant

heard

the

evidence,

represented

was

by

represented

testimony

of

read

Memorandums

the

Larry

R.

Keller.

by Brant H. Wall.

witnesses,

admitted

filed

The

Third

The Court
documentary

herein,

heard

oral

argument, and took the matter under advisement.
The Court now being fully advised, makes its ruling.
The Court finds as follows:
1.

Defendant

Doms

met

with

Mike

Sloan,

a real estate

agent, in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and

purchase

of

the Rossie Hills property.
2.
seller

Defendant
of

the

Doms

also

property,

met

with

Dewey

Anderson,

the

once before Doms and McCoy purchased

the property.
3.

Both

Sloan

and Anderson represented that the property

was a prime piece of development property and
best

use

would

be

as

its

highest

and

an integrated development with the two

adjoining parcels referred

to

as

block

62

and

the

Slipper

Parcels.
4.

The plaintiffs

conveyed

the

property

to

defendants

Doms and McCoy on March 10, 1982.
5.

Defendants Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in

Slipper parcel in October of 1982.

the

ANDERSON V. McCOY

6.

PAGE THREE
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The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and

further

the

McCoy

to

integrated development of the three parcels and to

equalize their position

with

the

developers

1982

Doms

engaged

of

the

Slipper

parcel and block 62.
7.

In October

attorney,

for

of

the

of

block

Kinghom,

an

specific purpose of closing the purchase of

the Slipper parcel and
owners

Mr.

continuing

62

for

the

the

negotiations

with

the

purpose of developing the three

parcels as an integrated development.
8.

Prior

property, Doms
development
architect:
9.

of

to
was

Doms' purchase
shown

the

a

three

of

the

preliminary

Anderson parcel of
site

for

the

parcels of property prepared by the

Mr. Kohler

Doms

knew

or

should

have

known

purchased the Anderson parcel and the Slipper
integrated

plan

development

at

the

parcel

time
that

he
the

of the three parcels had failed because

of the problems with the Anderson parcel and

the

inability

of

the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel.
10.
the

Doms walked the Anderson property

fall

of

1981

with

Mr.

Sloan

in

and knew that there were roads and sheds on

the property.
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11.

Doms

for the

first

November

7,

PAGE FOUR

had

actual

time

notice

sometime
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of the easement encroachment

between

October

22,

1981

and

1981 and had further notice during 1982 and up and

through 1984.
12.

Doms

did

not

give

notice

of

his intent to rescind

until January of 1985.
Doms7

13.

purchase of the Slipper parcel, the negotiations

to develop the three parcels as an integrated
subsequent
with

the

the

negotiations about credits and defining the problems
Anderson

personal

development,

parcel,

knowledge

affirm

the

fact

that

Doms

had

of the road and encroachments no later than

October of 1982.
The

issue presented to the Court for decision is whether or

not laches should apply in this matter.
The

Court

has

found

that

Doms knew of the loop road and

the encroachments as early as the fall
aware

of

the

encroachments

of .1981

and

Therefore, Doms was bound to take

action

time.

that

It

purchase the Anderson parcel and
parcel

without

viewing

made

and road prior to the purchase of

the Slipper parcel.
after

was

the

remedial

is unbelievable that Doms would
an

interest

property

and

in

the

determining

Anderson couldn't conclude the integration of the three

00413J.
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why

parcels
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development.

The Court believes that Doms was aware of the

problems with the
parcel
the

and

loop

credits

that

would

be

allocated

to

each

the problems that may be encountered as a result of
road

nevertheless,
in hopes
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of

and
Doms

encroachments

on

the

Anderson

parcel,

purchased an interest in the Slipper parcel

integrating

the

three

parcels

and

making

his

necessary

for

investment more profitable*
The Court is of the opinion that it was
Doms

to

obtain

a

legal

opinion

that

not

the

loop

prescriptive easement or the shed and fences had a
for

being

tender

to

on

the

Anderson

rescind.

encumbrances,

he

Once

should

road was a
legal

basis

property before he could make his
Doms

knew

of

the

road

and

the

have taken action within a reasonable

time to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind or make

his

claim for damages.
Doms contends that Eaeter v. West and North Properties,
P.2d

361

(Ore. App. 1988), is the applicable law to be applied

to the facts in this case.
among

others

Eaeter stands for

the

proposition,

that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little

use and brush and trees had to be moved to drive on it
so

open

758

or

was

not

notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with

knowledge of its existence.
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This

case

PAGE SIX

is
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readily distinguishable on the facts because

there is no question that the road in this case
and

was

being

used.

The

aerial

has

been

used

photograph of the Anderson

parcel clearly defines the loop road so that there could

be

no

question that the road has been and is still in use.
The Eaeter case is also cited for the rule that
seeking

to

rescind

the

contract

must

do

the

so promptly after

obtaining knowledge of the facts constituting

the

rescission.

required

However,

the

buyer

is

not

immediately to rescind so long as he acts

person

within

grounds

a

to

for
act

reasonable

time.
The Court does not
acted

agree

with

Doms'

contention

that

he

within a reasonable time after he obtained knowledge that

that Loop Road and the

encroachments

were

upon

the

Anderson

property.
Doms knew of the Loop Road and
1981

encroachments

early

as

and no later than October of 1982, and yet he did not take

any action to rescind until January of 1985,
way

as

of

a

settlement

offer

in

lieu

and

that

was

by

of making the $194,000

payment due on January 25, 1985.
It

was

that Doms

not until plaintiffs' action to foreclose was filed
filed

his

Amended

Counterclaim

seeking to rescind the warranty deed.

004133

in

June

of

1988
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PAGE SEVEN

The Court concludes that Doms
amount

has
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waited

an

unreasonable

of time to seek rescission, therefore, rescission is not

the appropriate remedy in this case.
The

Court

refers

the

parties

to plaintiffs' trial brief

that supports the Court's conclusion that rescission is not

the

appropriate remedy in this case.
Dated this

£-£> day of April, 1990.

oJ-^. A

C^JJLC/^

ROKICH
CT COURT JUDGE
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I
of the

hereby

certify

t h a t I mailed a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy

f o r e g o i n g . Jlemorandum

Decision,

to

the

following,

this
gfc day of * p ! S , ' 1990jfe YYklbU- RdtAta, Q - o ^ c /&&<^'s
a
Sa& £aJfo QJksJk 1b z
Irving H. Biele
Attorney for Plaintiffs
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
James A. Mcintosh
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
1399 South 700 East, Suite 14
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Brant H. Wall
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Larry R. Keller
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq.
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Franklin P. Anderson
Deputy Summit County Attorney
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
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ADDENDUM 26

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT -

STATE OF UTAH

FILE NO.
VrtE:

(V PARTIES PRESENT)

ELLEN ANDERSON, as pers. rep, of ESTATE of:
D.C.ANDERSON, ET"AL, DAN & JEANNE SCOTT
V

8339

COUNSEL:
t ^ COUNSEL PRESENT)
IRVING H. BIELE, 50 W BROADWAY.4TH FL,SLC 84
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, 1399 S 700 E**fcLC 84105

MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. DOMS

LARRY R. KELLER.257 E 200 S-10,#340, 3LC 841

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE CO.

BRANT H. WALL, 9 EX PL, #800, SLC 84111

JOYE D . OVARD
CLERK

HON.

J, DENNIS FREDERICK

DATE.

JUNE 25, 1989

JUOGE
REPORTER
BAILIFF

After RKQUEST FOR RULING was received and respective MEMORANDA reviewed, also OBJECTIONS
thereto, Court rules as follows:
1.

Involuntary Plaintiffs Anderson & Scott's MOTION FOR SANCTIONS RE: DOM'S OBJECTIONS TO
REQUESTS is granted to the extent that the discovery sought relates to real property
transactionsCas opposed to personalty).

Defendant Poms is directed to respond to the

discovery request within 30 days of the date of this minute entry ruling.

Movant is

amount,
granted reasonable attorney fees for necessity of bringing motionyto pe determined at
trial,
2.

Counsel for Movants is to prepare order.

Copies mailed i"6" Counsel as shown above 6-22-89.

JO
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 8

Supreme Court, rulemaking power of,
Relief from judgment or order. U.R.C.P. 60.
§ 78-2-4.
Requirements of signature. U.R.C.P. 11.
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside,
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and
U.R.C.P. 65A.
other papers. U.R.C.P. 5.
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P.
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P.
6(d).
65B'a;.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Motions.
—Amendments.
Prayer for relief.
—New trial.
Particularization.
—Setting aside conditional order.
Orders.
—Correction.
Cited.
Motions.
—Amendments.
Prayer for relief.
Although a trial court may deny a motion to
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to
present a written motion and a proposed
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c),
the prayer does not limit the relief which the
court mav grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
—New trial.
Particularization.
Only purpose for requiring particularization
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform
court and other party of theories upon which
new trial is sought; where defendant filed affidavit with motions setting forth theories, and

judgment had been on pleadings, court and
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds
for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d
149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960).
—Setting aside conditional order.
Where court on own initiative lowered from
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by
jury and entered conditional order granting
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduction, court could restore jury findings under
authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed motion to set aside conditional order for new trial
within ten days. National Farmers' Union
Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7,
286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955).
Orders.
—Correction.
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption
that order prepared by counsel correctly reflected judgment of Supreme Court and trial
court, judge could correct order on his own motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196,
299 P.2d 827 (1956).
Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v.
Heirs of Brafifet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507
(1956).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions,
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.: 61A Am. Jur. 2d
Pleading §§ 1 et seq., 238.
C.J.S. — 60 CJ.S. Motions and Orders § 1
et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210,140 et
seq., 211 et seq.
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8
A.L.R.3d 1361.

Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Key Numbers. — Motions *» 1 et seq.;
Pleading «=» 38 l / 2 to 186, 187 et seq.

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain ( D a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-

Rule 8
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graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits: but, when he does so intend
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially the same as Rule 8. F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Amended and supplemental pleadings, U.R.C.P. 15.
Arbitration. § 78-3 la-1 et seq.
Comparative negligence, $ 78-27-38.
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13.
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1
et seq.
Defenses and objections. U.R.C.P. 12.
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim,
§§ 21-1-5, 78-6-14.
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10.
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and
brevity of statement, U.R.C.P. 84.
Forms of answers. Forms 21, 22.
Hearing of certain defenses before trial.
U.R.C.P. 12(d).
Interpleader, U.R.C.P. 22.

Motions, forms for. Forms 20, 23. 24.
Numbered paragraphs. U.R.C.P. 10(b).
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2.
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.P. 7(a).
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A9-203.
Special forms of pleadings and writs abolished. U.R.C.P. 65B(a).
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq.
Statute of frauds, investment securities.
§ 70A-8-319.
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201.
Statute of frauds. Uniform Commercial
Code, personal property not otherwise covered,
§ 70A-1-206.
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14.
Time for answer, U.R.C.P. 12(a).
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affirmative defenses.
—Accord and satisfaction.
Pleading.
Time limitation.
—Avoidance.
—Consent.
—Election of remedies.
—Estoppel.

Failure to plead.
—Failure of consideration.
Failure to plead.
Pleading.
—Failure to plead.
Affidavit opposing summary judgment.
Denial.
Notice and opportunity.
Waiver of defense.

Rule 13
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Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule
13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or
may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may
claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the
pleading of the opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may,
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall
order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may
be rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of
the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross
demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one
had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set
up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each
other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or
death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision ij) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an assignor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee.
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where any counterclaim or
cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to
grant the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire
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plaint was filed and two weeks before the
scheduled trial date, where reasons for the untimely motion were inadequate and where the
parties failed to demonstrate that the court's
denial of the motions resulted in prejudice.
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Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Cited in Sen- v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc.,
743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
§ 188 et seq.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84.
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution

or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20
A.L.R.4th 338.
Key Numbers. — Parties «=» 49 to 56.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 15, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amendments.
—After pretrial order.
—Alternative to dismissal.
Payment of attorney fees.
Prolix complaint.
—Amendment of response.
—Answer.
To include counterclaim.

—Complaint.
To defeat motion for summary judgment.
To include damages.
—Considerations.
Prejudice.
—Court's discretion.
Abused.
Not abused.
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend.

Rule 17
|
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 62A Am. Jur. 2d Pretrial
Conference and Procedure § 1 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial § 17(2).
A.L.R. — Failure of party or his attorney to
appear at pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Propriety of allowing state court civil litigant to call nonexpert witness whose name or
address was not disclosed during pretrial discovery proceedings, 63 A.L.R.4th 712.
Consideration or submission at trial, under
Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of

issues not fixed for trial in pretrial order, 11
A.L.R. Fed. 786.
Validity and effect of local district court
rules providing for use of alternative dispute
resolution procedures as pretrial settlement
mechanisms. 86 A.L.R. Fed. 211.
Imposition of sanctions Under Rule 16(f),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failing to
obey scheduling or pretrial order, 90 A.L.R.
Fed. 157.
Key Numbers. — Trial *= 9(1).

PART IV.
PARTIES.
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may
sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
real party in interest.
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent
person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it
is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian
and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might
be a minor or an incompetent person.
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by
a court must be appointed as follows:
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if
the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the
application of a relative or friend of the minor.
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if
the minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after
the service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so
to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or
of any other party to the action.
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such
minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general
or testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is
none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such
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Rule 18

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations
and Clubs S§ 50. 51; 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign
Corporations § 193 et seq.; 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent Persons §§ 115 to 121; 42 Am. Jur.
2d Infants $$ 155 et seq., 175; 59 Am. Jur. 2d
Parties S§ 31, 38 to 44, 249 to 252, 255; 60 Am.
Jur. 2d Partnership § 324.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations §§ 36, 38: 20
C.J.S. Corporations § 1828 et seq.; 43 C.J.SInfants S§ 108, 110; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons
S§ 133 to 146; 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 17, 18, 133
to 138: 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 206 et seq.
A.L.R. — Power of incompetent spouse's
guardian, committee or next friend to sue for
granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of
marriage, or to make a compromise or settlement in such suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681.
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real
party in interest statute, to action against tortfeasor for damage to insured property where
insured has paid part of loss, 13 A.L.R.3d 140Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real
party in interest statute, to action against tortfeasor for damage to insured property where
loss is entirely covered by insurance, 13
A.L.R.3d 229.
State Consumer Protection Act, right to private action under, 62 A.L.R.3d 169.

Who is minor's next of kin for guardianship
purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813.
Bailor's right of direct action against bailee's
theft insurer for loss of bailed property > 64
A.L.R.3d 1207.
Proper party plaintiff in action for injury to
common areas of condominium development,
69 A.L.R.3d 1148.
Necessary or proper parties to suit or proceeding to establish private boundary line, 73
A.L.R.3d 948.
Necessity of requiring presence in court of
both parties in proceedings relating to custody
or visitation of children, 15 A.L.R.4th 864.
Right of illegitimate child to maintain action
to determine paternity, 19 A.L.R.4th 1082.
Required parties in adoption proceedings, 48
A.L.R.4th 860.
Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th
1234.
Standing to bring action relating to real
property of condominium, 74 A.L.R.4th 165.
Key Numbers. — Associations «=» 20, 26;
Corporations «=» 662; Courts «=» 12; Infants *=»
78, 80: Mental Health «=» 471 to 497; Parties *=>
1, 2. 6, 8, 21: Partnerships <e=» 191.

Rule 18. Joinder of claims and remedies.
la) Joinder of claims. The plaintiff in his complaint OT in a reply setting
forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims
either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party.
There may be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the
requirements of Rules 19, 20, and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder
of cross-claims or third-party claims if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14
respectively are satisfied.
(b) Joinder of remedies; fraudulent conveyances. Whenever a claim is
one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a
conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court shall
grant relief in that action only in accordance with the relative substantive
rights of the parties. In particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and
a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 18, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
misrepresentations by the vehicle's owner in
ANALYSIS
the policy application, and one of the defenJoinder of claims.
dants in the declaratory judgment action coun—Tort, contract and equity.
terclaimed against the insurer and crossAuto accident.
claimed in tort against the other defendants, in
Same transaction.
determining whether to dismiss the defen—Unrelated claims by assignee.
dant's counterclaim and cross-claim or permit
Joinder of remedies.
their joinder, the trial court should have per—Insurer and tort-feasor.
mitted the joinder unless the insurer could
Cited.
show that it would be prejudiced because of
Joinder of claims.
bias by the trier of fact if joinder was allowed;
—Tort, contract and equity.
trial court should not have dismissed defendant's counterclaim and cross-claim on basis
Auto accident.
Where insurer of a vehicle involved in an that joinder was of both tort and contract acauto accident filed a declaratory judgment ac- tions. Dairvland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d
tion seeking to void insurance policy due to 737 (Utah* 1982).
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— Same transaction.
All issues, whether in contract tort law or
l l r r l , 8
A ^ T n ^tWee"
two parties, may be pleaded and proved m a
single action. Smoot v Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168,
369 P.2d 933 (1962)
-Unrelated claims by assignee.
Where seven different claimants assigned
twelve different causes of action to plaintiff for
purpose of collecting on them from a single defendant, and each cause of action arose from
facts unrelated to any of the other causes of
action so assigned, the single collector-plaintiff
was not permitted to join all of the claims
against defendant m one action despite the
provisions of the rule, since the assignors could
not have joined together and asserted their
various claims in one action against defendant
(Rule 20(a)), and an assignee cannot possess
anv greater rights than those possessed by his
assignor. Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404
P.2d 964 (1965).
COLLATERAL
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions
§§ 100 to 126.
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Joinder of remedies.
_ , „ , „ , and tort-feasor.
Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insur:! J r J ^
ance company as a party defendant m a personal injury action, based on insurance policy
providing that the insurance company "has
a reed t0
*
P a v a c i a i m o n i v afteT another claim
h a s heen
prosecuted to a conclusion," did not
come within the joinder provision of either
Subdivision (b) or Rule 20 Young v. Barney,
20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967).
Because there is no reason to believe the new
rules were intended to change pnor practice of
not permitting disclosure to a jury of insurance
coverage in a personal injury suit, joinder of
tort-feasor with plaintiffs uninsured motorist
Chnstensen v Peterson,
i n s u r e r ^ impropeT.
2 5 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971).
Cited in Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,
351 P.2d 959 (1960).
REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 61 to 101.
Key Numbers. — Action «=» 39 to 60.

Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to sendee of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction oveT the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or,
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be
dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties: second, the extent
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons
why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of
Rule 23.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion
made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
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purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such
person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit If a party fails to admit the genuineness
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
admit.
id) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

137

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 54

PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants: and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves..
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT -

STATE OF UTAH
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PILE NO.
I"1 L E :

I • PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL:

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal rep, of Estate:

I-/ COUNSEL PRESENT)

IRVING H. BIELE
333 N 300 W, SLC 84103

of D.C.ANDERSON, ET AL
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, .SUITE 14, INTRADE BLDG,
1399 S 700 E, SLC 84105
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. DOMS

LARRY R. KELLER, 257 TOWERS, SUITE 340,
257 E 200 S #10, SLC 84111

ANDERSON & SC0TT(3rd Party Plaintiffs)
:
v SUMMIT CO. TITUi CO. (3rd Party Defendant!

"BRlNT H. WALL, 9 EX PL,#800, SLC 84111

JOYE D. OVARD
CLERK

HON.

J. DENNIS FREDERICK

REPORTER

DATE

AUG. 10, 1999

JUDGE

BAILIFF"

After REQUEST FOR RULING ON MOTIONS PERTAINING TO JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK'S JUNE 22, 1989
MINUTE ENTRY RULING, REQUEST FOR HEARING OR TELEPHONE CONFERENCE and OBJECTIONS thereto having
been filed and Court's review of MEMORANDA, Court rules as follows:
1.

Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY REQUESr
is denied.

2.

Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR HEARING ON COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES is denied. Hearing
as to reasonableness of fees awarded is reserved for trial.

3.

Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY RULING OF JUNE 22, 198'
and REQUEST FOR HEARING OR TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is denied.

)/

4.

Counsel for Anderson and Scott is awarded reasonable Attorney Fees on the instant matte:
to be determined at trial.

5.

Counsel for Anderson and Scott is to prepare Order.

Copies mailed to Counsel as shown above.
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BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT,

]>
]1
)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

Plaintiffs,

vs.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and
EUGENE E. DOMS,

Civil No. 8339

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

]

)
: ss.
)

E. RUSSELL VETTER, after being first duly sworn and upon oath,
deposes and says as follows:
1. He is a member of the Utah State Bar and in good standing.
2.

He is employed with the law firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch and

in such capacity has represented the above-named plaintiffs.
3. He has undertaken effort in behalf of the plaintiffs in the
prosecution of this matter as follows:
DATE
03/13/84

11/08/84

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

Discussion with Jerry Kinghorn attorney for parties
who are purchasing the Rossi Hill contract from the
Dewey Anderson Estate. (ESS) 1.00

$ 85.00

Preparation of memo to co-counsel. (ESS) .25

$ 21.25

000029

11/26/84

Discussion with Ellen Anderson on payment on Rossi
Hill contracts. (ESS) .50

$ 42.50

Conference with Jerry Kinghorn related to Rossi Hill
contracts. (ESS) .50

$ 42.50

Conference with Jerry Kinghorn concerning the
January 25 payment owing the estate from Ooms McCoy.
Review of documentation relative to easement problem.
(ESS) 2.00

$170.00

01/29/85

Review publishing of service by publication. (IHB) .75

$ 86.25

02/14/85

Office conference, review f i l e . (JPM) .50

$ 42.50

02/15/85

Going over Rossi H i l l Doms/McCoy foreclosure with
co-counsel . Conference with creditor of estate.
(ESS) .50

$ 42.50

Review of f i l e , l e t t e r to opposing counsel regarding
encroachment dispute, assessing over-due amounts
on contract, phone call to Valley Bank Trust Dept
regarding over-due amounts. (JPM) 3.50

$297.50

Calls to opposing counsel and Valley Bank Trust
Dept. regarding Rossi H i l l s contract. (JPM) .50

$ 42.50

Conference with Dan Scott concerning the Rossi
Hill property. (ESS) .25

$ 21.25

Conference with Jerry Kinghorn related to the
Doms/McCoy transaction. (ESS) .25

$ 21.25

Meeting with Jerry Kinghorn on the Rossi Hill
property which the estate has a 1/2 i n t e r e s t .
Review of Doms and McCoy's position of default by
the estate and Dan Scott concerning transfer of
property without encumbrances. (ESS) 1.00

$ 85.00

Meeting with opposing counsel, review of plat
maps, drafting memorandum to f i l e (JPM) 2.50

$212.50

Call to opposing counsel, revisions to memo.
(JPM) .50

$ 42.50

Discussion with Mike Sloan concerning the Rossi
H i l l s contract (ESS) .25

$ 21.25

Review of f i l e , revisions to Complaint. (JPM) .50

$ 42.50

12/05/84
01/17/85

02/15/85

02/20/85
02/28/85
03/12/85
03/18/85

03/18/85
03/19/85
03/25/85
04/09/85

000030

04/10/85

05/14/85
05/24/85

Revisions to Complaint, phone calls regarding
service of process, preparation of discovery
requests. (JPM) 2.00

$170.00

Phone conference with t i t l e company related to
obtaining address for Doms and McCoy (ESS) .25

S 21.25

Review and direction on setting up the Complaint
for foreclosure. (IHB) .50

$ 42.50

05/24/85

Drafting Complaint, office conference. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

05/28/85

Review of and modifications to Complaint for
foreclosure. (IHB) 1.00
Conference with co-counsel, revisions to Complaint.
(JPM) 1.00

$115.00
$ 85.00

Meeting with Mike Sloan to go over the Rossi H i l l
lawsuit, in p a r t i c u l a r , the facts surrounding the
sale of the property to Doms and McCoy. (ESS) .50

$ 42.50

06/05/85

Review of Complaint and approval. (IHB) .50

$ 57.50

05/21/85

Search for documents related to deposition on

05/29/85
06/03/85

06/24/85. (CM) .25

$ 10.00

Arranging for service of process, l e t t e r to Los
Angeles county s h e r i f f , phone call to same,
tracing address. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

06/28/85

Phone call to Dan Scott. (JPM) .25

$ 21.25

09/16/85

Phone call to opposing counsel. (JPM) .25

$ 21.25

10/25/85

Conference with opposing counsel, l e t t e r to same.
(JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

Phone call to opposing counsel, preparation of
default papers. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

Preparation of default papers, phone call to
Jerry Kinghorn. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

Phone calls to Dan Scott, Summit County Clerk
and opposing counsel. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

01/02/86

Conference with opposing counsel. (JPM) .25

$ 21.25

04/05/86

Review of file and preparation to file default
judgment against Doms and to proceed against
Michael McCoy. (ESS) 1.00

$ 85.00

06/25/85

10/31/85

11/19/85

12/03/85

•3-
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12/23/86
04/26/87

Preparation of l e t t e r to c l i e n t .
(ERV) ,40

Review f i l e .
$ 28.00

Review of f i l e related to status of case. Further
review of case and discussions with court clerk
related to status of case. (ERV) .50

$ 35,00

Attorney 1 s conference related to strategy in
case. Discussions with Summit County Clerk
related to pleadings in f i l e . Preparation of
l e t t e r to c l i e n t . (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

Discussions with James Sandal! related to proceedings in case. (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

Discussions with Summit County Clerk on tracking
down documents in case. (ERV) .50

$ 35.00

Discussions with Summit County Clerk regarding
location of documents. (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

07/10/87

Preparation for hearing to default Doms. (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

07/20/87

Appearance at Coalville Court for hearing on
motion for default judgment. Discussions with
counsel for defendants regarding resolution of
disputes. (ERV) 2.00

$140.00

07/21/87

Preparation of s t i p u l a t i o n . (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

08/21/87

Preparation of default c e r t i f i c a t e on defendant
Doms. (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

04/28/87

05/06/87
06/18/87
07/02/87

12/01/87

Preparation of Default Judgment and Affidavit
in Support of Attorneys 1 Fees. (ERV) 2.00

$140.00

TOTAL

$3,004.25

Costs: Filing Fees
Service Fees

$
$

TOTAL COSTS
4.

50,.00
33, .00
$ 83.00

In his opinion, considering the amount for which judgment was

prayed, the time and effort involved in the matter and the time that will
be required to enforce the judgment, that the sum of $3,004.25 is a reason-
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able attorney's fee to be allowed plaintiff in this action, plus $83.00
as costs.
DATED this

/ 4 day of January, 1988.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
<

/LJtfrh

E. RUSSELL VETTER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/ V ^ a y of January, 1988.

lMl.lL A?J.Mi,*a.,x
,
s . ~~ * ^ .

NOTARY PUBjLlC <-

Residing at: /jdJCT
My Commission Expires:

-5-
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TRVING H. BIELE, A0317, of,
BIELE. HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys For Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT
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(
;
)
]

Plaintiffs,
vs.

.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS
Civil No. 8339

MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE E. DOMS
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

]

)
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IRVING H. BIELE. after being first duly sworn, and upon oath deposes
and says as follows:
1.

He is a member of the Utah State Bar and in good standing.

2.

He is employed with the law firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch and in

5*uch capacity has represented the above-named plaintiffs.
3.

This supplemental affidavit is filed showing attorney's fees and

costs incurred in this case since December 31, 1987, which fees and costs are as
follows:

ooooco

HATE

DESCRIPTION

01/29/88

Discussions with court clerk of execution of
order defaulting parties. Review of Answer
and Counterclaim.

03/03/88

04/05/88

04/29/88

05/02/88

05/03/88

AMOUNT

37.50

Review of documentation. Call to the court
to determine if a judgment had been filed.
preparation of letter to opposing counsel
indicating that our judgment was of record
prior to his filing of the answer and
counterclaim. Client updates.

125.00

Receipt of Motion to Set Aside Judgment.
Research in relation to the legal issue on
setting aside the judgment. Preparation of
Order of Sale and forwarding to Sheriff.

187.50

Research on the law and preparation of a reply
to Mr. Kinghorn's Motion to Set Aside. Delivery
of the same to Judge Brian, the opposing counsel
and forwarding to the Court Clerk.

462.50

Travel to Coalville to attend hearing on Motion
to Set Aside Judgment. Appearance in court and
return.

275.00

Preparation of Order pursuant to instructions of
the Court, preparation of Supplemental Affidavit
for Attorney's Fees, letter to Sheriff cancelling
the sale.

125.00

Total Fees:

$ 1 . ,212. .50

COSTS ADVANCED:
13, .60
.50
3. .75
150. .00

Photo Copies:
Long Distance Calls:
Certified copy of Judgment and Exhibits:
Sheriff's Fees on Order of Sale (Sale cancelled as
result of order)
Total Costs & Fees:

$ 1 , r 380..35

PLUS:

$3, ,087 .25

Costs and Fees from original Affidavit

Total Costs and Fees expended to date:

Page -2-

000031

$4, ,467 . 6 0

DATED this

(_/

day of May, 1988.

LA.
day of May, 1988.

SITBSCRIBED AND SWORN V±o

^pt*</

XOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing supplemental Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs to
the Defendant, Eugene E. Doms, by delivering the same to counsel for this
Defendant, Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn, at his office at 9 Exchange Place, Suite
#1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of May,
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